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Abstract 
This thesis is a comparative analysis of the process of national identity formation in Eritrea 
and Lebanon, examining the different paths both societies took after the end of the European 
colonial/mandate regimes up until the early 1990s. Grounded in theories relating to the 
concepts of nationalism and national identity, a contrast-orient history approach is taken that 
seeks to unpack the international, regional, and domestic factors that impacted on the 
formation of national identity in both cases. 
  The creation of both countries by their respective colonial and mandate power, Italy 
and France, took place under different circumstances and by different means. Yet in both 
cases different communities, half of which were Muslim and the other half Christian, were 
joined under a single administration. The fact that in both Eritrea and Lebanon one of the 
communities had nationalist aspirations linked to the larger neighbouring political entity of 
co-religionists hampered the transfer of allegiances to the newly created entity and the 
development of a cohesive national identity in the wake of being granted self-determination. 
 This thesis argues that, despite their different treatment by the international 
community with regards to their right to self-determination, a form of syncretistic nationalism 
developed in the territorial entities created by the colonial/mandate powers in both Eritrea and 
Lebanon. While Lebanon was able to obtain independence from the French in 1943, Eritrea 
was not granted independence after the defeat of their colonial master, Italy. Instead, 
federation and finally annexation by Ethiopia resulted in thirty years of liberation struggle. 
Thus this thesis affirms the aptness of the concept of syncretistic nationalism for multi-
communal societies while attesting to the difficulties of its development and realisation 
through the analysis of the process of national identity formation in Eritrea and Lebanon. 
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Introduction 
During a press conference in Beirut in April 1971, one of Eritrea’s earliest nationalists, 
Woldeab Woldemariam, noted that aside from the struggle for self-determination and 
liberation from Ethiopian control, the Eritrean people still had to overcome religious 
and regional divisions and to develop a cohesive national identity in order to achieve 
complete national unity. With regards to this task, he pointed out the similarity between 
Eritrea and the country where the press conference was held, Lebanon:  
 
Some one [sic] has called Eritrea’The Lebanon of East-Africa’. I think the comparison arised 
[sic] not only from the similarity of the mountainous terren [sic] of the two countries, but also 
and especially from the similarity of the religious, social, cultural, traditional and even radical 
formation of their respective populations. In fact, as in the case of the Lebanese Communities, 
the Eritrean population is divided into equal number of Christians and Moslems and each 
Community enjoys its own culture, traditions and social system. As the Lebanese Communities 
did in the past, the Eritrean communities speak two different languages. [...] No one better than 
our Lebanese brothers can fully understand the immense difficulties which any one [sic] who 
takes upon himself the task of creating a nation out of such diversity of races, languages, 
traditions, social systems and cultures can face.
1
 
 
Eritrea and Lebanon indeed displaced remarkable similarities in the evolution of their 
national identity formation. However, while Lebanon was able to obtain independence 
from the French in 1943 as European control over former overseas territories ceased, 
Eritrea had to wait another 50 years. In fact Eritrea became the only case in which 
independence was not granted after the defeat of their colonial master, Italy, in the 
Second World War. Instead Eritrea was put under British Military Administration for 
ten years before being federated with, and finally annexed by Ethiopia in 1962. It was 
only after thirty years of liberation struggle, commonly referred to as ‘Africa’s Longest 
War’2, that Eritrea officially achieved national independence after a referendum in 
1993. Despite this decisive difference between Lebanon and Eritrea, both countries 
                                                          
1
 RDC, Speech 237/05453, ‘Statement made by Mr. Woldeab Woldemariam in his Press Conference in 
Beirut’ 15.04.1971, p. 3. 
2
 See for example David Pool, Eritrea – Africa’s Longest War (London: Anti-Slavery Society, 1979). 
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went through the process of developing a cohesive national identity referring to the 
territorial entity created by the European colonial powers, within which independence 
was to be achieved and/or maintained. Woldemariam’s statement encapsulates the main 
problem that both countries faced: the existence of opposed nationalist aspirations, 
largely linked to the existing Christian/Muslim dichotomy. As he emphasized in a 1983 
interview by stating ‘I am not a Christian, not a highlander; I am an Eritrean!’3, it was 
the elevation of allegiance to the territorial entity above other forms of identification 
such as religious or regional affiliation that was key to achieving an overarching and 
inclusive national identity. 
This thesis looks at the process of developing an overarching and inclusive 
national identity in Eritrea and Lebanon. It examines the different circumstances after 
the end of European colonialism and how the different treatment by the international 
community affected the process of national identity formation. It then analyses the 
changing internal and external circumstances in both countries and the extent to which 
they impacted the development of national identity, focusing on the role of discourse 
and political parties, the role of civil war and violence, and the role of education.  
This thesis is a comparative study of national identity formation in Eritrea and 
Lebanon. The cases of Eritrea and Lebanon were chosen for comparison due to their 
similarities with regards to their size, multi-communal make-up, Muslim/Christian 
dichotomy, civil war experience and international geostrategic importance. What makes 
the comparison even more interesting is the stark contrast between the treatments of 
both countries by the international community, particularly with regards to support of 
their right to self-determination and independence.  
In both cases, the process of national identity formation was rooted in a similar 
context, namely that of colonial or mandate experience that not only imposed a new 
                                                          
3
 RDC, Bio/265/06167, ‘Transcripts: WoldeAb and Labor Movement’, Interviews conducted at RICE, 
Rome, April 1983, by Tom Killion and Arefaine Berhane, Part B. 
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territorial shape for identification, but also impacted the socio-economic make-up of the 
population in these territories. At the same time, a sense of national identity 
corresponding to the newly created territorial entities was not nurtured in the state-
building ventures in Eritrea and Lebanon, which left the countries divided between 
communities with different nationalist aspirations. Divisions largely mirrored the 
Muslim/Christian dichotomy, and the nationalist aspirations of one side were linked to 
the larger neighbouring political entity of co-religionists that were raising irredentist 
claims to the territories. In both cases, reconciliation was sought through a system of 
power-sharing. However, in the case of Eritrea the possibility of developing an 
overarching national identity under such system was cut short by Ethiopian annexation 
of the territory, which resulted in the country experiencing protracted colonialism and 
recourse to the colonial period as reference point for national identification and claims 
for self-determination. Therefore, while with the Ethiopian annexation Eritrea became 
subject to another form of colonialism, albeit by a third world country, the term ‘post-
colonial’ in the title of this study refers in both cases to the period after the end of 
European control. 
Aside from the creation by foreign powers and the multi-communal fabric of 
society common to former colonial and mandate states, regional and superpower 
interests contributed to the process of national identity formation in both cases. 
Furthermore, the geostrategic position of both territories made them relevant in the Cold 
War considerations of the rival superpowers, and the history of the formation of 
national identity in both Eritrea and Lebanon is, to a certain extent, linked to Arabism 
and the regional impact of the Arab-Israeli conflicts. 
By the beginning of the 1990s, the process of forming a transcending national 
identity could not be considered a completed process in either case. Yet, despite 
political splits within the liberation movement in Eritrea, a form of national identity 
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evolved that has often been described as ‘unity in diversity’4
 
since it aimed to include all 
of the various communities in the territory. It would, however, still have to prove itself 
as genuine and stable in an independent state. In Lebanon, the attempt to create such 
‘unity in diversity’ resulted in the development of both a nation and a national 
awareness, yet it has often been described as a rather ‘sceptical’5
 
or ‘confusing and 
confused nation’6 since adherence to the state was never able to supersede communal 
allegiances. 
 
Analytical Framework  
The analytical framework for this comparative study is grounded in theories relating to 
the concepts of nationalism and national identity. After a definition of the term ‘multi-
communal states’ as used in the title and throughout the thesis, the most important 
strands relating to the concepts of nationalism and national identity and attempts at 
defining them will be presented in the following. Finally, the concept of syncretistic 
nationalism that is not only considered most apt in the context of multi-communal 
societies from an academic perspective, but also appears closest to describe the attempts 
at fostering a cohesive national identity in both countries, will be introduced. This 
concept will serve as analytic framework throughout this comparative study.  
 
Multi-communal states 
A vast variety of terms can be found in the literature that describe the heterogeneous 
make-up of Eritrea and Lebanon: ‘multi-ethnic states’, ‘multi-national states’, ‘diverse 
societies’ or, referring specifically to the conflict potential of such states/societies, 
                                                          
4
 See e.g. Alemseged Tesfai, ‘Diversity, Identity and Unity in Eritrea: A View from Inside’, paper 
presented at the “Identity and Conflict in Africa” conference, University of Leeds, September 1997. 
5
 Theodor Hanf, E pluribus unum? Lebanese opinions and attitudes on coexistence (Byblos: International 
Centre for Human Sciences, 2007), p. 5. 
6
 Hanna Ziadeh, Sectarianism and Intercommunal Nation-Building in Lebanon, (London: Hurst and 
Company, 2006), p. 10. 
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‘divided societies’. Inspired by economic theory approaches, de la Croix defines the 
term diverse society as ‘one in which there are different types of households; types 
reflect ideology, culture or ethnicity.’7 This certainly mirrors what all the various terms 
being used try to express: that people with different backgrounds - whether social, 
religious, or ethnic - are living together in one society, usually represented by a state 
apparatus and governmental institutions. Hanf opts for the term ‘communities’, defining 
them, ‘[i]n keeping with the most widely accepted usage in the literature’, as ‘all 
“peoples”, “national groups”, cultural groups, ethnic, religious or language groups 
within a state that form “cultural groups for themselves”.’8 The aspect of forming 
groups ‘for themselves’ refers to the important element of differentiation, which means 
that members distinguish themselves from ‘the others’, those labelled as ‘strangers’, and 
‘the different’.9 A state composed of several such communities constitutes a ‘multi-
communal state’. In accordance with Hanf, and since ‘communities’ appears to 
represent the term with the most general and inclusive character, it has been chosen for 
the purpose of this study.  
 
Nations and Nationalism 
While it is undeniable that ideological movements based on nationalism, the nation, and 
national identity have proved to be among the most important and powerful forces in 
modern times, ‘plausible theory about it is conspicuously meagre.’10  This is not because 
of a lack of debate surrounding the concepts: on the contrary, these phenomena have 
been the subject of research by a huge number of political theorists, historians, 
                                                          
7
 David De la Croix, ‘Education Funding and the Sustainability of Diverse Societies’, in: Theodor Hanf 
(ed.), The Political Function of Education in Deeply Divided Societies (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2012), p. 
321. 
8
 Theodor Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 1993), p. 21. 
9
 Peggy Hoyle, ‘The Eritrean National Identity: A Case Study’, North Carolina Journal of International Law 
and Commercial Regulation, 24:2 (1999), p. 392.  
10
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(London/New York: Verso, 2006), p. 3. 
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anthropologists and social scientists alike. The vast amount of literature dealing with the 
subject, and the use of different terminologies to often describe the same things, has 
contributed to the blurring of concepts.  
The roots of the concept of nation can be traced back to the end of the major 
empires in Europe when large multi-communal states disintegrated into smaller units of 
nation-states; these new units then started ‘exporting’ the concept to other parts of the 
world in their attempts to build new empires overseas through colonization. The 
nationalism that developed in colonial states has often been described as an anti-
colonial movement, however, it was based on the concept of nation and national 
sentiments ‘imported’ by the colonial powers and conveyed to the colonized people 
through various means.
11
 
At the centre of the theoretical discussions on nationalism are two opposing 
schools of thought, the primordialist and the modernist, each offering different 
explanations for the roots of nations. An understanding of how nations are formed is 
essential in order to define the term nationalism. For the primordialist school they were 
natural units that people were divided into, and ‘[…] each nation that has not yet 
manifested itself is only awaiting the appropriate leader, or circumstances, to 
reawaken’.12 The modernist school on the other hand stressed that nations are not 
natural units but rather were invented or imagined in a modern context. They came 
about as a result of the growth of industrialization and the socio-economic 
developments this brought with it. As such, the early modernists considered nations as 
something ‘evolutionary’ since they were ‘inevitable consequences of the revolutions 
that constituted modernity.’13 Benedict Anderson specifically points to the role of print 
                                                          
11
 Bill Ashcroft/ Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, Key concepts in post-colonial studies (London, New 
York: Routledge, 1998), p. 154. 
12
 Dominique Jacquin-Berdal, Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Horn of Africa: A Critique of the Ethnic 
Interpretation (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002), pp. 8/9. 
13
 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: A critical survey of recent theories of nations and 
nationalism (London/New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 21. 
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capitalism that not only promoted the development of vernacular languages but also 
allowed the masses access to information. The possibility of sharing with others without 
direct contact advanced what he called ‘imagined communities’. The use of the term 
‘imagined’ is meant to have a positive connotation and was coined by Anderson, as he 
explains, ‘because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of 
their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives 
the image of their communion.’14 This communion makes the members of the political 
community conceive the nation as ‘a deep, horizontal comradeship’ which ultimately 
creates a bond strong enough that people would ‘willingly […] die for such limited 
imaginings.’15 The limitedness of the imagined nation also means that it ‘has finite, if 
elastic boundaries, beyond which lie other nations.’16 This theory constitutes a much 
more positive understanding of the nation than that promoted by Ernest Gellner earlier. 
The term ‘invented’ as used by him already implies a more artificial construction. In 
fact, he propounded the view that modern times require a political and a national unit to 
be congruent, and to this end a nation would be ‘fabricated’ by inventing previously 
non-existing traditions or cultural traits.
17
 
Closely linked to the primordialist and modernist schools are the concepts of 
civic and ethnic nationalism. With the emotional appeal of nationalist sentiments 
moving into the centre of interest of most theorists, the concept of ethnicity was 
introduced in an attempt to ‘reconcile […] modernist understanding of nationalism (as 
political consciousness) with […] primordial conception of nationalism (as a cultural 
sentiment)’.18 Anthony D. Smith argues that non-Western models of nationalism are 
often based on a rather ethnic conception, meaning that the community of birth and 
                                                          
14
 Benedict Anderson (2006), p.6. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 56. 
18
 Dominique Jacquin-Berdal (2002), p. 18. 
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native culture are strongly highlighted.
19
 Yet the concept of ethnicity appears no less 
contentious than those of the nation and nationalism. Jaquin-Berdal noted that in the 
colonial context ethnic identities were modern creations brought about by the colonial 
powers, just as with the concept of nationalism itself.
20
 As such they can hardly serve as 
the prerequisite for a modern nation. Opposing the concept of ethnic nations is that of 
civic nations. This refers back to the voluntaristic approach that had already been 
presented by early thinkers such as Renan, for whom nations were modern creations 
and primordial rights ‘a very great error’.21 The voluntaristic concept suggests that 
nations are based on the individual’s decision, what Renan has described as ‘a daily 
plebiscite’.22 Whatever it is that nations form around, without the constant approval of 
its members it would be impossible for them to survive.  
The aspect of the voluntaristic nature of nationalism is of specific importance 
when looking at post-colonial, multi-communal states. Firstly, basing nationalism and 
national identity on the idea of individuals identifying themselves with the nation 
appears to be a solution on ‘how to facilitate coexistence between groups with different 
origins, different religious convictions and languages and, in consequence, different 
self-perceptions.’23 Secondly, it signifies that a nation can be created where a state 
exists already. A state has to be understood as the institutions holding the monopoly of 
power or, as Gellner formulated it, ‘that institution or set of institutions specifically 
concerned with the enforcement of order’ within a demarcated territory.24 In cases such 
as Eritrea and Lebanon, these institutions and the demarcation of the territory were 
established by the colonial and mandate powers.  
By elaborating on the differences between the concepts of nation and ethnie, 
                                                          
19
 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 11. 
20
 Dominique Jacquin-Berdal (2002), p. 57ff. 
21
 Ernest Renan, ‘What is a Nation?’, in: Bhabha, Homi K. (ed.), Nation and Narration (London: 
Routledge, 1990), p. 13. 
22
 Ibid., p. 19. 
23
 Theodor Hanf (1993), p. 7. 
24
 Ernest Gellner (1983), p. 4. 
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Smith affirms that ethnic identities can exist without being resident in the territorial 
‘homeland’ while the nation has to refer to a territorial unit.25 In fact, the understanding 
of nations being territorial political communities was the main assumption made by 
theorists of nation-building which relied heavily on the Western model of nation-states. 
The overriding allegiance of the citizens to the latter was considered essential ‘because 
it gave form and substance to the ideals of democratic civic participation.’26 According 
to Smith, the Western model has produced something of an anomaly in Africa: ‘a state 
which aims to turn itself into a nation, and a set of old ethnic communities and nations 
aspiring, it is hoped, to become one new nation.’27 Yet societies composed of different 
ethnies can form a nation within a defined and recognized territory. The concept of such 
territorial nationalism is closely linked to the idea of a civic nation and is of special 
relevance for the development of nationalism in the (post-) colonial context. It was the 
colonial powers that ‘for the first time defined a territorial space for the interaction and 
loyalty of the included populations’28; local nationalism that developed during the 
period of colonial rule related to this territorial space and in many colonies emerged 
from the Westernized indigenous intelligentsia. The propagated nation was to be 
imagined within the boundaries and institutions set by colonialism or the mandate 
system. Therefore, Bereketeab asserts, ‘colonial societies cannot be other than civic 
nations because, firstly they constitute aggregation of different ethnic collectives, and 
secondly their common identity is contingent on the territoralisation of their homeland 
and the acceptance of it as the creation of colonialism.’29  
In that sense, nationalism developed in the colonial context basically constitutes 
the opposite of what was considered the standard nation-state in the West, one that was 
                                                          
25
 Anthony D. Smith (1991), p. 40. 
26
 See Anthony D. Smith (1998), p. 20. 
27
Anthony D. Smith, State and Nation in the Third World: The Western State and African Nationalism 
(Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983), p. 124/125. 
28
 Anthony D. Smith (1991), p. 107. 
29
 Redie Bereketeab, ‘Supra-Ethnic Nationalism: The case of Eritrea’, African Sociological Review 6:2 
(2002), p. 148. 
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based on a homogenous entity. As Hobsbawm asserts, ‘[b]oth were typically unificatory 
as well as emancipatory’30; yet the question remains of how to reconcile all the 
communities in the territory thus enabling their identification with the territorial entity 
without being deprived of the communal identity which they are attached to by cultural 
sentiments. Some theorists such as Smith and Comaroff/Stern point out that the 
distinction between the two forms of nation, civic and ethnic, is not always an easy or 
useful marker since nationalism usually reveals elements of both forms.
31
 A nation 
might be ‘invented’ or ‘imagined’ in a modern context but could be based on primordial 
histories, concepts, and traditions and, as such, cannot be considered as simply being 
constructed but it could rather be both at the same time. Accordingly, collective 
identities in a colonial context are defined in response to external forces and should be 
considered an ‘interplay of Western ideals and forms with indigenous structures and 
cultures.’32 In fact, Smith identifies two ways to create civic, territorial nations in a 
colonial setting: the ‘dominant ethnie’ model and the supra-ethnic ‘political culture’ 
model. The first model establishes the national identity of the new state around the 
historic culture of the ‘core ethnic community’33 and, while other minority communities 
may still prosper, the new state integrates the culture of the core community into a 
modern state. Hanf emphasizes that this concept is only possible in states where this 
‘core community’ forms a clear and overwhelming majority or where power is 
controlled by use of violence. Yet, as he rightfully notes: ‘[…] not even massive use of 
violence can guarantee stability: it often generates counter-violence.’34 The second 
model comes into use when the new state does not have an acknowledged core ethnie 
                                                          
30
 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, 2
nd
 edition, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
31
 Anthony D. Smith (1991), p. 12. 
32
 Anthony D. Smith (1983), p. 122. See also John L. Comaroff/Paul C. Stern, ‘New Perspectives on 
Nationalism and War’, in: John L. Comaroff/Paul C. Stern (eds.), Perspectives on Nationalism and War 
(Amsterdam: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1995), p. 5. 
33
 Anthony D. Smith (1991), p. 110. 
34
 Theodor Hanf (1993), p. 27. 
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but consists of a number of either equal or rival ethnies as in multi-communal states 
such as Eritrea and Lebanon. In such cases, the supra-ethnic ‘political culture’ model 
aims to create common civic values as the basis for a new, territorial national identity 
instead of prioritizing any of the communities within the territory.
35
 However, in this 
model struggles may ensue between the various communities and lead to conflict, 
particularly when communal identities are directed against each other and one attempts 
to overemphasize its own identity over the others. Hanf notes that this can be fostered 
by the process of modernization that can affect communities to different degrees or at 
different times which intensifies ‘the sense of economic and symbolic cultural 
deprivation and thus generate[s] conflicts between communities.’36  
He asserts that a promising way to reconcile diverse communities and to regulate 
conflict over domination in multi-communal states is offered by the concept of 
syncretistic nationalism, which ‘regards existing, organic communities as the building 
blocks of a transcending nation, aiming neither for unity nor for diversity but for unity 
in diversity.’37 This concept describes the coexistence of both forms of identities, ethnic 
and civic, with the civic form overarching the ethnic one. Hanf identifies two forms of 
arrangement within this concept, which differ regarding the articulation of the various 
communities. In the first case, communal identities are institutionalized and articulated 
politically ‘though channelled within a federation of communities that constitute a 
transcending, multifarious nation.’38 The second form though aims at the de-
politicization of communal identities and ‘institutionalizes and encourages cultural 
diversity in order to prevent symbolic cultural deprivation, thereby facilitating the 
political unity of the state.’39 While the first form appears to be rather similar to Smith’s 
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supra-ethnic political culture, the second form has to be considered as the potentially 
more successful model since it is exactly the depoliticizing of cultural cleavages that 
appears to reduce inter-communal conflict and facilitate identification with a common 
state.  
The concept of syncretistic nationalism is important in the cases of Eritrea and 
Lebanon since it reflects how, in both countries, attempts were made to regulate the 
coexistence of the various communities in order to develop a transcending national 
identity. Yet in Lebanon the first form was institutionalized from early on through the 
1926 constitution, while in the case of Eritrea the second form developed later, after 
being subjected to a nationalist approach by Ethiopia that aimed to impose the culture 
and identity of one ethnic group (Amhara) on all territories within the boundaries of 
Ethiopia.  
 
National Identity  
Related to the above discussed concepts of nation and nationalism is the collective 
identity related to them - national identity - which Anthony D. Smith has described as 
‘perhaps the most fundamental and inclusive’.40  
Identity in general has to be understood as a ‘relational term’ because it ‘defines 
the relationship between two or more related entities in a manner that asserts a sameness 
or equality.’41 While individual identities refer to certain social characteristics (age, 
class, sex) where the ‘object of identification is [...] a person, and the subject is the other 
people’42, collective identities have to be seen in relation to systems. Both forms of 
identity though, are defined from the outside and can overlap. Since people change 
throughout their lives, so do their identities, whether on a personal, social or national 
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level. Hence, identities can never be considered as static or unchangeable but, according 
to Weber, ‘[i]n the sense of those using the term at a given time, the concept undoubtly 
[sic] means, above all, that it is proper to expect from certain groups a specific 
sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups.’43 In fact, the influence of others is 
essential in determining a person’s affiliation to a given group: ‘the influence of those 
about him [...] who try to make him one of them; together with the influence of those on 
the other side, who do their best to exclude him.’44 This means to be able to identify 
myself with the ‘us’ of the nation, there always needs to be a ‘them’, some others that I 
can identify myself as being different from. At the same time, as Billing pointed out, 
this implies ‘a whole way of thinking about the world’, namely ‘the naturalness of the 
world of nations, divided into separate homelands.’45 
Furthermore, the aspect of continuity also plays a decisive role in the emotional 
attachment to the nation. According to Anthony D. Smith, in addition to the existence of 
a historic territory, common myths and historical memories are just as important to the 
development of a national identity as the legal-political community and the legal-
political equality of its members.
46
 The historical memories and myths are of specific 
relevance since their relation to the historic territory is what creates an emotional 
attachment to the latter. These memories can relate to common suffering or joy
47
 or find 
expression in traditions and symbols generating what Smith calls ‘cultural kinship’.48 
Anderson has also pointed out the importance of shared symbols such as the map, 
singing of national songs, and museums in visualizing the common history.
49
 While 
certain rituals or occasions remind the members of a nation of their link to the other 
members of the nation and emphasize what unites them, the daily ‘flagging’ of the 
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homeland through ‘banal words, jingling in the ears of the citizens, or passing before 
their eyes’ also plays a decisive role as a pervasive reminder.50 
Two aspects appear of great importance with regard to national identity: the 
temporality of social reality
 
and the acceptance of the existence of a number of identities 
that may be layered according to varying hierarchies.
51
 Smith describes the existence of 
various layers of identity as multiple identities. Maalouf claims that a person can 
actually feel as though s/he belongs to more than one nation which, together with all the 
other layers of identity, would make up the individual identity of that person.
52
 Wodak 
also notes the fact that ‘individuals as well as collective groups such as nations are in 
many respects hybrids of identity’ since the ‘members of any Staatsnation are 
enculturated in many heterogeneous and often conflicting regional, supraregional, 
cultural, linguistic, ethnic, religious, sexual, political and otherwise defined ‘we’-
identities.’53 Consequently, the concept of national identity may have different 
meanings for each person experiencing that allegiance. Such different interpretations 
may depend on or be formed by various factors, the existing layers of other identities 
(e.g. tribal, ethnolinguistic, sectarian), but should not make any form of national identity 
awareness less valid than another. In the end, every person is composed of multiple 
identities, often related to the roles played in society (familial, territorial, religious, 
class, gender).
54 
Since most of them are overlapping, none of them alone can serve as 
the basis for a lasting collective identity. However, Smith stresses the connection 
between religious and ethnic identities and how these two forms of identity often 
overlap and strengthen each other and ‘singly or together [...] mobilize and sustain 
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strong communities.’55  
Nevertheless, the feeling of belonging to the group inhabiting a clearly 
demarcated territory, the imagining oneself as part of a community within these 
boundaries, still allows for sub-identities (e.g. religious, ethnic, etc.) to exist. In fact, the 
multidimensional character of the concept ‘has made national identity such a flexible 
and persistent force in modern life and politics, and allowed it to combine effectively 
with other powerful ideologies and movements without losing its character’.56 The fact 
that sub-identities do not prevent an identity on a national level, but can be combined to 
form such an overarching identity, points to the concept of syncretistic nationalism as a 
successful model for multi-communal territories such as Eritrea and Lebanon.   
 
Chapter Structure  
The thesis is structured thematically but will follow a chronological order within the 
chapters. This permits specific features of both cases with regard to the development of 
national identity to be treated comparatively. Both cases are analysed in a parallel 
manner in each chapter, which helps to draw out similarities and/or differences.  
Chapter One focuses on the situation of the territories prior to coming under 
control of European powers and how they were shaped as territorial states by the 
colonial/mandate power. An examination of this period is essential to understand the 
legacies that affected the process of national identity formation after the end of 
European domination. This chapter argues that it was due to the different pre-colonial 
circumstances and external factors that opposing nationalist aspirations developed in the 
territories that were to be joined into the territorial state of Lebanon, while in Eritrea 
nationalist aspirations only started to develop during the colonial period and their 
formulation only became possible under the British Military Administration. Yet, they 
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displayed a similar dichotomy, namely that of religious divisions.  
Chapter Two looks at the developments towards the end of the colonial and 
mandate period. It highlights that events in Eritrea were remarkably similar to pre-
mandate Lebanon in terms of the articulation of opposing nationalist aspirations facing 
the prospect of self-determination and independence. Despite the 50 years of common 
colonial experience, the communities were not able to reconcile and the decision on the 
future of the country was ultimately based on the interests of the international powers 
involved. In Lebanon, on the other hand, the opposing camps were able to reconcile 
long enough to do away with foreign domination. That this reconciliation was 
temporary and did not solve the main issues of contention will be shown in the analysis 
of the events following independence up until the end of the civil war. The examination 
of the period from the end of European domination up until the beginning of the 1990s 
will also serve as the historical context for the following chapters.  
Chapter Three analysis the differing views, ideas, and problems concerning 
national identity and its relation to the territorial entity created by the colonial/mandate 
powers that found expression in the intellectual discourse in both Eritrea and Lebanon. 
While the discourse in both cases initially largely mirrored the existing divide 
concerning the identity of the country, it will be argued here that a more civic approach, 
hinting at the concept of syncretistic nationalism, developed amidst the changing 
environment in Eritrea and Lebanon. Experiencing annexation and disintegration 
through civil conflict, the civic approach appeared to be the only way to maintain 
territorial integrity and claim self-determination. 
Chapter Four looks at political parties in both territories and examines how they 
initially mainly reflected and/or promoted the opposed nationalist aspirations linked to 
the differing interpretations of the identity of the country. However, these aspirations 
were supported by members of the old and new elites mainly to further their own 
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interests. The existence of multi-communal and secular parties in both countries on the 
other hand affirms the possibility for a syncretistic nationalism to be developed and 
implemented; yet it was almost impossible to sustain in a climate of politicized religious 
affiliation. It will be argued that a development towards accommodation took place in 
both countries which was interrupted by the increasingly militarized environment and 
the experience of annexation, violence and (civil) war. 
Chapter Five focuses on the impact of violence and civil war on the development 
of national identity. Both countries went through a prolonged period of conflict. Eritrea 
was fighting for independence over a period of thirty years during which it also twice 
witnessed civil conflict; Lebanon was embroiled in a fifteen-year civil war. This chapter 
shows how the experience of civil conflict revived old cleavages and/or created new 
ones amongst the involved parties. However, it will be argued that a common will to co-
exist amongst the civilian population was actually strengthened through the experience 
of conflict making post-conflict accommodation and the implementation of an 
overarching national identity possible. 
Chapter Six discusses the impact of external actors on the politics of both 
countries and evaluates how this influenced existing forms of identity or identity 
formation. It focuses on the influence of the US and Soviet Union on the one hand, and 
the Arab world and Israel on the other. This chapter concludes that the superpowers and 
Cold War politics had a degree of influence on the consolidation of national identity in 
both countries. In Eritrea, the superpowers consistently disregarded Eritrean aspirations 
for self-determination, causing major negative perceptions of the US and the USSR by 
Eritreans. In Lebanon the active involvement of the US and the interests and presence of 
superpower proxies on Lebanese territory constituted a further divisive aspect in the 
country. The role and influence of the Arab world was largely linked to the politics of 
alliance with the superpowers in both cases.  
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Chapter Seven analyses the role of education commonly considered crucial in 
nurturing social cohesion and a civic national identity. It demonstrates how in both 
cases the means of education were constantly manipulated by the communities and/or 
parties in power and no real overarching concept of national identity was ever 
promoted. Therefore, the impact of education was rather detrimental to the development 
of a cohesive national identity in both cases.  
Drawing upon the experiences of Eritrea and Lebanon of national identity 
formation this thesis shows the difficulties of developing a concept of syncretistic 
nationalism in multi-communal states. What sounds promising as an academic concept 
turns out to be a highly vulnerable notion in the face of a large number of internal and 
external factors and dynamics that often lie beyond the control of the states/societies in 
question. Furthermore, the transfer of loyalty and sense of belonging to an overarching 
civic identity remains problematic not least since emotions and sentiments can hardly be 
controlled by the state. When an adjacent country or region appears to already offer a 
concept of identity that part of the population feels bound to or refers to for the 
definition of its own identity, as was the case for both Eritrea and Lebanon, this exercise 
is rendered even more difficult. 
 
Arguments 
This thesis advances two sets of arguments. The first set relates to nationalism and 
national identity. Here it will be argued that in both Eritrea and Lebanon a development 
towards syncretistic nationalism was the result of the various communities being placed 
under a single administration, making them subject to the same institutions for the first 
time. This led to the emergence of a public culture shared by all communities which, in 
turn, became the basis for a civic rather than an ethnic nationalism. The second set of 
arguments revolves around the differences in the formation of national identity between 
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Eritrea and Lebanon. Here it will be posited that three key factors explain the different 
evolution of syncretistic nationalism: the length of the struggle for independence, the 
nature of the political systems introduced by the colonial powers, the role of the 
communities themselves, and the treatment by regional as well as international actors. 
Lebanon’s consociational democratic system introduced by the French institutionalised 
pre-mandate representation which was based on sectarian affiliations. This was 
subsequently consolidated throughout the years of independence and was often cited as 
a positive example of power-sharing before the country descended into its 15-year long 
civil war in 1975. Although Lebanon’s political system did not hinder the development 
of a civic national identity it never superseded the interests of the various communities 
and more specifically their leaders. In Eritrea, in comparison, traditional forms of 
representation were partly based on democratic principles and adapted with 
modernization. This could have facilitated the development of an inclusive and cohesive 
national identity yet nationalist aspirations of the communities differed decisively by the 
end of the colonial period. With respect to the treatment of both countries on a regional 
and international level, this made a decisive impact on the development of the self-
awareness of communities. Most emerging post-colonial states faced a similar challenge 
of transforming a multi-communal society into a nation and self-determination was 
sought through claims to nationhood rather than ethnic claims. Yet, Eritrea was put 
under the control of another African country, Ethiopia, which had ‘not itself taken even 
the most rudimentary steps toward unified national development.’57 While union had 
been aspired to by one group of Eritrean nationalists, suppressive Ethiopian policies 
soon undermined Eritrean autonomous institutions and culminated in annexation. The 
fact that the right to self-determination was henceforth constantly denied by both 
regional actors and the international community, in addition to the repressive policies of 
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the Ethiopian regime inside Eritrea, served as a unifying factor with the ability to pull 
together all communities into one cohesive nation. In Lebanon, sovereignty was only 
ever questioned externally by Syria; internally, however, varying alliances of the 
different communities contributed to keeping different interpretations of Lebanese 
national identity on the communal level alive and all attempts at conflict resolution were 
largely shaped by the relationship between internal and external (regional and 
international) elites. Hence, this thesis argues that these internal and external factors 
were crucial in the emergence of national identity. 
 
Methodology and Sources  
This thesis is a contrast-oriented comparative history based on empirical research. The 
scientific method of the comparative approach in historical research generally serves to 
compare historical processes across times and places by examining similarities and 
differences. Skocpol and Somers differentiate between three logics in using comparative 
history, namely the macro-causal analysis, the parallel demonstration of history and the 
contrast-oriented approach. While the first two are mainly concerned with proving and 
developing theoretical hypotheses and generalizations, the main importance of the 
contrast-oriented approach is ‘that the historical integrity of each case as a whole is 
carefully respected.’58 In order to preserve this historical integrity, the unique features of 
each case are brought out and their impact on the general social process being 
researched analysed. The main aim is to identify contrasts between the cases being 
compared and ‘such contrasts are developed with the aid of references to broad themes 
or orienting questions or ideal-type concepts.’59 While this kind of comparative 
approach may implicitly confirm or derive theoretical explanations, this is not its main 
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goal. It rather helps sharpen the understanding of different contexts and underlines, 
through emphasizing the contrasts between and among the cases, the uniqueness of 
each.
60
 For this study, the themes of nationalism and national identity have been 
introduced as broad themes for the analysis, and the concept of syncretic nationalism as 
the ideal-type concept of how to facilitate the development of an overarching identity in 
Eritrea and Lebanon, both territorial states with a multi-communal society. The 
orienting questions as presented above relate to these broad themes and the ideal-type 
concept.  
The empirical research underlying this thesis draws upon a broad base of 
primary source material including political memoirs, official documents, pamphlets, and 
archival material collected from repositories in Eritrea, Lebanon, the UK, Germany and 
France. These written primary sources have been supplemented with in-depth 
interviews with people who witnessed the developments in Eritrea as well as 
questionnaires (in both English and Arabic) with a number of Lebanese. These ‘eye-
witness’ accounts have to be considered as supplementing the sources mentioned above 
because of their limited number. Furthermore, the drawbacks of interviews and 
questionnaires should not be forgotten, specifically with regard to qualitative interviews 
and questionnaires that cover events in the rather distant past. In the case of the Eritrean 
informants, the interviews have to be considered as ‘life story interviews’, even though 
the focus was on specific events and aspects that took place mainly during the Eritrean 
struggle for independence.
61
 Such interviews always carry the danger of ‘retrospective 
bias’ since the person interviewed always ‘reconstructs memories through his or her 
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present construct system.’62 While interviews help to uncover the meaning behind the 
facts, they often represent the informant’s subjective interpretation of the meaning of 
events and developments. The same is true for qualitative questionnaires, although they 
allow for a better comparison since the questions are always the same for all informants. 
The interview has to be considered rather open-ended since new questions may arise 
during the interview and conversations take different turns depending on the person 
interviewed and the quality of the relationship with the interviewer. Bearing the 
disadvantages of interviews and questionnaires in mind they are, nonetheless, 
recognized as an important part of oral history and consequently have been chosen to 
supplement written sources for this study. 
 
Literature Review  
The literature dealing with the question of nationalism and national identity in both 
countries is vast. In the case of Lebanon this is due to the fact that the country became a 
paradigmatic model for scholars dealing with questions of consociationalism and 
conflict regulation in multi-communal states. In this regard, Lebanon has also been used 
in comparative studies a number of times.
63
 
Eritrea, however, has largely been studied 
with a focus on its long struggle for independence, and the few existing comparative 
accounts also focus on this aspect of its history.
64
 The following review will highlight 
the main existing strands of literature on nationalism in Eritrea and Lebanon and present 
some of the scholarly works. 
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Eritrea  
For a long time the topic of Eritrean nationalism constituted probably one of the most 
contested issues concerning the Horn of Africa. This relates back to the significant 
divergence of historical interpretations by both Ethiopian and Eritrean nationalists. 
While the official Ethiopian discourse was for a long time backed up by scholarly 
support, the Eritrean nationalist argumentation only found international scholarly 
support in the late 1970s. 
The ‘Ethiopianist’, or ‘Greater Ethiopia’, school propounded the historic unity of 
Ethiopia and put great emphasis on pre-colonial links while denying the development of 
a distinct Eritrean identity during the European colonial period and throughout the 
decades of Eritrean struggle for self-determination. The thesis of ‘Greater Ethiopia’, the 
existence of a historically rooted unity of all the communities within the boundaries of 
Ethiopia, was first proposed by Donald N. Levine. In his 1974 study Greater Ethiopia: 
The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society he presents Eritrea as ‘the portion of Ethiopian 
territory the Italians called Eritrea’ which for a short period in history was disconnected 
from the rest of Ethiopia.
65
 That specifically the inhabitants of the Eritrean plateau never 
ceased identifying themselves with Ethiopia was shown, according to Levine, in their 
‘strong support’ for the proposal of federation of the former Italian colony with Ethiopia 
in 1952.
66
 Later proponents following Levine’s thesis also emphasised the organic unity 
of Ethiopia and its rootedness in history, and mainly blamed external Muslim forces and 
misgovernment by the Ethiopian regime for the emergence of Eritrean armed 
opposition. Christopher Clapham notes the ‘imperial regime’s inability to construct 
linkages with regional political interests’ which in Eritrea led to the forceful abolition of 
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the local government and full incorporation into the Ethiopian empire.
67
 While he grants 
that this policy, and later the violence exerted by the Dergue, exacerbated conflicts, he 
asserts that it was rather ‘the age-old tensions between centre and periphery in the 
Ethiopian state itself, coupled with the availability of military and diplomatic support 
from nearby Moslem states, [that] made armed guerrilla opposition a […] viable 
option’.68 Clapham considered the opposition in Eritrea as part of a political culture of 
factionalism and warfare that had marked the territory over many centuries, and the 
Eritrean liberation movement a separatist or secessionist insurgency trying to create a 
separate state out of one region of an existing state.
69
 Haggai Erlich agrees with the 
thesis of Ethiopian misgovernment, which resulted in a failed ‘reunification’. He 
concedes that the western and northern areas of Eritrea had never actually been under 
Ethiopian control and, thus, ‘cannot historically be considered part of Ethiopia’;70 yet 
the core regions of today’s Eritrea were ‘undoubtedly and integral – indeed the cradle – 
of Ethiopian civilization, statehood and history.’71 While he acknowledges that the 
existence of the country as a separate entity during the colonial period contributed to the 
strengthening of an Eritrean awareness, he characterizes the early struggle for 
independence as ‘little more than an Islamic-inspired local separatism’, fuelled by 
Ethiopian misgovernment.
72
 Only after continuous forceful suppression of any Eritrean-
ness and excessive use of force by the Ethiopians, did a full-fledged nationalist 
movement develop in the 1960s with the increasing alienation of the Christian 
community in Eritrea: ‘Once Eritrean Christians joined the Muslim separatists, Eritrean 
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nationalism was on its way.’73 Nonetheless, Erlich asserts that this nationalism was 
based mainly on the negation of Ethiopia-ness while remaining historically rootless and 
shallow, and considered it merely ‘a by-product of recent history’.74 Tekeste Negash 
focused his attention on the colonial and federal periods in his two studies that also 
aimed to deconstruct arguments for a distinct Eritrean national identity. In his doctoral 
dissertation on the colonial period he comes to the conclusion that the period of Italian 
administration did not have a meaningful impact on national consciousness in Eritrea, 
and certainly did not provide the foundation for the emergence of an Eritrean 
nationalism due to the ‘virtual absence of national consciousness’ by the end of Italian 
control.
75
 Yet he concedes that ‘Italian colonialism left in its wake some demographic, 
economic and political impact on Eritrea’.76 In his later book which focuses on the 
federation period he asserts that it was that impact that contributed greatly ‘to the rather 
widely spread belief in what one might call separate and distinct Eritrean identity or 
consciousness’.77 Yet the ‘separatist’ movements that adopted that belief are largely 
depicted as instigated and controlled by European powers. At the same time, Negash 
downplays Ethiopian influence on the pro-Ethiopian Unionist Party whose support by 
Eritreans is described as quite natural due to historic links and the desire of Eritreans to 
re-join Ethiopia after the period of colonial disruption. He views the dissolution of the 
federation as an expression of this desire and brought about ‘largely by Eritrean forces 
themselves’.78 The later emerging ELF is depicted as a strictly Pan-Arab and Pan-
Muslim movement that ‘did not make any distinction between the Eritrean Christians 
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and the Ethiopian state’,79 which would ultimately result in the conflict with the EPLF.  
The second school that emerged with regard to the question of Eritrean 
nationalism and national identity directly questioned the ‘Greater Ethiopia’ thesis of 
Eritrean-Ethiopian organic unity. While some accounts tried to counter this thesis by 
projecting a distinctive identity of Eritrea into the distant past, its emergence is mainly 
located in the colonial period which is described as constituting a decisive rupture in an 
area characterized by centuries of fluctuating domination by various empires. This 
rupture not only demarcated Eritrea as a distinct unit but also constituted a period of 
shared experience which unified the various communities within the territory. 
Incorporation of Eritrea into Ethiopia is viewed as an act of colonial domination rather 
than reunification of a previously organic unit and as an act negating the Eritreans’ right 
to self-determination. This Eritrean nationalist school found international scholarly 
support largely from authors that had first-hand experience of the liberation movements 
(mainly the EPLF), and who, in their accounts, reiterate the Eritrean liberation 
organizations’ position with regard to historical interpretations and the Eritrean right to 
self-determination. 
Pateman goes back to pre-colonial times, describing early linkages of the 
Eritrean communities, and dismisses the Greater Ethiopian assertion of organic unity as 
‘illusory’, but he also roots the beginning of a sense of Eritrean identity during the 
period of Italian colonization.
80
 Comparing the Ethiopian Empire with the European 
Empires, he considers it ‘a colonial occupying power’ and emphasizes that Eritrea’s 
legal right to self-determination was not addressed properly by the United Nations.
81
 He 
considers the continuous subjugation of Eritrea to colonial control as having resulted in 
the maturation of an Eritrean consciousness and ‘in the process’ the development of ‘a 
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common culture, a lingua franca, and a relatively advanced economic life’ when 
compared to the rest of Ethiopia.
82
 Firebrace and Holland also ascribe to the thesis of 
the creation of a separate political identity of Eritrea during the Italian colonial period 
and assert that ‘this identity has not been lost over the subsequent years of Ethiopian 
occupation.’83 The mere change of occupying power would not compromise the right of 
Eritrea as a nation to self-determination. The authors further point to the role of 
international and regional actors in compromising Eritrea’s rights. A specific focus on 
the effects of international involvement and pressures on Eritrean independence has 
been provided by Okbazghi Yohannes. The shaping by external forces is described as 
having started with Italian colonialism since it was exactly this period that, as 
everywhere in colonized Africa, provided both ‘the context and the basis of anti-
colonial nationalism.’84 While the role of the superpowers during the Cold War period 
in enabling continuous Ethiopian control over the territory after annexation is examined, 
the main focus of his study is on the UN decision on the disposal of Eritrea. Yohannes 
asserts that union with Ethiopia did not represent the aspirations of the majority of the 
population and that the decision on the future of the former colony was mainly guided 
by the interests of external powers involved.  
In his examination of Greater Ethiopian and Eritrean nationalist accounts, 
Sorenson notes the considerable attention that was given to the pre-federation history of 
Eritrea but emphasizes that ‘Eritrean identity is regarded as a product of the shared 
experience of colonial occupation’, starting with Italian colonialism.85 As such, 
contemporary aspects take precedence over rootedness in antiquity and the focus is put 
on the future and the anticipated creation of an independent state. This emphasizes the 
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territorial origin of Eritrean identity ‘acknowledging its relatively recent construction 
and development through different stages’86. The recency of Eritrean nationalism is also 
stressed by Ruth Iyob in her invaluable and comprehensive analysis of the political 
history of the country over five decades. Placing the development of Eritrean 
nationalism in the wider regional and international context, she describes how the 
various communities of Eritrea were ‘strangers to one another’ that ‘were forced to 
interact with each other on a stage not of their own making’ during the period of Italian 
colonization and British administration.
87
 The absence of a shared vision and ideology 
led to the subjection under Ethiopian domination, and it was only during the struggle for 
independence that a distinctive nationalism and identity developed. In fact, she 
emphasizes that divisions persisted even during the first two decades of the struggle and 
‘[i]t was only during the 1980s, when the single imperative of liberation from Ethiopian 
hegemonic control emerged to unite the Eritrean factions, that an all-encompassing 
nationalism was achieved.’88 Yet Iyob also cautioned that after the achievement of 
independence ‘a new covenant between the Eritrean people and the state based on the 
reciprocities of civic obligation and not the need to survive in the face of a common 
enemy’ was needed to transform the national identity achieved into a full-fledged, 
lasting one.
89
 
The majority of the representatives of the Eritrean nationalist school have tended 
to present a rather positive picture of the EPLF. However, more critical accounts of the 
leadership of the movement emerged after its tyrannical nature had become obvious 
after years of independence. While Sorenson already noted by the end of the war of 
independence that ‘[t]here is no need to romanticize the EPLF or overlook its use of 
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violence’ he also pointed out the importance of a security system in the context of 
war.
90
 David Pool in his extensive study on EPLF dedicates a chapter to the forceful 
suppression of internal dissent in its early years and notes that the official account of the 
crisis ‘provides a clear portrayal of Issayas Afeworki's early conception of 
democracy.’91 He details how internal criticism of undemocratic and violent measures 
by the leadership was silenced and resulted in the establishment of a dominant 
leadership; yet he also notes that the criticism that had been silenced constituted ‘a 
major impetus to developing the PLF into the successful military organisation that it 
became’.92 Gaim Kibreab roots what he calls ‘the seeds of dictatorship’, resulting in the 
autocratic nature of the government in independent Eritrea, in exactly that period of 
violent suppression of internal opposition by the leadership. While he notes that both 
movements were ‘culpable, not only in sowing the seeds of disunity but also in 
cleansing their recruits of the civic virtues’,93 he also points out the impact left by the 
conflict between the ELF and the EPLF over hegemony in the field. At the same time he 
stresses that the divisions were not of a religious or ethnic nature and have to be located 
mainly at the elite level. In fact, his search for explanations of why the leadership in 
post-independence Eritrea turned into a ruthless dictatorship was guided by the strong 
sense of Eritrean community and transcending national identity that he experienced in 
interviews with Eritrean refugees which he traces back to social capital that had already 
developed in pre-colonial times.
94
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Lebanon  
Despite the description of Lebanese nationalism as ‘sceptical and ‘confused and 
confusing’, its existence has never been as contested as the Eritrean identity. The 
majority of the scholarly literature rather deals with the question of how differences 
were reconciled and conflicts resolved. However, specifically the pre-mandate and 
mandate period witnessed a history-writing on the local level that displayed a 
dichotomy very similar to the Eritrean case: The idea of a historically rooted separate 
Lebanese identity, very much congruent with Maronite identity and rooted in its 
Phoenician past opposed to the idea of a more geographical based identity of Lebanon 
as part of the Arab nation or geographical Syria. These diametrical opposed poles had 
already developed in the pre-mandate period, and that this dichotomy was never 
properly resolved has generally been considered the root of conflict in independent 
Lebanon. 
Meir Zamir makes this connection in his study of the creation of modern 
Lebanon from the remains of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of World War I. He 
posits that the conflicts that occurred in 1958 and 1975 were connected to problems 
inherent in the concept of Greater Lebanon. He depicts the extension of the territory of 
Mount Lebanon to the borders of Greater Lebanon as largely the doing of the Maronite 
community through ‘manipulation’ of the French governments and the ‘exploitation’ of 
the rivalries between France on the one hand, and Britain, Faisal and the Arab 
nationalist movement on the other.
95
 The achievement of Greater Lebanon represents to 
him ‘the culmination of centuries of Maronite endeavours’ as he considers Lebanese 
nationalism basically the ‘continuation of Maronite nationalism.’96 However, the 
heterogeneous nature of the new territory resulted in a deeply divided society and this 
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ultimately turned the Maronites into one minority amongst others.
97
 He argues that the 
Muslims of Greater Lebanon continuously questioned the legitimacy of the state and, 
therefore, the Maronites were forced to seek allies outside the Muslim world to protect 
the character of the Lebanese state during the sectarian confrontations in 1958 and 
1975/76.  
Ussama Makdisi’s account focuses on nineteenth-century Ottoman Lebanon and 
analyses the communities in the area of Mount Lebanon and their response to European 
involvement. While religious identity and communities existed in the traditional society, 
their meaning and status was transformed through the process of ‘discourse’ between 
Ottoman, European and local ideas of modernization.
98
 As a result, the meaning of 
religion in the construction of identity was transformed decisively and resulted in new 
forms of authority and identity: sectarianism. Makdisi emphasizes that since 
sectarianism was produced, it could also be changed. This is a clear repudiation of 
accounts that treat sectarianism in Lebanon not only as a deeply embedded system but 
as one inherently linked to Lebanese society. He further cautioned that sectarianism 
presaged the nationalist era and was ‘Lebanese nationalism’s specific precursor’ as it 
was rather the formulation of new public political identities than nationalism per se.
99
 In 
her very recent study on the crucial pre-mandate period Carol Hakim provides a similar 
analysis. She traces the nationalist ideas and myths that had, in fact, evolved by the mid-
nineteenth century in Ottoman Lebanon and contends that these did not constitute the 
development of nationalist movements but have to be considered ‘a shifting and 
tentative quest for national representation among some members of the Maronite elites, 
as well as their Syrian counterparts, that evolved and fluctuated in relation with their 
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diverse reformist agendas.’100 It was only in the few months prior to the establishment 
of the Lebanese state that the developed core ideas matured into coherent nationalist 
claims. 
 The protracted civil war that started in the mid- 1970s, and its descent into 
sectarian violence, led to the reassessment of Lebanese national identity, or rather its 
various existing forms. One of the most seminal revisionist accounts, aimed at critically 
evaluating the opposing nationalist ideas from pre-mandate Lebanon onwards, was 
provided by Kamal Salibi in his A House of Many Mansions. He notes that by the end of 
WWI, the Arabs of the Ottoman Empire had a very limited national consciousness 
which ‘was blurred and confounded by traditional loyalties of other kinds which were 
often in conflict with one another.’101 On Arab nationalism, he notes that at the 
beginning of the twentieth century it was ‘more of a romantic idea than a political 
movement with clear precepts and a set programme’ before going on to deconstruct the 
‘Lebanist’ narrative of Lebanese history. Noting that the Maronites have to be 
considered as a ‘tribe or a tribal confederation’ rather than a purely religious community 
he affirms that they ‘originally conceived of what they called Lebanese nationality in 
terms of their own tribal particularism.’102 The propounded historical connection to 
Phoenicia is carefully deconstructed by him as well as a number of other Lebanist 
myths, and Lebanon’s uniqueness in Arab history refuted. Salibi demonstrates the 
relevance of the different narratives of history which have blurred the reality of 
coexistence ever since the creation of Greater Lebanon in 1920 and notes that ‘the 
continuing civil war in Lebanon was, in a fundamental way, a war to determine the 
correct history of the country.’103 He further affirms that without a shared vision of a 
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common past, the development and maintenance of a sense of political community is 
impossible; however, he asserts that the ‘invention’ of a special history pre-1920 was 
not needed since a distinct sense of territorial identity and a strong state nationality had 
evolved since the creation of Greater Lebanon.
104
 The existence of the state of Lebanon 
is acknowledged by Lebanese people of all denominations, and all Lebanese sects 
emerged from the civil war with ‘a strong sense of common identity, albeit with some 
different nuances.’105  
In fact, this claim is reaffirmed in the second most seminal study on the 
development of Lebanese nationalism, Theodor Hanf’s Coexistence in Wartime 
Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation. Based on a large number of 
quantitative surveys conducted during the civil war, Hanf argues that ‘[t]he 
overwhelming majority of the Lebanese want peace, coexistence and national unity.’106 
Hanf examines the pre-war Lebanese political system and asserts that it is best 
described as a syncretistic system which worked through the mutual deterrence of 
opposing strategies of communities in the country.
107
 This system, coded through the 
National Pact of 1943, worked as a mechanism of conflict regulation and ‘broke down 
when one of the Lebanese communities or actors operated their strategy in an attempt to 
get more than a relative advantage, that is, control over everything’.108 According to 
Hanf this was exactly what happened in 1975, and the use of foreign proxies 
precipitated the country’s slip into a civil war after ‘[w]hat started primarily as a 
surrogate over Palestine has become a conflict over the coexistence between various 
Lebanese groups.’109 
Farid El Khazen also analyses the role of internal and external variables but 
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focuses his attention on the period leading to the outbreak of civil war in 1975. He 
analyses the internal and regional dynamics that led to the breakdown of the state in the 
early 1970s and argues that the Lebanese system lacked ‘instruments of control that are 
at the disposal of other Arab states’ which accounts for the failure of the state to deal 
with these dynamics.
110
 The open and democratic state in Lebanon as described by El 
Khazen proved to be unable to survive in the very different regional environment and its 
pressures and this would become especially evident when the PLO installed itself as a 
non-state actor in Lebanon. While democracy was needed to manage the relations 
between the heterogeneous communities of the country, the lack of consensus 
concerning regional problems opened the country to destabilizing forces which 
ultimately resulted in the breakdown of the state and civil conflict.
111
 
One of the more recent studies dealing with the identity of Lebanon, and mostly 
the process of nation-building, is Hanna Ziadeh’s Sectarianism and Intercommunal 
Nation-Building in Lebanon (2006). His analysis provides a new approach to tracing the 
process and development of nation-building in Lebanon through the study of 
constitutional documents. Ziadeh concludes that the endurance of the 19
th
 century 
communal system was the result of choices made by the political elites and was not due 
to any supposedly inherent character within the system.
112
 While Ziadeh agrees with 
Makdisi’s description of the system being a product, he also incorporates Hanf’s 
contention that the system created a situation of mutual deterrence in which the 
influence of communities has to be continuously renegotiated. In concert with earlier 
scholarship, he also emphasizes the strong dependence on developments in the regional 
system and external allies that this system created. 
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Chapter 1: (Pre-) Colonial state-building 
Neither the state of Eritrea nor the state of Lebanon existed in their current territorial 
shape before their creation by European colonial and mandate powers. Eritrea was 
created as Italy’s first colony during the European ‘scramble for Africa’ in the late 19th 
century, shaped out of highly contested territories in northeast Africa. While the first 
colonial settlements were established in 1882, it was only in 1890 that Eritrea in its 
present-day borders was consolidated as an Italian colonial unit. The state of Greater 
Lebanon was created as a French mandate territory in 1920 out of the Levantine parts of 
the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Following the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire, the French were granted the mandate over all of Syria and carved out the 
territorial state of Lebanon by enlarging the previously autonomous region of Mount 
Lebanon. The two newly-created states were under very different control since the 
mandate was officially envisioned to be of temporary nature only until Lebanon would 
eventually be released into independence, while Eritrea as a colonial possession was 
considered an integral part of Italy. Yet, in both cases the creation of the new territorial 
entity brought together various communities, largely divided into half Christian and half 
Muslim, under a single administrative unit.  
 This chapter will first assess the pre-colonial/mandate setting in the territories 
that were to be amalgamated by the colonial and mandate powers. It will argue that the 
territorial states were shaped out of areas that were in a completely different state of 
development in terms of their national awareness and institutions of representation in a 
Western sense. It will then examine the impact of the colonial/mandate period on the 
newly created territorial state and the development of a cohesive national identity 
relating to the new political entity. It concludes that while the system set up in both 
states aimed to create a sense of loyalty to the colonial/mandate power rather than to the 
new territory, the administrative structures created worked towards socio-economic 
46 
 
integration in Eritrea and co-existence in Lebanon, both important for the development 
of social cohesion and national identification.  
 
ERITREA 
The Eritrean territories in pre-colonial times 
The history of Eritrea as a territorial entity dates back to the advent of Italian 
colonialism, bringing the inhabitants of the different regions under a single form of 
political and legal administration as the Italian ‘colonia primo-genita’, the first-born 
colony of Italy. Prior to Italy’s joining the European ‘scramble for Africa’ in the 19th 
century the different parts of the territory had been subjected to various types of control 
by the Sudanic Funj Kingdom, the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and various Abyssinian 
(Ethiopian) empires over time.
1
 In the third century, most of present-day Eritrea and the 
northern Ethiopian region of Tigrai were part of the Christian Axumite Empire until 
Arab invasions resulted in the Axumites’ loss of their Mediterranean trade routes. This 
ultimately contributed to the decline of the Empire by the second half of the seventh 
century.
2
 The interior of Eritrea came under the control of the Beja kingdoms until their 
loose federation started to crumble in the fourteenth century. In the meantime, the centre 
of the future Amharic/Abyssinian kingdom developed south of the Beja kingdoms, in 
the mountains of the plateau.
3
  
In the Eritrean highlands, several autonomous units were established throughout 
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Comprising the provinces of Akele Guzay, Serai 
and Hamasien, a joint kingdom was formed under Governor Bahri Negasi. A number of 
European travellers and a Portuguese map of 1660 described this kingdom, named 
Medri Bahri (Land of the Sea), as a political entity separate from Abyssinia. The 
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Scottish traveller Bruce Scott described the distinctiveness of the two units in 1770 and 
has often been quoted by scholars in support of Eritrean independence; yet Scott also 
noted that the autonomous status of the Medri Bahri was fiercely contested by 
Abyssinia.
4
 As Reid has rightfully noted, the terms Abyssinia and Ethiopia have often 
been used ‘in their broadest, most generic sense, as mere geographical expression’, 
especially by European travellers, and cannot necessarily be understood as describing 
political territorial states.
5
 In fact, it was not until the end of the nineteenth century that 
Ethiopia could be described as a modern nation-state. Likewise the entity of Medri 
Bahri did not constitute a territorial state, yet existed as an entity separate from the 
territories south of the river Mareb. At the same time, it cannot be denied that the 
relations of Medri Bahri and Abyssinia were at least intertwined and, as Tesfagiorgis 
points out, the survival of the entity of Medri Bahri relied heavily on careful 
manoeuvres between Abyssinia in the south and the Ottomans who had extended their 
sovereignty to the Eritrean littoral in the late 1500s. Alliances with Abyssinia were 
sought specifically to guard against attempts at Muslim expansion into the territory of 
Medri Bahri.
6
 The rule of the Bahri Negasi declined in the eighteenth century while the 
Abyssianian kingdom was plagued by competition between various nobles and reached 
the ‘verge of disintegration’ by 1753.7 During the following period, referred to as the 
‘Era of the Princes’ (1769 – 1855), the Eritrean highlands were subjected to numerous 
military raids by Tigrean warlords. The process of unifying the various parts of 
Abyssinia started with the rise to power of Theodros II, who took the throne by force 
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and became Emperor in 1855.
8
 His policy was continued by Emperor Yohannes IV, 
who was crowned ‘King of Kings’ in 1872.  
The Red Sea coast had come under Islamic influence and was subject to 
Ottoman control until the arrival of its Egyptian successors in 1865 who proceeded to 
expand their control further inland. In 1871, the Swiss adventurer Munzinger Pasha was 
appointed Egyptian governor of Massawa and a year later he occupied Keren with a 
garrison of Egyptian soldiers. Throughout his reign, Emperor Yohannes IV was 
embroiled in fighting Egyptian expansion in Eritrea and led the Ethiopian armies to 
victory in the battles of Gundet and Gura. While this enabled him to gain control of the 
Eritrean highlands, the Egyptians remained in control of large parts of the Eritrean 
lowlands and the littoral. In the areas under their control the Egyptians established a 
common infrastructure, which Pateman claims constituted the beginning of ‘the long 
process of unifying the disparate parts of Eritrea.’9 However, Egyptian control only 
lasted for a short period and never extended to cover the entire territory that was to be 
joined into the colony of Eritrea by Italy. Aside from a small portion in the southwest 
under Ethiopian control, the very southeast of today’s Eritrea formed part of the Islamic 
Afar kingdom, the Sultanate of Awsa, which remained practically independent until the 
arrival of the Italians.  
The different forms of domination together with various waves of migration over 
the centuries help to explain the accumulation of the different social and religious 
groups in the Eritrean regions: Coptic Christians on the plateau, an area under 
occasional Abyssinian/Ethiopian influence or domination, and Muslims in the coastal 
area due to its proximity to the Arabian Peninsula and influence and domination by the 
Ottoman Empire and Egypt. ‘Mixed’ areas were found predominantly in the territories 
connecting the various parts. It is assumed that there was little migration from the late 
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eighteenth century onwards. Stephen Longrigg, Chief Administrator of Eritrea from 
1942 to 1944, concluded in 1945 that ‘the Eritrea of 1750 was racially and in general 
economically that of to-day.’10 
In fact, the huge variety of ethnic and linguistic groups, described by Munzinger 
in the early 1860s and further studied during the period of Italian colonialism and 
British administration, made the comparatively small population into a ‘mosaic of 
tribes, races, linguistic groups.’11 The differences between the various communities 
making up this ‘mosaic’ can be distinguished along a number of lines, including 
religion, language, and mode of livelihood, reflecting the waves of immigration from 
both the Ethiopian plateau and the Arabian Peninsula over many centuries. The 
geographical features of the territory and the correlated climatic and environmental 
differences the population faced in the various areas of the territory also contributed 
significantly to Eritrea’s overall population diversity. This diversification is usually 
broken down into three main territories: the highlands, the interior lowlands and the 
coastal plains.
12
 Due to the geographical and climatic conditions, the population in the 
highlands were settled farmers while the lowlands and the coastal areas were dominated 
by pastoralists and semi-nomadic farmers.  
The population of the territory is made up of nine ethno-linguistic groups 
(Tigrinya, Tigre, Saho, Rashaida, Afar, Bilen, Nara, Kunama, Beja) spread over the 
three different geographical areas. Some of the communities’ languages differ quite 
decisively from each other, ascribed to their different origins and influences over many 
centuries. The two dominant linguistic communities are Tigrinya and Tigre, both of 
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Semitic origin and a high correlation exists between language, religion and geographical 
location. With the exception of some differences in customary law between individual 
clans, the Tigrinya community can be described as socially quite a coherent group. The 
Tigre-speaking community is more fragmented, consisting of clans that differ decisively 
from each other. Despite the huge variety of rural communities in the Eritrean regions 
and the various forms of domination they endured, it has been argued by some scholars 
such as Killion and Kibreab that, due to the existence of common-pool resources needed 
by all for their respective agricultural mode of production, the ‘Eritrean rural 
communities developed appropriate institutional arrangements for collective and 
intercommunal action.’13 Kibreab even refers to the development of a ‘civic culture’ in 
pre-colonial Eritrea, based on social capital which he describes as enabling both 
interaction between different communities and the ability to ‘share values and norms 
that encourage cooperation, openness and compromise.’14 This does not mean though 
that conflict and rivalries did not exist. On the contrary, even within communities such 
as the Beni Amer, conflicts prevailed that, as Gebre-Medhin asserts, ‘made strong 
political unity impossible.’15 Yet, the various communities had their own systems of 
conflict resolution and the interconnectedness between the communities and existing 
social capital also led to the development of conflict resolution strategies and collective 
actions for the benefit of all communities involved. While these mechanisms are far 
from sharing a common identity, they can be considered an important pre-requisite for a 
possible future syncretistic nationalism once the communities found themselves under a 
single form of political administration. At the same time, the interconnectedness, social 
capital and forms of conflict resolutions cannot be said to have been limited to the 
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Eritrean regions only. Boundaries were rather fluid in pre-colonial times and so regions 
adjacent to the Eritrean territories also had some, if temporary, experience of the 
different forms of domination as borders changed; thus interconnectedness also existed 
with regions outside of the territory that was to become Eritrea.   
When the European powers started intervening in the region in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, the multi-communal area was still highly contested, the 
Abyssinian Empire continuously trying to gain control over the Eritrean plateau. Hence, 
the arrival of the Italians must be seen as aggravating a situation of fierce competition. 
In fact, Italian interests were not limited to the territories that would become the colony 
of Eritrea. Munzinger’s Ostafrikanische Studien (East African Studies), published in 
1864 and later translated into Italian is said to have been used as ‘the primary guide 
book for the later Italian occupation of Eritrea.’16 This confirms wider Italian 
expansionist interests and also means that the ‘creation’ of Eritrea by Italian colonialism 
was arbitrary only in the sense that attempts at wider expansion were quashed.   
 
Italy’s first-born colony (la colonia primogenita) 
The first territorial advances by Italy in the coastal area were not violent in nature, in 
fact they were quite the opposite. Italy first got her ‘foot in the door’ through 
commercial means, by acquiring the Bay of Assab in the very southeast of the territory 
through a shipping company in 1869. It was not until 1882 that the port town of Assab 
was declared an Italian colony.
17
 
The port was of enormous geostrategic importance, not 
only because of its proximity to the Suez Canal, but for future trade with the Ethiopian 
hinterland. The first expansion of the colonial territory extended to Massawa in 1885 
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and was met with resistance by the Ethiopians who were especially irritated by the 
technical assistance Britain gave to the Italians during the occupation. Ethiopia had 
emphasized its interest in the port to the British who had by then taken control of Egypt 
and were trying to mediate an orderly withdrawal of Egyptian garrisons from the 
Eritrean territories.
18
 The British, however, felt that rather than Ethiopia acquiring the 
coastal areas, they preferred Italian control in order to counterbalance French 
domination in Djibouti.
19
  
In the following years, Italy tried to expand its colonial terrain by military 
campaigns into the highlands. The expansion into the Eritrean highlands was agreed by 
the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II, successor to Yohannes IV, in the treaty of Wichale 
(Ucciali) in 1889 and led to the formal consolidation of the territories into the single 
unit of the colony of Eritrea in 1890.
20
 However, there was decisive disagreement over 
Article XVII of the treaty which, according to the Italian text, would effectively have 
proclaimed an Italian protectorate over all of Ethiopia. After three years of negotiations 
over the article, Menelik unilaterally denounced the entire treaty. He had already been 
heavily criticized for ‘selling-out’ a part of the Ethiopian state and was not ready to 
make any further concessions.
21
 Preparing for an armed confrontation with Italy, 
Menelik purchased modern arms and equipment and was able to rally leaders of the 
usually rather disparate empire around him for support. After Italy annexed parts of the 
north Ethiopian province of Tigre, the first confrontations took place in December 1895, 
and in February 1896 the six-day battle of Adua erupted.
22
 The Italians suffered a 
decisive loss, with a large number of casualties. Not only did this Ethiopian victory send 
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‘shock waves throughout Europe’, it also resulted in an agreement that halted Italian 
penetration north of the Mareb River, and the recognition of Ethiopia as an independent 
country.
23
 Italian dreams of larger territorial possessions in Ethiopia were quashed for 
the time being. Ethiopia, on the other hand, was able to expand and secure territories for 
its empire by treaties with France and Great Britain. Through these agreements, 
formerly fluid boundaries were defined and, as Keller rightfully notes, Menelik himself 
became a participant in the colonial ‘scramble for Africa’.24 Despite the conflict 
following the treaty of Wichale, its importance has often been pointed out by scholars in 
support of Eritrean nationalism. Bereketeab emphasizes that Menelik entered freely into 
the treaty, which was deemed proof that the Eritrean territory was not seen as an integral 
part of Ethiopia at a time when the Empire itself ‘was as much in the process of being 
formed as a unified modern state as Eritrea.’25
 
 
When the Italians first started their expansion, they were actually welcomed by 
some of the ethnic groups, especially in the western lowlands (e.g. the Beni Amer, 
Kunama and Bilen), that had endured Ethiopia’s continuous raids and attempts at 
occupation.
26
 For the Italians, however, the colony was initially meant to solve 
problems of land shortages at home by absorbing a large number of Italian settlers. The 
confiscation of land sufficient for the needs of Italian colonists in the territory had a 
decisive impact on the social make-up of its inhabitants, changing existing social 
structures, and engendering sporadic resistance from early on: some 400,000 hectares of 
land were expropriated for Italian agrarian colonization. That these measures indeed 
affected the population can be seen in the manifestations of discontent such as open 
revolt by some 2000 men (referred to as the Bahta Revolution, named after the leader of 
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the protest, Bahta Hagos) in 1894. Yohannes calls the revolt the first Eritrean nationalist 
uprising
27
 and, in fact, Bahta Hagos promised his followers he would free them from the 
Italians so they could be their ‘own masters.’28 Yet, he actually appealed to the 
Ethiopian Emperor Menelik for help in fighting the Italian colonialists.
 
Reid asserts that 
the sporadic resistance the Italians faced from the 1890s onwards ‘was not Eritrean 
nationalism per se, and therefore not even organic Eritrean protest, but was motivated 
by a desire to rejoin the Ethiopian motherland, actively encouraged by Ethiopia itself.’29
 
Viewing the Bahta revolution in this context, the recourse to links with Ethiopia in order 
to challenge Italian rule and expansion appears hardly surprising. These links, however, 
did not refer back to an Ethiopian national identity; rather they stemmed from the shared 
system of agricultural livelihood and periods of common political history of the 
highlands of Eritrea with their neighbours across the border. In addition, open rebellion 
has to be viewed as a form of social protest that was common in the area throughout 
pre-colonial times. Taddia describes what is referred to as ‘banditry’ or shifta30 as a 
social phenomenon of pre-colonial rural Abyssinia.
31
 While the factors behind the 
banditry varied from economic to political and social, the protagonists of ‘banditry’ as a 
form of social protest were traditionally nobles able to mobilize a large following 
among the peasants. The Italian colonialist policy in the territory resulted in a 
transformation of the shifta phenomenon since most of the influential nobles had been 
removed and replaced by those willing to collaborate with the Italian colonizers. Taddia 
                                                          
27
 Okbazghi Yohannes (1991), p. 9. 
28
 Richard Caulk, ‘“Black Snake, White Snake”: Bāhta Hagos and his Revolt against Italian Overrule in 
Eritrea, 1894’, in: Crummey, Donald (ed.), Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa (London: 
Currey, 1986), p. 300. 
29
 Richard Reid, Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa: Genealogies of Conflict since c.1800 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 106. On the resistance and the Ethiopian role in its emergence 
see also Tekeste Negash (1987), pp. 127-137. 
30
 The term ‚shifta‘ or ‚shitnet‘ is usually translated as ‚rebel‘ or ‚bandit‘ even though it complex meaning 
is rather difficult to translate. For a semantic explanation see Fekadu Ogbasellassie, ‘Shifta problems in 
the Kebesa region of Eritrea (1947-1952)’, in: Melake, Tekeste (ed.), Proceedings of a Workshop on 
aspects of Eritrean history, 20 – 21 September 2005, Asmara, (Asmara: Hdri Publishers, 2005), pp. 51.  
31
 Irma Taddia, L’Eritrea-Colonia 1890-1952: Paesaggi, strutture, uomini del colonialism (Milano: Franco 
Angeli, 1986), p. 78. 
55 
 
describes this as the evolution of modern ‘banditry’, from shifta to bureaucrats with 
privileged positions.
32
 Bahta Hagos was one of them, a shifta who had become an 
Italian protégé. However, he became angered by the destruction of local, traditional 
modes of livelihood caused by Italian land annexation and came into conflict with 
Italian officers since he felt offended by their ‘brash jingoism’.33 Even though making 
himself spokesperson for a wider discontent, he failed to draw sufficient support due to 
the distrust he created through his autocratic behaviour and was killed in a battle against 
the Italian army. However, the revolt led by him constitutes the only documented larger 
rebellion against Italian rule and, therefore, it later developed into an important myth of 
resistance to colonial domination for Eritrean nationalists.
34
    
In general, acts of resistance remained limited and never actually threatened 
colonial rule. However, they did contribute to the abandonment of demographic 
colonization by the Italians even though land expropriation was only generally 
renounced by decree in 1906 and 1926.
35
 By 1906 approximately 482,000 hectares had 
been turned into Italian state property, including all the lowland areas and large areas of 
arable land on the plateau.
36
 The expropriation of land also did not spare the Coptic 
Church of Eritrea and served to weaken its traditional power. In addition to attempts to 
Catholicise the Eritrean Christians and create a separate Orthodox Church, the 
damaging of the church through land expropriation carried the danger of sparking 
resistance from the Christian inhabitants of the highlands. This danger was further 
aggravated by the possibility of the Eritrean Christians to ‘one day make common cause 
with their co-religionists in Ethiopia.’37 The Muslims of Eritrea, on the other hand, 
appeared to be potentially more loyal subjects to the Italians than the Christians. They 
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inhabited the areas in which the Italians had been most welcomed and did not have 
religious or positive historical links to adjacent Ethiopia. However, while the Italian 
policy towards the Muslims of Eritrea has to be described as favourable throughout the 
entire colonial period, the reasoning behind this was shaped by various factors in 
different phases. Miran details how the supportive attitude of the colonial regime was 
initially guided by the need to maintain stability within the Muslim territories and, at the 
same time, generate support against Mahdist threats from neighbouring Sudan. After the 
1920s, and under fascist rule, Italy ‘deployed explicit pro-Muslim propaganda, 
appealing to public opinion in the Muslim world’ which in Eritrea translated into active 
encouragement of Islam and material support of the Muslim community.
38
 
Under Ferdinando Martini, Governor of Eritrea from 1897 - 1907, the territory 
became largely used for economic exploitation. Negash described this period as a 
‘watershed’ in the colonial history of Italy in Eritrea and it was, in fact, crucial for the 
consolidation of colonial rule.
39
 Eritrea became both a centre for trade, especially with 
eastern Sudan and northern Ethiopia, and a reservoir of indigenous soldiers to serve the 
colonial troops fighting colonial wars for Italy in Libya, Somalia, and Ethiopia. Their 
loyalty to and love for the Italians was described as remarkable by the latter.
40 
Yohannes 
asserts that the absorption of quite a significant number of Eritreans into the military 
had an effect on the already growing process of class configuration as ‘they were 
transformed into an incipient class of the petit bourgeoisie, oriented toward modern 
technology and ideas.’41In fact, the contact with modern ideas and the mingling of 
members of different communities in the colonial army has to be considered as 
contributing to a growing self-awareness and national consciousness. Hence, it could be 
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asserted that Eritreans who served in the Italian colonial army together with the more 
privileged classes of half-castes and locals working in the colonial bureaucratic 
administration formed a petty bourgeoisie, the social force that would bring an end to 
colonialism in most colonial states. As a consequence, maintaining political stability 
became the main goal of Italian policy in the territory and Negash asserts that it was 
achieved ‘by a policy of meticulous preservation of the precolonial socio-political 
structures.’42 However, the land expropriations had already broken the power of certain 
notables on the Eritrean plateau, and in the 1930s a number of colonial decrees 
abolished the hereditary land tenure system in favour of collective village ownership in 
order to appease the lower strata of peasants.
43
 In the lowlands, where communities 
were universally divided into serf and aristocratic classes, the serfs actually appealed to 
the new colonial rulers to be relieved of their obligations towards the aristocrats. Yet, 
since it was ‘an extremely useful system for the imposition and consolidation of 
colonial rule’, it was modified to serve the Italian administration.44 Leonard describes 
how the Italians intervened in a way so ‘as to reinforce the strength of feudal chiefs and 
to increase the availability of the serfs for profitable work and military service.’45 While 
the serfs were freed of traditional feudal dues and services, the inheriting of serfs was 
restricted to a certain number of tribal chiefs which resulted in a more powerful and 
centralized aristocratic class supported by the Italians. To meet the demands of the 
Italian administration, even groups such as the Baria and the Kunama, whose self-
organization had traditionally been based on democratic and egalitarian principles, had 
to submit to the institution of chieftainship.   
Political stability was maintained for four decades resulting in enhanced material 
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well-being and employment of the Eritrean population due to Italian innovations in the 
colony. Italian development efforts were largely centred in the predominantly Muslim 
lowlands, including the establishment of an infrastructure network and agricultural 
developments around Tessenei near the Sudanese border and Keren as well as along the 
eastern escarpment.
46
 The developments around urban centres together with the land 
expropriations that had deprived peasants of their land accelerated the process of 
urbanization as thousands of landless flocked to the cities in search of work. Towns, 
especially Asmara, Decamhare, Mendefera, Keren and Massawa, witnessed an 
increased urbanization which resulted in an uneven development of the territories and 
growing disparities between urban centres and rural areas. At the same time, members 
of the various ethnic groups for the first time worked together under a new, capitalist-
oriented economic system. Yohannes argues that ‘[u]nder such conditions, it was 
inevitable that the rural proletariat would develop some sense of solidarity within itself 
which, over time, would translate into national awakening and political activism.’47 In 
fact, it may be argued that the material basis for a cohesive economic activity was 
created by the Italians, which resulted in the emergence of a common consciousness 
mitigating hostilities between the different ethnic groups inhabiting the forcibly joined 
territories. 
The advent of Fascism in the early 1930s impacted deeply upon Eritrea. The 
Fascist government revived the idea of further expanding into Ethiopia and, therefore, 
developed the colony ‘as a base both for military operations and later for the economic 
exploitation of Abyssinia.’48
 
Hence, from 1931 onwards the economy in the territory 
was directed towards this goal and the consequent influx of Italians together with the 
imposition of racial laws resulted in the effective barring of Eritreans from skilled 
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employment. In addition, social integration between the areas was effectively halted by 
the fact that ‘there was little labor migration’ between the lowlands and the highlands 
that had turned into the centre of economic developments after 1934.
49
 Therefore, the 
period of preparation for the invasion of Ethiopia had a much deeper impact on the 
central highlands and saw a decisive transformation of the traditional economy ‘from 
one that was overwhelmingly rural and traditionally-based to one with a significant 
urban and industrial component.’50 Hence, while innovations by the Italians such as the 
impressive infrastructure, industrialisation and commercialisation of the economy were 
often described as laying the basic structural conditions for the emergence of an Eritrean 
nationalism and the beginning of a nation-building process, they actually affected the 
various communities to different degrees.  
In 1935, Italian ambitions to conquer Abyssinia started to become concrete, and 
under General Emilio De Bono Italian troops crossed the Mareb river on 5 October 
1935. Seven months later they marched into Addis Ababa and Ethiopia was officially 
merged with Italian Somaliland and Eritrea into a new state named Africa Orientale 
Italiana (Italian East Africa) on 1 June 1936. The war against Ethiopia and the 
development of an administration for the newly created state also had an impact on the 
growth of a separate Eritrean identity since the Eritreans were to play a specific role in 
this new state. After having been loyal soldiers for the Italians, they not only made up 
large parts of the first colonial army in Ethiopia, but were also given priority with 
regard to certain jobs in the new country, and a 1937 decree asserted that they ‘were to 
be addressed as Eritreans and not as natives’.51 Yet, the Eritreans, like all Italian 
colonial subjects, were subject to the fascist laws of racial segregation, and the 
consequent treatment of the Eritrean population certainly contributed to an increasing 
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anti-colonial sentiment.  
 
The British Military Administration (BMA) 
Shortly after the Italians declared war on the Allies, its colonial control came to an end 
with the invasion of British troops into Eritrean territory in early 1941. By the end of the 
summer of the same year, the British controlled all the former Italian colonies and had 
brought them under British administration. As a signatory of the Hague Convention of 
1907, the territories were to be administered in accordance with the regulations 
stipulated for occupied territories. 
Britain’s rapid invasion was aided by the defection of the local Askari (the 
Eritrean soldiers serving in the Italian army) on the one hand, and by Italian over-
estimation of British strength in Sudan on the other.
52
 
In literature supporting the 
Eritrean nationalist school it is often suggested that the defection of the Askari was 
proof of the existence of Eritrean nationalist feelings by the end of the colonial period, 
at least amongst some of the Eritrean people. The key incentive to defect were British 
promises of the fulfilment of Eritrean nationalist aspirations, propagated by an active 
British propaganda initiative including the dropping of leaflets over the territory. There 
has been some disagreement over whether this promise referred to Eritrean 
independence or (re-)union with Ethiopia. The translation of one of the pamphlets 
published by G.L. Steer, then chief of the British propaganda unit, appears to confirm 
the latter interpretation.
53
 In any case, defections were enormous and contributed 
decisively to the end of the Italian colonial period. Whether the defections were 
encouraged by the prospect of independence or of (re-)union with Ethiopia, they were 
certainly an expression of the desire to end Italian rule, and to that end recourse to links 
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with Ethiopia were sought as seen before in the Bahta Revolution.  
Ethiopia was granted independence in 1944, three years after Haile Selassie had 
returned from exile in the UK to Addis Ababa and been reinstated as Emperor. The 
remaining former Italian colonial territories were placed under temporary British 
administration until an international decision on their disposal was taken. In fact, it was 
clear from early on that the British had no intention of keeping control over the territory 
longer than necessary, even in form of a trusteeship, as it was considered a burden to 
British tax-payers.
54
 In addition, the British had not entered Eritrea with the aim of 
freeing the inhabitants from colonial rule but rather to defeat the Axis powers. While 
fascist policies such as the colour bar were lifted, the BMA kept Italian administrative 
structures and functionaries in place in order to keep the costs of administering the 
territory low. The economic boom that the territory had witnessed during the later years 
of Italian colonialism continued during the early years of the BMA since the facilities 
established in Eritrea were used by the British and Americans for military projects in 
their North Africa Campaign.
55
 However, as Killion notes, it was mainly the remaining 
Italian population who profited from employment opportunities. Furthermore, the 
uneven social transformations, due to the industrial and infrastructural developments 
that had started during Italian war preparations being constrained to the central plateau, 
continued. While the economic development could have served as the foundation for an 
integrated Eritrean economy, the uneven distribution ‘made the social integration of 
Eritrea more problematic.’56 Besides, the economic boom was short-lived and soon after 
the end of World War II, Eritrea entered a serious economic recession resulting in a 
large Italian exodus leading to the closing of Italian businesses and disinvestment. After 
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most of the military projects closed down, the British also actively contributed to the 
destruction of the modern infrastructure achieved during the Italian colonial period. This 
was actually brought to attention by Sylvia Pankhurst, who in an account of her travels 
in the region gives clear evidence of what she deemed a ‘disgrace to British 
civilisation’, the removal and dismantling of facilities in Eritrea by the BMA to either 
sell the materials or use them in their own territories in the region.
57
 Pankhurst’s 
indignation was certainly motivated by protecting what she considered part of the 
Ethiopian Empire. A fervent British feminist, whose ‘hatred of British imperialism had, 
ironically, turned her into an enthusiastic campaigner for an African empire’, she fought 
tooth and nail for what she considered the just cause of Greater Ethiopia.
58
 While she 
has to be considered a biased source at least, she backed up her claims with 
photographic evidence. Furthermore, the weakening of the Eritrean economy through 
the removal of facilities made sense apropos the British plans for the territory that were 
largely based on the assertion that Eritrea did not constitute an economic viable unit. 
British policies in the territory, especially the maintaining of Italian personnel and the 
economic exploitation, also frustrated Eritreans who felt betrayed by the failure to 
deliver the promised independence. Consequently, the BMA was viewed by Eritreans as 
a mere continuation of European colonialism. 
On a political level the question of Eritrea’s future was addressed by the British 
from early on, especially once the territory had served its purpose as a base for Anglo-
American wartime policies in the region. G.K.N. Trevaskis, who worked in the British 
Administration of Eritrea from 1941 to 1950, described the country at the time of the 
arrival of the British forces as ‘a well-integrated political unit’.59 However, the British 
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authorities were not convinced that the territory would be economically viable once 
Western subsidies were removed. Furthermore, they propagated a ‘natural’ line of 
separation where ‘[t]he main plateau and the coastal areas belong naturally to Ethiopia’ 
and ‘[t]he inhabitants of the western lowlands are however Moslem nomads and belong 
more naturally to the Sudan.’60 Referring back to the pre-colonial history of the area, 
they asserted that before European penetration ‘[n]o historical event has served to unite 
the Eritreans into a self-conscious community’.61 Consequently, partition of the territory 
between Ethiopia and Anglo-Egyptian Sudan was envisioned by the British and it was 
argued that this ‘would in no sense involve the dismemberment of an essential unity but 
merely the discontinuance of an unnatural association of heterogeneous and largely 
discordant elements.’62 
In Eritrea itself, nationalist aspirations were discussed on the elite level as well. 
Specifically with reference to British promises of independence an ‘elite’ movement 
gathered and asked to be included in the decision-making on the political future of the 
country. This clandestine association of intellectuals formed in May 1941 and named 
itself Mahber Feqri Hager (Association for Love of the Country). While it is often 
depicted as a strictly pro-Ethiopian movement backed by Haile Selassie, it was a multi-
communal, anti-colonial association that, however, quickly disintegrated due to its 
internal failure to agree on how to realize the nationalist aspiration of being freed from 
Western foreign domination. Ethiopia’s achievement of independence as a fully 
sovereign state in December 1944 nurtured the largely Christian position of union with 
Ethiopia while the Muslim communities predominantly advocated independence. An 
attempt to reconcile the different nationalist aspirations was unsuccessful. Instead, 
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separate political movements organized along the opposed aspirations in the wake of the 
international community’s decision on the future of the territory.  
 
LEBANON 
Multi-communal arrangements in pre-mandate Lebanon  
The 1920 creation, with its particular boundaries, of the state of Lebanon by the French 
mandate authorities cannot be considered purely arbitrary. It was rather based on the 
pre-existing region of Mount Lebanon (Ğabal Lubnān) which, while part of the 
Ottoman Empire, enjoyed a number of autonomous privileges and a history of special 
relationships with France and Great Britain. Therefore, the pre-mandate situation in 
Lebanon differed decisively from the situation in Eritrea before the advent of Italian 
colonialism. 
The autonomous status of the region of Mount Lebanon has been described as a 
rather ‘curious phenomenon’63 in the Ottoman Empire and is attributed to European 
intervention following a civil war in the region in 1860. In the decades preceding the 
civil conflict, the situation in the mountain area was rather harmonious among the 
communities inhabiting the territory:  
 
They had seen the ascent and fall of dynasties arising from their each or any of their 
communities, had acted as close and accepted neighbours, had been indifferently landlord or 
tenant or worker on estates of every ownership; they had sustained, in community of interest, 
scene, language, livelihood, and familiar friendship, a scarcely troubled symbiosis.
64
  
 
 
In fact, elite status in the rural mountain area was defined by rank rather than religious 
affiliation, and alliances between the great families were contracted regardless of 
religion.
65
 Makdisi noted that this system was marked by ‘an undeniable respect for 
sacred boundaries of faith’, despite the fact that there existed a ‘language of religious 
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discrimination and differentiation’ based on religious allegiance.66 The main inhabitants 
of the mountain area, the Maronites and the Druze, enjoyed relative autonomy under the 
Ottoman millet system and they had developed a symbiotic relationship with common 
values and forms of conflict regulation, comparable to what Kibreab has described as 
‘social capital’ in pre-colonial Eritrea. Of course, the Ottoman millet system was based 
on demarcation along communal lines; yet the indirect rule over the region by the 
Ottoman Empire meant that ‘they had to pay taxes, but were otherwise left in peace.’67 
This had resulted in the development of a stratum of notables whose status was based on 
their right to collect taxes, and this function and their rank within the ‘class’ of notables 
was of more relevance than sectarian affiliation. Yet, while the demographics of the 
Druze community remained rather static, the Maronite community increased decisively, 
by the mid-19
th
 century becoming the majority not only in their traditional territories, 
but also in previously Druze-dominated areas of the mountains.
68
 The tradition of 
peaceful cohabitation started showing signs of disintegration during the second quarter 
of the nineteenth century, mainly caused by the erosion of Maronite feudal leadership 
and disturbances arising from Egyptian occupation. French interest had already 
manifested itself in the decades before the unrest and resulted in the establishment of a 
special relationship with the Maronite Christians in Mount Lebanon.
69
 While a Maronite 
Seminary was established in Rome as early as 1584, it was France that saw itself as 
having the role of protecting the Catholics in the Muslim-dominated Ottoman Empire.
70
 
The affiliation with the Catholic Church and France resulted in strong links with French 
Jesuits. These relations were crucial in the development of the identity of the Maronite 
community since it advanced the Maronites’ education and exposed them to French 
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culture, language and thinking. Jesuits, such as the often mentioned Henri Lammens, 
who perfected the theory of the mountain area as a refuge for oppressed minorities, had 
a strong influence on the Maronites’ early perception of their identity.71 British attempts 
to discourage rebellion against the Egyptian occupation in 1840 and the subsequent 
London Agreement between the Western powers and Russia constituted the first 
international intervention in the affairs in the mountains and ‘established an important, 
and at first unofficial, precedent for a tradition of such interventions that became a 
recognised aspect of Lebanese politics.’72 By the end of 1842, Mount Lebanon was 
divided into two districts, the northern part ruled by a Christian sub-governor 
(qā’iamaqām) and the southern part by a Druze sub-governor. However, the religious 
composition of the two districts was not clear-cut and did not exactly match the division 
of the sub-governorates.  
The resulting imbalance in the system of coexistence led to communal cleavages 
and finally resulted in the violence of 1860. Problems in the region became more 
entangled with the politics of the Western powers when the British entered the scene. 
Like the French they viewed the areas of Mount Lebanon ‘as an ideal site for the 
reformation of the Ottoman Empire’73 and, in line with their generally more pro-Muslim 
policies, they adopted a policy that favoured the Druze. Western policies of different 
countries siding with different communities resulted in a changed attitude of the 
inhabitants of the mountains regarding the relevance of their denominations as they 
were described by Western powers according to their religion and thus ‘imagined and 
experienced separately in Mount Lebanon.’74 Makdisi refers to this as the ‘invention’ of 
a tribal-like social structure by the European powers and notes how it, in connection 
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with the process of modernization, resulted in affiliation with religious communities 
becoming the main marker of identity in the area. On 9 June 1861, an international 
constitutional settlement, the Règlement et protocol relatives à la réorganisation du 
Mont Liban, was signed. This agreement was structured ‘by the French under the 
watchful eye of the British and other members of the Concert of Europe, the precursor 
of the League of Nations.’75 While the French had actually advocated the establishment 
of an autonomous Maronite principality, the whole area of Mount Lebanon was 
reconstituted as a single Ottoman province. This crucial change to the pre-existing 
system was enshrined in the Règlement which managed to secure peace for the next fifty 
years. Yet, as Longrigg noted, ‘[i]t had been installed in the sole interests of a single 
Syrian community, the Catholic and French-protected Maronites.’76 In fact, the 
governor was to be a Catholic Christian assisted by a central administrative council 
composed of twelve members representing the various communities of the area. The 
Maronites were given predominance in the council, allocated four seats while the Druze 
had three, the Greek Orthodox two and the Catholics, Sunni, and Shi
c
a one seat each.  
With this new system, the territory of Ğabal Lubnān had special status within the 
Ottoman Empire; yet as both Firro and Salibi point out, the specific situation did not 
reflect the emergence of an uncontested Lebanese identity: ‘what one finds, rather, is 
that in cultural and political terms most Maronites continue to think of themselves as 
Syrians (shawām, s. shāmi, i.e., belonging to Bilād al-Shām), or of course Arabs, and as 
Lebanese only in the more restricted territorial sense.’77 In fact, despite enjoying relative 
political autonomy through the millet system and later on the Règlement, the area of 
Mount Lebanon remained connected specifically with the adjacent Syrian provinces of 
the Ottoman Empire. Being subject to the same Ottoman structures and sharing 
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established trade networks in the provinces resulted not only in a close economic 
integration but also in frequent social interactions.
78
 Therefore, the fact that many 
Lebanese, especially among the elites, actually perceived themselves as Syrians is 
hardly surprising. This was certainly facilitated by the fact that Syrian identity itself was 
in its infancy since a state of (Greater) Syria had never previously existed. The lack of 
clearly demarcated boundaries and ancient roots meant that Syrian national identity 
remained rather fluid and open to individual definitions in its early stages. Wild asserts 
though, that at least the Maronites of this time ‘can be rightly called the “first 
Lebanese”’ as they did not consider themselves citizens of the Ottoman Empire after the 
enacting of the Règlement.
79
 Yet, not identifying themselves as Ottomans does not mean 
they specifically perceived themselves as Lebanese rather than Syrians. However, the 
fact that a specific identification in relation to the territorial unit of Mount Lebanon 
existed means that an ‘embryonic’ sense of identity had developed in the area, 
facilitated by its special status, recognized not only by the Ottoman Empire but by 
international powers as well. In that sense there was ‘differentiation’ from the ‘others’ 
and this differentiation was based on religion as well as the minority status of the 
Maronites in the Muslim Arab regions of the Empire.  
For the French, the passing of the Règlement was of great importance since they 
considered the region of Mount Lebanon a place where they ‘had established a political 
position of critical strategic advantage to their cultural and economic presence in Beirut 
and in the bordering regions of Syria.’80 Throughout the years, the region of Mount 
Lebanon remained a priority for the French so that when the Ottoman Empire fell apart, 
France tried to gain control over the Levantine territory that included it.  
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The creation of Greater Lebanon  
The creation of today’s Lebanon was preceded by the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 
which agreed the division of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire between France 
and the United Kingdom once the Empire had fallen. However, while the agreement 
would have allowed the two powers to establish ‘such direct or indirect administration 
or control as they desire‘81, the International Peace Conference of 1919 decided on the 
establishment of trusteeship, thus decisively limiting the planned liberty of action of 
France. 
82
  
Amidst the demise of the Ottoman Empire during World War I, extensive 
discussion on the future of the Arab provinces took place not only amongst the 
international powers. Facing the prospects of self-determination and independence in 
line with Wilsonian principles, Lebanese and Syrian elites presented their own, 
diverging ideas concerning the future of their territories. Hakim details how the 
campaign for the future of Lebanon was first initiated by the emigrant communities 
abroad as the local population was paralyzed by the impact of World War I in the 
territories.
83
 The ideas propounded by the majority centred on the inclusion of Mount 
Lebanon as an autonomous unit into a larger Syrian state (Greater Syria), either under 
Prince Faisal or a French/Western trusteeship.
84
 However, some of the mainly Maronite 
emigrant communities, most notably the Alliance Libanaise, based in Cairo, promoted 
the idea of a Greater Lebanon. To support the case of an independent Lebanon as a 
separate entity a number of books and pamphlets were published, basing the claim not 
only on the principle of self-determination but on a carefully developed historical 
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narrative.
85
 While the main argument of the proponents of a Greater Syria was largely 
based on the economic unity of the Syrian provinces, the supporters of a Greater 
Lebanon attempted to root their claims in ancient history, referring to a purported 
Phoenician legacy. A separate history of a Greater Lebanon was constructed, one that 
was marked by a constant fight against conquest by the Arabs and Ottomans and that 
witnessed the compromising of its ‘natural frontiers’ by the Ottomans and the British in 
1861.
86
 Consequently, a Greater Lebanon would merely be a return to historical 
boundaries, (despite the lack of proof that such ever existed in history) and enable the 
economic viability of an independent Lebanese state. 
When the Allied forces reached the Lebanese and Syrian provinces in October 
1918, the local elites of the Lebanese mountains were caught ‘unprepared, with no clear 
plan for dealing with the new situation and explicit national claim to uphold.’87 In 
addition, the decision on the future status of the provinces was suspended amidst rivalry 
over control of Syria between the French and King Faisal, who had been installed by the 
British as de facto ruler of Syria in 1918. Faisal described Syria as the ‘gem in the Arab 
crown’ and considered it an important part of the independent Arab state to which he 
aspired.
88
 The clashes between France and Faisal contributed to a polarization of the 
local population, specifically amongst the inhabitants of the Lebanese mountains that 
feared their autonomous status would be bargained away by France in exchange for an 
extension of French influence over all the Syrian provinces.  
Since the existence of nationalist feelings and aspirations amongst the local 
population was recognized by the international community, a fact finding mission 
endorsed by US President Wilson – the King-Crane Commission – was sent to the non-
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Turkish parts of the crumbled Ottoman Empire. The aim of the Commission was to 
establish whether the emergent nationalism in the area could be considered strong 
enough for independent and sovereign states. The papers of the King-Crane 
Commission (which visited the territory for 42 days from June 10 - July 21 1919) 
consist of a large number of petitions by the communities of the area, their demands 
ranging from complete independence and independence under French trusteeship to 
autonomy within a larger Syrian state.
89
 The expressions of national aspirations were 
very much in line with those formulated earlier by the emigrant communities. While the 
Maronites advocated for a Greater Lebanon ‘absolutely independent of the rest of 
Syria’ and even expressed the wish ‘to become French citizens at an early moment’, the 
other community traditionally inhabiting the mountains, the Druze, ‘asked emphatically 
to be left out of the Lebanon in case it be given to France’. 90 The inhabitants of the 
territories that were meant to be included in a state of Greater Lebanon - consisting of 
mainly Muslims, some Greek Orthodox Christians and a small group of Protestants – 
also voiced their aversion to French control. A delegation representing these inhabitants, 
consisting of both Muslims and Christians, asked for autonomy within a Syrian state 
based on fears regarding the economic future of a separate Lebanon.
91
 The Commission 
also noted the impact of what they called the ‘French policy of “colonization”’ in the 
area and how it had resulted in some form of separate identity since the affected 
inhabitants ‘are apt to hold themselves as of a distinctly higher order of civilization than 
the people of the interior.’92 That this was limited to the Maronites of the mountains was 
proved by the fact that a mere fourteen percent, mainly Lebanese Maronites, actually 
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requested a mandate held by the French if one were to be imposed on the territories.
93
 
The final report of the King-Crane Commission to the peace conference in Paris 
recommended a Western power trusteeship for a united state of Greater Syria governed 
under Prince Faisal. The report specified that the power that was to take over this 
trusteeship was to enter ‘not at all as a colonizing Power in the old sense of that term, 
but as a Mandatory under the League of Nations with the clear consciousness that "the 
well-being and development" of the people form for it a "sacred trust."’94 It was noted 
that Lebanon was considered to be best served by remaining part of Syria, albeit with an 
autonomous status: 
 
Lebanon has achieved a considerable degree of prosperity and autonomy within the Turkish
 Empire. She certainly should not find her legitimate  aspirations less possible within a Syrian
 national State. On the contrary, it may be confidently expected that both her economic  and 
political relations with the rest of Syria would be better if she were a constituent member of the 
State, rather than entirely independent of it.
95
 
 
 
However, the report was shelved and at the Conference of San Remo on 26 April 1920, 
the future of the territories of the former Ottoman Empire was officially decided. Since 
British opposition to French control over Syria had been side-tracked by the mounting 
crisis in Egypt, France was granted the mandate over the entire Levant. Once again, the 
temporary character of the mandate as well as its ultimate goal of preparing the 
territories for independence was emphasized in the Covenant of the League of Nations.96 
In the wake of the removal of British troops in October 1919, Prince Faisal gained de 
facto control over Syria and confrontation with France intensified. In an attempt to avert 
the granting of the mandate over Syria to France, Faisal ‘decided to promote and assist 
the formation of armed bands in the regions adjoining the French zone to harass French 
forces and with a view to forcing the French government to withdraw its forces from 
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Syria.’97 The armed bands mainly raided the contested areas of the Biqāc valley and the 
hinterland of Tyre and Tripoli, finding support from local Shi
c
a and Druze forces. The 
aim of the banditry did not remain limited to harassing French forces but soon turned 
against Christian villages that were perceived to be pro-French. The raids also continued 
after France had officially been granted the mandate over the entire territory and was 
meant to spread feelings of insecurity. The violence culminated in early May, 1920 with 
an attack on the Catholic village of 
cAīn ‘Ibl by a large Shica gang from neighbouring 
Bint Ğbaīl: 50 residents were massacred.98 Attempts by members of the Administrative 
Council of the Lebanese mountains to attain independence through a deal with Faisal 
were quashed by the French, and Faisal was expelled from Syria following the defeat of 
his forces in July of the same year.
 
On 1 September 1920, France officially drew the borders for what was to 
become the State of Greater Lebanon, adding the coastal cities, 
cAkkār plain, Biqāc 
valley and Ğabal cĀmil to the region of Mount Lebanon. As such, the mandate power 
created a territorial entity along frontiers that had never before existed. The annexation 
of the coastal cities was a contentious issue since it cut the Syrian capital of Damascus 
off from its closest port, Beirut. While the extension of the mountain area turned the 
new state into an economically viable entity, the redrawn borders had the potential to 
seriously weaken Damascus’ economy. Specifically the question of access to the sea 
was an issue, at least until the Alawite State, comprising the port city of Lattakia, was 
fully incorporated into Syria in 1936. The French decision to separate the territory of 
Ğabal Lubnān from the rest of Syria was contrary to the recommendations made by the 
King-Crane Commission and joined territories with strong Sunni and Shi
c
a Muslim 
majorities with the Maronite and Druze communities inhabiting Ğabal Lubnān. 
Furthermore, the adding of territories to the north and east disrespected the wishes of 
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their inhabitants who had clearly expressed their desire to be part of a Syrian state. 
The creation of Greater Lebanon was driven by economic considerations, and 
designed to make the new Lebanon a viable entity; it was being planned in France and 
amongst some Christian Lebanese intellectuals even before World War I.
99
 In fact, the 
autonomous Maronite principality advocated by the French in the wake of the 
Règlement had been accompanied by a detailed map. This map was also used by 
Lebanese nationalists presenting their claims for an independent state to the Paris Peace 
Conference and ‘the Greater Lebanon that ultimately emerged in 1920 looked strangely 
in shape like the one already devised in 1860.’100 Both Longrigg and Zamir argue that 
French decisions on Lebanese independence were guided by the gratification of loyal 
friends and ‘the final decision on borders was prompted more by Maronite demands 
than by French interest.’101 This argument, however, seems to overestimate Maronite 
influence on France’s policies in the Levant. While the special relationship with the 
Maronites certainly played an important role, it should not be forgotten that France had 
been willing to compromise an independent Greater Lebanon when contesting for 
influence over all Syrian provinces. Furthermore, General Gouraud admitted in a 
memorandum that France’s own power interests in the territories had played an 
important role in the decision since ‘[i]t is easy to maintain a balance between [...] states 
that will be large enough to achieve self-sufficiency and, if need be, pit one against the 
other’.102
 
In any case, the solution met with opposition, both from Syria and from within 
the new entity, even from some Maronite Christians who considered the large number 
of adherents to the Muslim faith a threat to the Christian state they had aspired to create.  
The system set up by the French for the Levant States, and particularly for 
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Lebanon, has been characterised by Patrick Seale as practically providing ‘little more 
than a fig leaf for a colonial regime’.103 While there can be no doubt that France was 
trying to extend her influence in the territory as much as possible and to instil loyalty to 
France within the Lebanese population, her policies were bound by the regulations for 
mandate regimes and could never go as far as, for example, using the territory for 
settlement as the Italians had in Eritrea. Furthermore, the mandate countries obtained 
their own constitutions and set up their own government. Yet, French policy towards 
Lebanon differed decisively from that adopted towards Syria. The special attitude 
towards Lebanon was described in 1924 by Temperley and helps to elucidate France’s 
later reluctance to release Lebanon into independence:  
 
The French administration […] regarded the Lebanon as being an integral portion of France, in 
much the same way as Algeria, and their policy was based upon this unavowed but governing 
assumption. […] Even when the election of representatives to the State Councils was adopted 
and the Syrian States were officially called ‘autonomous’, the form of government remained a 
façade behind which French officials exerted complete power.
104
 
 
 
Despite France’s official policy of educating and assisting weaker nations, following 
their mission civilatrice, the French actually worked towards retaining their authority in 
the territories by controlling every detail of constitutional and administrative life. Even 
more importantly, ‘no efforts of the Mandatory availed to correct the weaknesses of 
Lebanese politics, so deeply rooted in the nation’s civilization and its leaders’ 
conception of public life.’105 The new territorial reality rather fostered contesting forms 
of nationalism that had existed and dominated the debates in pre-mandate Lebanon: 
Lebanism, Syrianism and Arabism. While nationalist tendencies were often connected 
with religious affiliation, it cannot be said that there was a clear-cut Muslim-Christian 
dichotomy in pre-mandate Lebanon. Diversification existed within the various camps 
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and allegiances with opposing nationalist camps had been rather fluid. The most 
obvious testimony to this is the fact that a large number of Christian intellectuals, 
mainly Greek Orthodox, played a crucial role in the emergence of Arab nationalism, 
especially in its early days. As Hanf asserted, ‘the main currents of Arab nationalism in 
Lebanon as well as of Lebanese nationalism are not so much ‘Arab’ and ‘Lebanese’ as 
codewords for what is best termed a Sunni and a Maronite sense of community.’106 
The political system applied by the French in Greater Lebanon was based on the 
sectarian system that had been established following the Règlement. The 1926 
Constitution of the State of Greater Lebanon basically re-instituted sectarian power-
sharing following the model of the 1861 agreement. The system is often termed 
sectarianism (ṭāi’fīye), confessionalism or consocioationalism, all basically describing 
the same thing, namely a system that legitimizes and institutionalizes the distribution of 
power according to confessional affiliations. Of course, the term consociationalism is 
not intrinsically linked to power-sharing based on religion but describes ‘a state or 
region within which two or more cultural or ethnic or national communities peaceably 
coexist, with none being institutionally superior to the others, and in which the relevant 
communities cooperate politically through self-government and shared government’.107 
The institutionalization of this system through the Constitution contributed to the further 
politicization of confession and resulted in the almost complete disappearance of any 
religious and confessional fluidity. Other identity markers basically ceased to play a 
decisive role and, as Ghassan Salame phrased it, ‘ethnic differences in the true sense of 
the word have no place in Lebanon. It is a tribal confessional system that separates an 
ethnically and linguistically homogenous population into distinctive groups.’108  
The nationalist ideology that would have to be developed for the new territorial 
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entity, one overarching communal divisions, was decisively hampered by the 
politicization of communities ascribing to different ideas of national identity. A further 
hindrance was the fact that the system that was imposed on the state of Greater 
Lebanon had been in operation in parts of the new territorial entity, namely Mount 
Lebanon, before. The Christians, familiar with the system and socially more developed 
due to decades of contact with Western powers, secured most of the key positions in the 
new state. Naturally this alienated the Sunni Muslims and their boycott of the new state 
facilitated the Maronites’ achievement of a virtual monopoly over the country.109 The 
latter, on the other hand, felt they had to maintain control over the state as they did not 
trust the Muslims who felt more bound to neighbouring Syria by historical and religious 
links.
110
 Rather than the different communities serving as building blocks for a 
transcending, civic national identity, the federation into a new state was not accepted by 
all communities and the politicization of cleavages rather seemed to have increased the 
potential for conflict. Therefore, the prospect of a syncretistic nationalism developing 
appeared rather limited during the early stages of the mandate.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that the territories that were to be joined into the territorial 
states of Eritrea and Lebanon had very different histories before the arrival of their 
respective colonial and the mandate powers. While control over the Eritrean territories 
was highly contested by various regional empires over many centuries, the regions that 
were to become Greater Lebanon had all been part of the Ottoman Empire for a long 
time.  
The colony of Eritrea was carved out through expansionism and partially 
through treaties with Abyssinia in the period of the ‘scramble for Africa’. While there 
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were connections between various communities in the region and the adjacent 
territories, nationalist sentiments in a Western sense did not exist. The emergence of a 
growing self-awareness and consciousness only came through the establishment of a 
comprehensive infrastructure, socio-economic integration and the impact left on the 
social structure of the territory by the Italians. The latter primarily refers to the creation 
of new social classes arising from the Italian policy of land expropriation and 
consequent urbanisation, as well as the drafting of large number of Eritreans into the 
Italian colonial army. In the case of Lebanon, the regional situation was completely 
different when France sought to gain the mandate over the Levantine territories in the 
wake of the demise of the Ottoman Empire. The Arab regions of the Empire were 
already experiencing the emergence of nationalist sentiments and, facing the prospect of 
self-determination, the various communities articulated their own nationalist 
aspirations. The core area of Mount Lebanon had had an autonomous status within the 
Ottoman Empire, based on a system of sectarian representation, and developed an 
‘embryonic’ sense of identity. The creation of Greater Lebanon centred on this 
autonomous unit but, guided by economic considerations, brought communities with 
different nationalist aspirations into the new territorial state. These aspirations were 
largely based on identification with their Syrian neighbours and co-religionists and, 
consequently, allegiance to the new state was refused.   
The differing states of political consciousness at the time of the creation of the 
new territorial entities of Eritrea and Lebanon were certainly due to the difference in 
political development. The Arab regions of the Ottoman Empire were more advanced in 
terms of political awareness and already familiar with the concepts of national 
identification and self-determination, not least because of their earlier contacts with 
Western powers. The Eritrean communities became familiar with the concepts of 
Western political organisation only after they came under Italian control. The 
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development of a national consciousness was not directly fostered by the colonial power 
but slowly emerged and manifested itself in small-scale resistance to the colonial 
regime. Despite largely keeping the Italian administrative apparatus in place, the BMA 
differed from the colonial regime as it was only as a temporary measure, much like the 
French mandate in Lebanon. However, while the BMA had taken over a territorial unit 
that had already existed for 50 years (with exception of the short period as part of Italian 
East Africa), France had created a new territorial unit that only satisfied the wishes of 
part of the population. In both cases the question with regard to the future of the 
territories was whether all the communities involved would be willing and able to 
identify with the territorial state as an integral part of their national identity. This will be 
analysed in the next chapter which mainly examines the nationalist aspirations in Eritrea 
in the final stage of British administration, and compares it with the development of 
nationalist aspirations resulting in the abolishment of the French mandate. 
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Chapter 2: Towards independence? 
By the end of World War II, Eritrea and Lebanon both faced the prospect of 
independence due to developments in the international arena. Italy had been defeated by 
the Allies and, consequently, lost power over its colonial territories in Africa that had 
been part of the battleground. During the British Military Administration this brought 
about the question of the future of Eritrea, and the multi-communal population was 
asked to define its own nationalist aspirations. In the case of Lebanon, nationalist 
aspirations had already been formulated prior to the establishment of the mandate of 
Greater Lebanon. However, the multi-communal state that had been created by the 
French only met the aspirations of one of the communities and had, above all, served 
French interests. The provisions of the mandate had not established a time frame for the 
release of the country into independence, but British domination in the Middle East and 
its attitude towards independence for the mandate territories provided the preconditions 
for its final achievement.   
This chapter will examine the events leading to the end of European control in 
both Eritrea and Lebanon and analyse the state of their national cohesion at that time. It 
will show that both countries were divided by opposing nationalist aspirations that 
defined their identity as either being linked to the neighbouring territorial entity or as 
separate from it within the boundaries of the territorial state created by the 
colonial/mandate regime. However, it will argue that at the same time a certain degree 
of allegiance to the territorial unit had developed. In Lebanon this was strongly fostered 
by economic and power considerations. Indeed, the experience of political consociation 
and power-sharing facilitated a reconciliation of opposed aspirations to achieve 
independence within the boundaries of the territorial state. In Eritrea on the other hand, 
nationalist aspirations had only had a short period to be articulated politically since it 
was only during the BMA that political consciousness was fostered, and this process 
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was strongly influenced by the interests of Ethiopia and the major international powers 
involved in the decision on the future of the territory.  
After the examination of the end of European control, the second part of the 
chapter will give a historical outline of the events leading up to the early 1990s when 
Eritrea finally achieved independence and the civil war in Lebanon ended. This will 
serve as the background for the subsequent chapters that analyse at the post-
colonial/mandate period. 
 
ERITREA 
The disposal of the former Italian colony  
In the Treaty of Peace with Italy of 10 February 1947, the former colonial power 
renounced all rights and titles to its overseas territories and the decision on their final 
disposal was to be taken unanimously by a commission of the Governments of the 
USSR, the US, the UK and France by 15 September 1948.
1
 The interests of Ethiopia, an 
ally of both the UK and the US, played a decisive role in the debate on the disposal of 
the Italian colonies, especially when it came to Eritrea; unlike the British, the US was 
mainly concerned with the issue of access to the sea for Ethiopia while historic links to 
the region were dismissed as ‘vague.’2 Following the principles of the Atlantic Charter 
with regard to the right of self-government and self-determination, the US initially 
proposed the creation of an international trusteeship followed by independence before 
putting their support behind the earlier proposal by the French to put Eritrea back under 
Italian administration for a period of transition. This proposal was also supported by the 
USSR while the UK advocated partition. 
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In order to come to an unanimous decision, the Four Powers decided to send a 
commission to the territories to investigate the wishes of the population. As in the case 
of the King-Crane Commission in pre-mandate Lebanon, the aim was to determine 
whether there existed a strong separate Eritrean identity that would warrant 
independence. The commission visited the territory from November 1947 to January 
1948, held numerous official hearings and accepted submission of the political views of 
various political parties as well as religious and professional associations. As the report 
of the Commission of Investigation reveals, a few groups were not included in the 
hearings such as religious minorities in some areas, and in some instances pro-Ethiopian 
forces actually prevented people from attending hearings.
3
 Union with Ethiopia, full 
independence for Eritrea and a ‘Greater Eritrea’, incorporating the Tigrinya speakers 
south of the river Mareb were among the desired realizations of self-determination.
4
 The 
final report of the Commission concluded that 55.2% of the people were in support of 
Eritrean independence.
5
 Yet, the degree of political understanding of the population was 
actually doubted by the Commission of Investigation, and Eritrean representatives were 
described as ‘politically backward’ and ‘coached by their party leaders in the 
appropriate replies to be given.’6 The Four Powers again failed to come to an 
agreement, mainly due to their differing wider interests as Iyob rightfully noted. While 
the emerging superpowers of the US and the USSR were competing to establish a 
foothold in the Horn of Africa, France was worried about its own colonial possessions 
and wanted ‘to prevent precedents of early independence for its colonies in the Horn 
and the Maghreb.’7 For the British, partition would have meant an expansion of their 
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own colonial possessions in the region. Negash on the other hand asserts that the British 
plan for partition ‘was based primarily on their appreciation of the local realities’.8  
In fact, amidst international discussions regarding the future of the territory, and 
frustration with continuous foreign occupation, the political climate within the territory 
was tense and the anti-colonialist nationalist platform fragmented into two main camps 
supporting differing nationalist aspirations. When the Four Power Commission toured 
the territory, it not only encountered the Unionist Party (UP) demanding union with 
Ethiopia but also four parties advocating independence (Muslim League, Liberal 
Progressive Party, National Party of Massawa, New Eritrea Pro-Italia Party). The 
Eritrean Orthodox Church also played a decisive role in the formation of public political 
opinion at the time. After having been stripped of its privileges by the European 
colonial powers, alliance with Ethiopia appeared to be a way to regain these privileges, 
an option that was, of course, actively encouraged by the Empire itself. Trevaskis 
described the pro-Ethiopian actions of the Orthodox Church as follows: 
 
By 1942, every priest had become a propagandist in the Ethiopian cause, every village church 
had become a centre of Ethiopian nationalism, and popular religious feast days […] had become 
occasions for open displays of Ethiopian patriotism. The cathedral, monasteries, and village 
churches would be festooned with Ethiopian flags and the sermons and prayers would be 
delivered in unequivocal political language.
9
 
 
This active adoption of ideological leadership by the Church did have some negative 
implications since Christians opposing the pro-Ethiopian ideology were often subjected 
to ‘religious punishments’ such as ex-communication.10 Scholars of the Eritrean 
nationalist school often reiterated accusations made by supporters of independence of 
that time, namely that the UP was supported not only verbally and financially by the 
Orthodox Church and the Empire, but that it was actually created by the latter in order 
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to back up irredentist claims.
11
 Yet, it has to be acknowledged that the pro-Ethiopian 
nationalist sentiment was not merely imposed on its supporters. Specifically the 
inhabitants of the highlands did not only consider themselves as sharing values and 
customs with their neighbours south of the Mareb river, these territories used to be 
inter-connected over the centuries prior to the advent of Italian colonialism. 
Furthermore, as Killion rightfully noted, these aspirations have to be considered ‘a 
manifestation, at least in part, of an anti-colonial ‘proto-nationalism’ that regarded unity 
with Ethiopia as a means of empowering indigenous Eritreans against European 
colonizers.’12 Proponents of independence for the territory, mainly from the Muslim 
lowlands, were also driven by the desire to end colonial rule, yet they saw their 
aspirations best fulfilled as an independent sovereign country that they considered much 
more advanced economically than Ethiopia. Therefore, annexation to Ethiopia was 
considered as ‘going back a hundred years’ in terms of socio-economic development.13
 The legitimacy of the parties advocating for independence was questioned by 
supporters of the unionist cause using the same argument that had been used to discredit 
the UP, namely that the independence movement was instigated from outside, 
predominantly by Britain and Italy who wanted to prolong their control over the 
territory.
14
 It should be noted that, while there was decisive disagreement on how to end 
European colonial domination, neither the UP nor the supporters of independence were 
willing to endorse partition as proposed by the British. This shows that allegiance to the 
territorial unit created by Italian colonialism had developed amongst Eritreans and that 
even the supporters of the opposing nationalist aspiration were ‘imagined’ as belonging 
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to the same nation. In his study on colonial Eritrea, Negash argues against a decisive 
impact on Eritrean national consciousness brought about by the colonial capitalist 
activities. He bases this on the fact that the sections of the Eritrean population that were 
most affected by colonialism, the inhabitants of the highlands, should have been the 
ones rallying for independence but instead fervently supported union with Ethiopia.
15
 
However, this argument ignores the fact that the Muslim communities in the lowlands 
not only witnessed the integration of their territories early on during the colonial period 
through the establishment of infrastructure and agricultural development schemes; they 
had also experienced ‘special’ treatment by the Italians due to their pro-Muslim policy, 
specifically under the fascist regime, which Miran describes as having ‘worked towards 
the genesis and formation of an ‘Eritrean’ Muslim consciousness, at least among the 
growing urban elite’.16 Consequently, it seems only logical that the Eritrean Muslims 
with their developed self-consciousness would rather have seen their aspirations 
fulfilled in an independent Eritrean state than in a larger Christian Ethiopia where they 
would be reduced to a minority status. 
With Eritrean nationalism being fragmented, and the Four Powers unable to 
come to a unanimous decision, the matter of Eritrea’s disposition was passed to the 
United Nations. However, the discussions in the General Assembly mainly reiterated 
earlier proposals regarding its future. The necessity of access to the sea remained 
Ethiopia’s main argument for its claim over the territory, and long term cultural and 
religious links were also stressed. Italy, despite the official renunciation of any right to 
its former colonial possession had been successfully lobbying for Italian trusteeship 
over at least parts of its former colonies. The result was the division of the UN General 
Assembly into a pro-Italian bloc (mainly Latin American states and France) and an anti-
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Italian pro-independence group (mainly the Asiatics).
17
 An agreement was hammered 
out between Britain and Italy, the Bevin-Sforza agreement, in which the British 
proposal for partition of Eritrea was incorporated.
18
 The agreement was based only on 
the interests of international powers and did not take the wishes of the inhabitants of the 
territories into consideration. It was rejected by the UN mainly because of its provisions 
for the other two former Italian colonies, Libya and Somalia. Instead it was decided to 
send another Investigation Commission to Eritrea.  
Within Eritrea, political conditions had deteriorated decisively partly due to the 
negatively perceived Bevin-Sforza agreement and fears of partition. Anti-Italian 
sentiments were running high and shifta activities increased decisively, taking on the 
form of a ‘political weapon’.19 At their height (1947 to 1952) they were triggered by the 
widespread uncertainty concerning the future of the territory and, initially, mainly 
directed against Italians. However, the shiftas also targeted advocates of Eritrean 
independence, specifically in the wake of the arrival of both the Four Power and the UN 
Commissions of Inquiry. Kibreab asserts that they were deliberately planned to coincide 
with the arrivals of the missions of inquiry.
20
 Ethiopia was often accused of financing 
and instigating the shifta activities against anyone opposing the struggle for Eritrean 
union with Ethiopia.
21
 Gebre-Medhin refers to documents found by the British 
authorities and deposited in the British National Archives that prove links between the 
Assistant of the Ethiopian Liaison Office and shifta activities of the UP’s Youth 
League.
22
 Yet, in a telegram from the Chief Administrator of Eritrea to the Foreign 
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Office it was emphasized that behind the attacks were rather ‘local Eritrean shifta 
leaders, with perhaps some Ethiopians in their gangs, who have sympathetic instigation 
from the local Unionist Party.’23 Incidentally, the politically motivated shifta activities 
largely ended after the UN decision on federation with Ethiopia and the declaration of a 
general amnesty by the British administration.
24
 Aside from the shifta actually having 
been a traditional instrument of social protest throughout Eritrean and Ethiopian history, 
the use of banditry to create a feeling of insecurity and to push through political 
aspirations was actually not a phenomenon limited to the northeast African regions. It 
had also been used in Lebanon in the wake of the establishment of the French mandate 
with a similar goal as in Eritrea, namely to ensure that territories containing co-
religionists would be joined with the larger neighbouring state that had only just come 
into existence itself. Moreover, it has to be noted that while the politicization of 
religion, due to the division of nationalist aspirations largely running along religious 
lines, resulted in certain schisms and also culminated in some violent clashes between 
Christians and Muslims, it did not degenerate into a larger civil conflict along religious 
lines. In fact, religious leaders and elders from both denominations actively promoted 
reconciliation in order to avoid the confrontations turning into larger sectarian 
violence.
25
 
The UN Commission of Investigation, which included representatives from 
Burma, Guatemala, Norway, Pakistan and South Africa, spent roughly four months in 
Eritrea in early 1950, but since ‘there were marked differences in regard to essential 
factual matters’ failed to deliver even a joint report.26 Guatemala and Pakistan were in 
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support of independence, mainly because they were convinced that the Muslim Eritrean 
population would never accept any form of annexation or federation. Burma, Norway 
and South Africa on the other hand submitted a memorandum which concluded that 
Eritrea lacked the capacity for self-government largely due to the high illiteracy rate 
and, furthermore, was not viable as an economic unit. While the report further stated 
that support for independence within the territory had actually decreased, it noted that  
a common past and seventy years of common rule have had potent unifying effects not only 
between the diverse peoples of Eritrea but also in their relations with the Italian settlers; such 
amity cannot readily be destroyed and there is no doubt that resort to violence is repugnant to the 
deep-rooted desire of all sections in Eritrea to continue to live in peace side by side.
27 
 
This ruled out any form of partition of the territory. Based on an additional proposal 
submitted by Burma and South Africa, federation with Ethiopia was recommended and 
a draft resolution with a detailed plan was developed. Federation was seen as a 
compromise solution since the problem in Eritrea was considered to be the existence of 
‘two ardent forms of nationalism’ that were irreconcilable because both had ‘the stamp 
of validity’.28 The US agreed that an autonomous Eritrea federated with Ethiopia 
represented a just solution for the opposed interpretations of nationalism, since the 
autonomy within the Ethiopian Empire would ‘satisfy element [sic] supporting 
independence Eritrea’.29 Yet, US support of the federation proposal was also triggered 
by the increasing realization of the strategic importance of the territory. In 1949, the 
achievement of a ‘long-term agreement assuring the continued right to maintain and 
operate existing communication facilities at Asmara, Eritrea’ was considered a military 
necessity by the US that ‘should be obtained on the highest priority.’30 The conviction 
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that this would be more likely if the territory was under Ethiopian sovereignty was also 
nurtured by Ethiopian military support in the Korean War. Despite continuing 
opposition in the General Assembly and within Eritrea, the resolution was adopted on 
24 November 1950 by a vote of 38 to 14, with 8 abstentions.
31
 
In accordance with the resolution, a United Nations Commissioner went to 
Eritrea to draft a Constitution in cooperation with Eritrean political and religious leaders 
and after consultations with inhabitants of the territory.
32
 On 25 and 26 of March the 
first ever elections in Eritrea took place. The Unionist leader Tedla Bairu was voted 
President of the Assembly, and the leader of the Moslem League of the Western 
Province, Ali Mohammed Mussa Radai, Vice-President. Under its UN-designated 
autonomous status, the Eritrean political system was based on power-sharing, drawn 
along religious lines:  
 
As in other parts of the world where two religious communities, almost equally balanced, live 
together, side by side, the Coptic Christians and the Moslems in Eritrea share the positions of 
precedence in the state between themselves. Thus the Chief Executive is a Christian and the 
President of the Legislature is a Moslem; the latter’s Deputy is a Copt and of the six Secretaries 
of the Eritrean administrative departments half are Copts and half are Moslems. Again, the 
Mayor of Asmara is a Christian (though not a Copt) and his Deputy a Moslem. Of the 66 
members of the Assembly 33 are Moslems and the great Mohammedan religious festivals are 
officially declared as general public holidays.
33
  
 
A similarly balanced power-sharing could be found in all the divisional offices. The 
only exception was the central administrative department in Asmara, where the ratio 
favoured the Christians; this can be explained by the lower educational levels of the 
Muslim population in general as well as the preference of better educated Muslims to 
work in commerce rather than in the civil service. Overall, this system of power-sharing 
can be described as one of ‘political consociation’ and is thus comparable to that 
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adopted in Lebanon.  
During negotiations on the exact terms of the agreement, the Emperor had tried 
to push through things aimed at annexation rather than federation such as the 
appointment of the Eritrean Government by the Emperor. He also opposed the idea of a 
separate flag for Eritrea as well as plans for the preservation of the distinct languages of 
the Eritrean territory, albeit with no success.
34
 In fact, the granting of the flag as a 
symbol of autonomy and the preservation of Tigrinya and Arabic as official languages, 
in addition to the democratic institutions provided for the autonomous unit, have to be 
considered of utmost importance in the crystallisation of an Eritrean identity. Not only 
would they serve to ‘differentiate’ Eritrea from the rest of the Ethiopia but also facilitate 
the ‘imagining’ of the various communities as part of the Eritrean unit. 
 Eritrea was officially federated with Ethiopia after the Eritrean Constitution was 
finalized in July 1952, and the Federal Act was approved in Ethiopia on 15 September 
1952. Inside Eritrea, the federation was accepted as a compromise by both the Unionists 
and the ‘Independentists’ who adapted their plans to realize their nationalist aspirations 
within the autonomous institutions created for Eritrea.  
 
LEBANON 
Achieving independence and the national pact  
While Eritrea only witnessed the prospect of self-determination and the considerations 
of their wishes towards the end of World War II, the Lebanese had already been through 
the exercise prior to the French mandate period. The territorial entity of Greater 
Lebanon as established by the mandate power only satisfied the nationalist aspirations 
of one community within its boundaries, yet all the inhabitants had understood the 
French mandate to be a temporary measure and, hence, were anticipating their 
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achievement of independence. 
During World War II, conditions favourable to Lebanon’s independence 
increased decisively due to a number of developments, especially the competition 
between France and the UK concerning the future of the peoples in the Near East and 
the situation in France itself. After the collapse of France under Nazi occupation in 
1940, the Germans attempted to get a foothold in the territories by promising 
independence as the Vichy government in the Levant became increasingly unpopular.
35
 
 
The Lebanese in particular grew resentful of being controlled by a country itself under 
enemy occupation. In fact, agreements on independence had already been negotiated but 
not ratified by the French parliament which was reluctant to give up any mandate 
power. In 1941, the Free French and British troops managed to overthrow the Vichy 
administration in both Lebanon and Syria in a concerted effort, however the prospect of 
the Free French taking over control in the territories was not met with great enthusiasm 
by either population. British administration appeared to be more appealing since the 
British were considered more supportive of independence. However, the British 
guaranteed to both Syria and Lebanon that the promise of independence would be 
realized under Free French administration.36 
Hence, while they were still under French mandate by the end of World War II, 
Lebanon and Syria had the promise of imminent independence secured by the British. 
Churchill’s personal representative to the Free French, Sir Edward Spears, described 
how the Lebanese had these expectations in mind and ‘[i]t was fascinating to see the 
pride of nationhood developing in quite ordinary people; sailors in the harbour, taxi 
drivers, began to feel they were now citizens of a beautiful country, the loveliness of 
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which they seemed to realize for the first time’.37 However, it must be questioned 
whether the anticipation of independence can be considered an expression of genuine 
nationhood or whether it was rather an anti-mandate nationalist sentiment. 
In fact, the earlier differences concerning nationalist aspirations were brought up 
again during discussions surrounding the matter of impending elections and the 
elaboration of a constitution for an independent Lebanon. The matter of contention was 
the allocation of seats in the new parliament and Muslim communities threatened to 
boycott the elections as they felt the distribution of power, based on the 1932 census, 
was unfair (32 Christian as opposed to 22 Muslim deputies). The numbers recorded by 
the 1932 census were no longer considered to be accurate as demographic changes had 
almost equalised the Christian-Muslim ratio.
38
 Letters of protest were sent to the 
representatives of Great Britain, the US and Egypt. Sunni elites even called for a re-
union with Syria of the provinces that had been attached to Greater Lebanon in 1920 in 
case the demands for equal representation were not met.
39
 Sir Edward Spears reported 
though that ‘this idea was particularly unwelcome among the Lebanese Moslems.’40 In 
fact, the Muslim boycott was quickly renounced after a revised agreement allocated 30 
seats to the Christians and 25 to the Muslim and the Druze. This implies that the idea of 
recourse to (re-) union with Syria was only used to put pressure on the Christian 
communities to agree to the adjustment of the seat quota. Envisioning the achievement 
of independence within the boundaries of Greater Lebanon became possible for the 
Muslim communities as long as they felt fairly represented in the state. In fact, within 
the Syrian state the Muslim communities of Lebanon would have become part of a 
Muslim majority and, consequently, had less political influence. Furthermore, as 
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Chaitani noted, economic considerations also played a decisive role since within the 
boundaries of Greater Lebanon the capital of Beirut had developed into ‘an 
administrative and trading centre, and an important gateway to the Arab hinterland.’41 
While reconciliation of the previously opposed nationalist aspirations of Lebanese 
Christians and Muslims was mainly based on the agreement to end French domination, 
the elites of both sides realized that a solution to the remaining contentious issue of the 
identity of the country was necessary. During negotiations on Lebanon’s independence 
in Cairo in June 1942, Bishara al-Khoury and Riad al-Sulh had already come to an 
agreement that would be established in the summer of 1943, and together with the new 
constitution would form the basis for independent Lebanon. The formula of the 
agreement that came to be known as ‘National Pact’ was Christian acceptance of the 
Arab identity of Lebanon and renunciation of Western protection in exchange for 
Muslim acceptance of the legitimacy and independence of the Lebanese state. Included 
was a formula for sectarian representation, also enshrined in the constitution of 
independent Lebanon which, with the exception of the new ratio agreed upon, left the 
main articles relating to the sectarian system of the 1926 constitution largely untouched. 
While agreement was reached amongst the communities of Lebanon, de Gaulle 
was still reluctant to give up the mandate territories for good and attempted to trade the 
elections for treaties. His brazen statements such as ‘there is no question of France 
maintaining the same position she occupied in Syria before the war’ not only gave 
offence to the local governments but also put the guarantees given by the British into 
question.
42
 Under great pressure Lebanese elections took place in July 1943. The 
Christian Bishara al-Khoury became the first President, and Riad al-Sulh (Sunni 
Muslim) the first Prime Minister of independent Lebanon. Following the elections, the 
Lebanese government asked for the French mandate to officially end and to have all 
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authority transferred to the newly elected Lebanese Government. Furthermore, Arabic 
was designated the only official language of the country. The French reacted by 
suspending the Constitution and dismissing the government. The majority of the 
ministers, including the President and the Prime Minister, were arrested; some were 
able to flee to the mountains from where they started to agitate.
43
 Emile Eddé was 
appointed the new head of government by the French authorities. This was not only a 
violation of Lebanon’s right to self-determination but also an open affront to the British 
who had observed the elections and continuously guaranteed the independence of 
Lebanon. At this point, the Lebanese government was determined to finally push 
through the independence that had long been promised to them. French behaviour had 
further alienated the Christian community, its traditionally close ally in the region, and 
helped to forge unity between the Christian and Muslim components of the Lebanese 
government. Lord Casey reported from his conversation with the representative of the 
Maronite community in Lebanon, that Archbishop Monseigneur Mobarek affirmed that 
the ‘French now had to go finally’.44 He further noted the ‘complete accord between 
Christians and Moslems’ and that ‘[t]he country could not be held quiet for much 
longer.’45 During the meeting, it was also made clear that if the British did not protect 
the Lebanese from the French, they would take matters in their own hands. While the 
Free French actually tried to trick the Archbishop into a public declaration of support,
46
 
Mobarek publicly affirmed his sympathy with the lawfully elected Lebanese 
government and vowed to fight for the unity of Lebanese of all denominations:  
 
They must know that the propaganda which they sow by words serves only to increase unity and 
cohesion between both Moslem, Christian and Druze alike around Lebanese independence and 
self-respect and liberty. [...] I beg you, O sons of Islam and Druzes and Lebanese Christians, as I 
                                                          
43
 TNA, FO226/245 (File 94 I), Cypher Telegram from H.M Minister, Beirut to the Foreign Office, No. 
637, 11.11.1943. 
44
 Sir Edward Spears (1977), p. 248/249. 
45
 Ibid., p. 249. 
46
 TNA, FO226/245 (94II), Cypher Telegram by H.M. Minister, Beirut to the Foreign Office, No. 656, 
12.11.1943. 
95 
 
beg every Lebanese to be in readiness to shed his blood to water the roots of our cedar which 
thirsts for blood.
47
 
 
 
French proposals to release, but not reinstate, the ministers were dismissed by the 
British and attempts to approach the elected Lebanese government in its refuge in the 
mountains were unsuccessful.
48
 
The British finally set an ultimatum for the release and reinstatement of the 
Lebanese president and the ministers, or else martial law would be imposed and the 
prisoners freed by British troops. General Catroux himself recognized that the French 
‘had failed to notice the development of a Lebanese nationalism’49 and ‘the strength of 
nationalist feeling and [...] complete unanimity of all sections of the population’.50 With 
the Lebanese population on the cusp of revolt, the French finally gave in to the pressure. 
They released and reinstated the elected government which was met with great joy by 
the population of the country:  
 
The twenty-second of November was principally noteworthy for the fact that large crowds 
carrying deputies shoulder-high converged on the Chamber, while others tore down the old 
Lebanese flag (the French tricolour with a cedar on the white) and replaced it by the new banner 
which consisted of a broad white band between two red ones, and a cedar tree on the white, as on 
the old flag.
51
 
 
 
The spirit of unity sweeping the country was also voiced by leaders of the various 
communities, such as the Moslem leader of Tripoli Hamid Karame. While hoisting the 
new flag himself, he declared that ‘in future no one in the Lebanon should speak of 
Christians and Moslems, but only of Lebanese.’52 
The National Pact, which was essential in achieving reconciliation between the 
Lebanese communities and facilitated independence, was described by the Lebanese 
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journalist René Aggiouri as the ‘expression of the will of the different minorities to 
coexist within the structures of an independent and sovereign state’.53 In that sense, it 
represents the foundation stone for a possible civic nation bound together by the 
transcending will to live together. National symbols had evolved, such as a common 
flag that was hoisted by members of all communities amidst the achievement of 
independence. The Pact, in combination with the Constitution and the Electoral Law, 
converted Lebanon into a constitutional democracy in which all crucial political 
questions could be solved by consensus only.
54
 
Yet, as Hourani pointed out, the 
agreement of the National Pact was only amongst the leaders of the communities and 
not necessarily the expression of a widespread agreement that existed among the 
Lebanese people, or as he put it, ‘that there really existed a Lebanese political society’.55 
In fact, the Lebanese president in the period leading up to independence, Alfred 
Naccache, had noted that  
 
[t]here is very little feeling of civic responsibility in this country. There is very little national 
sentiment. The Lebanon is not, according to occidental standards, a nation. It is little more than a 
conglomeration of populations of different religions, and religion here is the important thing.
56
 
 
The question after independence was whether the provisions of the National Pact would 
be sufficient to turn this conglomeration into a federation of religious communities, 
adhering to an overarching national identity related to the territorial state of Lebanon. 
Since communities remained politicized and religious identity was not moved to the 
private realm, the imminent danger remained that conflict would always automatically 
acquire a religious connotation and the preservation of the identity of the religious 
community remain the priority. 
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Formally, the mandate was ended by the Franco-Syrian-Lebanese Tripartite Agreement 
of 22 December 1943 and the Lebanese Republic received the ‘blessing of the two 
superpowers’, the US and the USSR, through their recognition of Lebanon as a fully 
independent state on 19 and 20 September 1945 respectively.
57
 
 
ERITREA 
Eritrea as an autonomous part of the Ethiopian Empire and annexation  
Similar to the Lebanese, the Eritreans exited European domination with their own 
constitution based on power-sharing between the religious communities and their own 
elected government; yet, these institutions had been established by the international 
community for an autonomous unit that was joined with Ethiopia through federation. 
Moreover, from the very beginning Ethiopia started weakening the autonomous Eritrean 
institutions and worked towards annexation of the territory. The attitude of the Emperor 
and the Ethiopian administration during the negotiations on the federal agreement had 
already shown that it was interested in incorporation rather than federation. Indeed days 
before the federal plan was officially installed, the Ethiopians took measures to 
physically control the territory by ‘a brigade of Ethiopian troops’ as well as ‘an virtual 
army of Shewan tax collectors and bureaucrats’.58 Suppression started with decisively 
limiting the freedom of the press, especially with regard to any voice critical of the 
Ethiopian regime. Measures such as incarceration were taken against critics from both 
the Muslim and the Coptic Christian communities and a number of prominent Eritrean 
nationalists were forced into exile, including the Protestant Woldeab Woldemariam and 
the Muslim Ibrahim Sultan, both elected members of the first Eritrean parliament and 
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staunch nationalists who fled to nearby Egypt.
59
  
The situation initially appeared more difficult for the Muslim population of 
Eritrea since Eritrean Muslims were being discriminated against both by the Imperial 
government and by the Eritrean government, which was completely dominated by the 
UP.
60
 A British memorandum of May 1953 noted that the Chief Executive of Eritrea 
and UP leader, Tedla Bairu, had failed to implement the democratic provisions of the 
constitution, violated the freedom of the press and vetoed persons politically opposed to 
him.
61
 The developments in the territory and Ethiopian behaviour did not go unnoticed 
by the international community. Shortly before Christmas 1953, a US intelligence report 
noted that ‘[t]he federation of Ethiopia and Eritrea is leading to dissatisfaction in the 
latter area due to Ethiopia’s tendency to ignore the local autonomy assured Eritrea by 
the UN. The federation increasingly will be dominated by Ethiopia despite Eritrean 
protest.’62 In fact, the Ethiopian representative in the Eritrean parliament openly 
declared in 1955 that ‘there is no internal or external affair as far as the office of His 
Imperial Majesty’s representative is concerned and there will be none in the future.’63
 
In 
1957, the British ambassador noted in a report that annexation was basically only a 
matter of time and the autonomy of the Eritrean province was no more than a ‘facade’ 
by the later 1950s.
64
 In his study on the federation period, Negash argues that it was not 
the Ethiopian but rather the Eritrean government that ‘on its own initiative dismantled 
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the federation.’65 Yet, most of the relevant positions were actually occupied by members 
of the UP heavily directed by Ethiopia. In 1955, Tedla Bairu was forced to resign from 
his position as Chief Executive of Eritrea after growing increasingly unpopular within 
Eritrea.
66
 Asfaha Woldemichael, Vice Representative of the Emperor in Eritrea and 
according to British assessment ‘a man even more closely bound to Unionist interests’ 
than Tedla Bairu, was voted his successor in a secret ballot in August of the same 
year.
67
 Woldemichael did not renounce his former position of Vice Representative of 
the Emperor after being appointed Chief Executive of Eritrea, which resulted in the 
lines of authority being blurred and the autonomous status of Eritrea being 
compromised.
68
 It seems hardly surprising that this contributed decisively to the 
acceleration of the dismantlement. 
The abolition of the Eritrean flag in 1958 and the introduction of Amharic as the 
official language in 1959 were parts of a gradual process of annexation that culminated 
in the forcing of the Eritrean assembly to dissolve itself and vote for union with 
Ethiopia. Eritrea was officially declared part of the Ethiopian Empire on 14 November 
1962. Even the advisor to Haile Selassie, the American John Spencer, had to admit that 
these acts plainly ‘violated the spirit of UN resolution 390 V’, but he believed that it 
would be ‘more difficult to claim that a technical violation of the resolution had been 
committed.’69 In fact, as British documents reveal, the take-over was considered a 
violation of the UN resolution; yet the fact that the dissolution of the Eritrean Assembly 
and union with Eritrea had actually been voted for by the Eritrean Assembly 
complicated the matter since, as such, it would have to be considered an act of self-
determination.
70
 At the same time, the irregularities surrounding the vote were known 
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and it was noted how ‘they beat the hedgerows on November 13 for reluctant Eritrean 
Deputies and even then had to push the measure through by acclamation without a vote 
or even a show of hands: and we still do not know how many Deputies there were 
present.’71 The fact that neither the British nor the rest of the international community 
officially disapproved of the events in Eritrea may be explained by ‘the convenient 
distraction afforded by the graver events in Cuba, China and India’ at that moment.’72  
 
The struggle for independence  
While pro-independence sentiments in the territory had never completely ceased to 
exist, Ethiopian policies and the slow abrogation of the federation certainly contributed 
to the Eritrean independence movement growing in strength. Cliffe noted the impact of 
‘the failure of Ethiopian policy to build an alternative national consciousness’ on the 
growth of ‘a genuine pan-Eritrea national consciousness’, especially in the 1970s when 
it became shared by the Christian population as well.
73
  
In fact, instead of trying to build an alternative national consciousness Ethiopia, 
lacking a cohesive national identity itself, wanted to forcefully impose the identity of 
the Amhara elite on Eritrea and all other communities within its boundary. Anthony D. 
Smith has noted how the establishing of national identity around a ‘core ethnic 
community’ can serve to create a civic and territorial nation in a multi-communal 
society. However, this can only be successful if enough space is left for the other 
existing minority communities to prosper.
74
 Therefore the imposition of the Amharic 
identity on Eritrea, where a national consciousness had already developed during the 
BMA and the process of building its own autonomous institutions, was destined to lead 
to conflict. In fact, leaders of the independence movement reiterated their rejection of 
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what they called ‘Unity by Force’, and the abolition of autonomous achievements such 
as the Constitution.
75
  
Ethiopian repressive policies in Eritrea not only alienated Eritrean Muslims, but 
also the Christian population. Eritrean Christians had supported union with Ethiopia to 
realize their own nationalist aspirations but were quickly disillusioned by the disregard 
of Eritrea’s autonomous status. Consequently, in the 1950s and 1960s they started to 
join the resistance to Ethiopian hegemony in the territory, albeit in limited numbers. 
They participated in popular demonstrations and strikes largely organized by workers’ 
and students’ associations ‘which waged organized action and demonstrations towards 
the end of the Fifties.’76 The 1958 nation-wide strike organized by the Union of Free 
Workers of Eritrea was supported by both Christians and Muslims and Yohannes 
asserts that this indeed made it ‘evident that a unified nationalist leadership composed 
of Moslems and Christians was in the making.’77 
Since Ethiopian policies in Eritrea did not allow any opposition to form, and a 
number of prominent Eritrean nationalist figures lived in exile, Eritrean independence 
movements started organizing abroad. The origin of what would turn into an armed 
struggle for independence can be traced back to the formation of the Eritrean Liberation 
Movement (ELM) in the Sudan. While the leadership was based abroad it functioned 
through a network of cells existing in all Eritrean cities, and due to its secular ideology 
it appealed to Christians and Muslims alike. Its strategy was mainly based on raising 
awareness and encouraging civil disobedience; however, it did take up military action 
shortly before its demise in 1964 when it came into competition with the Eritrean 
Liberation Front (ELF) that had been established in Cairo by the leadership of the 
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former independence movement and nationalist Eritrean students in 1960. From its 
inception the ELF promoted a military solution and quickly found followers inside 
Eritrea and among Eritreans serving in the Sudanese army and police force.
78
 The ELF’s 
first fighters came almost exclusively from the Muslim lowlands and received support 
from a number of Arab states which made the front look suspicious to many Eritrean 
Christians. Furthermore, it made the Ethiopian government ‘well positioned to present 
the ELF as an organization inspired by Arabism and Islam, confronting an African, pro-
Western Christian state.’79
  
The first shot, marking the beginning of the armed struggle in Eritrea, was fired 
by Hamid Idris Awate on 1 September 1961. While Awate was depicted as a patriotic 
hero in independent Eritrea, and the date made a public holiday, his role has to be 
considered as being far from uncontested. During the Italian colonial period, Awate had 
been an Askari for many years, unwilling to submit to the new administration after the 
territory came under control of the BMA. Negash describes him as one of the ‘most 
notorious’ bandits (shifta) who was raiding the Kunama and Baria people with his own 
small army in the 1940s and 1950s.
80
 In fact, his raids left a lasting negative impression 
of ‘mass murder’ on the affected communities as Lassier showed in her anthropological 
study on the Kunama in Eritrea.
81
 The launch of the armed struggle by him has often 
been depicted as spontaneous rebellion; yet, it was in fact initiated by requests from 
ELF leader Idris Mohamed Adem and ELF proponent Muhammad Sheikh Dawd.
82
  
The Ethiopian response to growing Eritrean nationalism and its increasingly 
violent expression can only be described as immediate and brutal. Accounts of 
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Ethiopian brutality in Eritrea include everything from burning down villages and 
slaughtering  livestock  to  arbitrary detention,  rape  and  torture.
83   
In  December  1970, 
Eritrea  was  placed  under  martial  law  which  allowed  Ethiopia  to  rule  the  territory 
through military commanders.
84  
The independence movement experienced internal 
struggles  towards  the  end  of the  1960s,  caused  by ethnic tensions  in  several  areas 
fuelled  by  the  repressive  practices  of  the  ELF,  and  tensions  between  the  outside 
leadership and the fighters. These were exacerbated when educated cadres and a larger 
number of Christian highlanders started joining the Front. As demands for reforms went 
unanswered, increasing divisions resulted in a number of top to bottom splits between 
1968 and 1970. Connell asserts that the leadership prevented the development of ‘a 
truly national organization with a nationwide military strategy and a social content to 
their struggle’, while the majority of its members were fighting for exactly that.85  In 
fact, despite the splits of the liberation movement, more and more people joined the 
armed struggle. As conversations with ex-fighters reveal, the decision on which 
organization to join was not based on the agendas of the various movements but rather 
on proximity and personal contacts.
86  
In 1970, The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front 
(EPLF) emerged out of dissident groups of mixed religious adherence and became 
embroiled in two rounds of civil war with the ELF. The first civil conflict from 1972- 
1974 only ended due to public pressure. Attempts to build a united front failed mainly 
due to the conflict over hegemony over the independence struggle.  Instead tensions 
were exacerbated and loyalty to each group was reinforced leading to the outbreak of 
the second civil war at the beginning of the 1980s. 
That  the  nationalist  struggle  for  independence  was  not  completely defeated 
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during the first civil conflict to the fact that Ethiopia was dealing with its own internal 
struggles. In 1974, the Ethiopian Revolution replaced the old regime of Haile Selassie 
with the new, more Communist-oriented system of the Dergue. The Ethiopian power 
struggle allowed both Eritrean fronts to progress decisively, and they managed to gain 
control of most of the countryside and many towns by 1977. However, just one year 
later a major setback was suffered when the Ethiopian army, greatly bolstered by their 
new ally the Soviet Union, took back control over most areas. The ELF was hit 
especially hard by the Ethiopian army while the EPLF was able to save the majority of 
its forces due to a timely strategic retreat. Already weakened by fighting the Ethiopians, 
the second civil war led to the ELF being pushed into the Sudan border area by the 
forces of the EPLF in 1982. The ELF further suffered from increasing internal splits and 
disintegrated more and more. 
Inside the field, the EPLF had become the sole liberation organization and began 
to create a strong political campaign on the national and international level in order to 
attain recognition of the legitimacy of the Eritrean struggle. At the same time, it 
continued functioning as a military organization and carried on the armed struggle. 
While new ‘professionalized’ diplomatic efforts finally managed to break the 
international isolation of the independence movement, US attempts to negotiate a 
peaceful settlement between the liberation front and the Ethiopian regime failed.
87
 The 
EPLF was able to achieve some decisive military victories though, especially in the 
battle of Afabet in 1988 and the capture of Massawa on 10 February 1990. The parallel 
campaign against the Ethiopian regime waged by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF), an umbrella organization uniting various armed Ethiopian 
opposition groups, proved critical in capturing Asmara and in achieving complete 
victory. The EPLF had strong links with the EPRDF, especially with one of its largest 
                                                          
87
 See Ruth Iyob (1995), p. 133 ff. 
105 
 
groups, the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and they coordinated their 
attacks against the Ethiopian army. On 24 May 1991, the EPLF took over Asmara. The 
following day, the EPDRF took control over Addis Ababa and established an interim 
Government coalition. Military victory was also facilitated by the fact that the Mengistu 
regime in Addis Ababa had lost most of its military and financial support despite 
continuous attempts to portray the conflict in Eritrea as part of a larger anti-Arab 
alliance. Although in control of the entire territory, including the capital Asmara, the 
EPLF ‘stopped short of declaring full sovereignty’ and agreed to a referendum that was 
to be observed and verified by the UN in order to gain full international legitimacy.
88
 
The interim Government in Addis Ababa, with the TPLF as its largest faction, agreed 
Eritrea’s right to self-determination and supported the decision for an internationally 
supervised referendum which was held between 23 and 25 April 1993 and resulted in a 
clear majority of over 99 per cent voting for independence.  
While the long struggle for independence had brought together Eritreans of all 
religious and ethno-linguistic communities, Iyob warned that ‘the evolution of a 
common identity in the face of an external threat […] should not be mistaken for a full-
fledged national identity.’89 In fact, the EPLF90 recognized in their National Charter 
that the Eritrean process of nation-building was not over yet:  
 
Nationhood is a long, complicated historical process ... this process is not yet concluded [so] we 
should consider the development and strengthening of Eritrean nationalism and the unity of its 
people ... It is necessary to build a national government which ... rejects all divisive attitudes and 
activities, places national interest above everything else and enables participation of all sectors of 
Eritrean society.
91
  
 
 
The foundation for an effective governmental and administrative framework had been 
laid in the liberated areas during the struggle, and national symbols and a common 
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history of struggle existed. The Eritrean government would now have the task of 
transforming a highly militarized society and creating civil values that could serve as 
the basis for an overarching national identity for members of all the religious and ethno-
linguistic communities in a state in which they would all be represented equally.  
 
LEBANON 
Stability through the National Pact?  
While the Eritreans, deprived of their autonomous status, had to fight to achieve their 
independence, the Lebanese had to make co-existence work in their independent state 
after the end of the French mandate. The events leading up to the achievement of 
independence had given the impression that a broadly based Lebanese cohesiveness had 
developed. However, the basic ideological problem concerning the identity of the 
country had been only superficially solved by the National Pact and only on the elite 
level. The possibility of an overarching national identity developing through allegiance 
with the state was decisively hampered by the reinforcement of the sectarian system 
through the National Pact and the constitution, not only because it ‘was an inadequate 
way to run a modern country’ but because it preserved Maronite domination.92 
Furthermore, it facilitated the nurturing of communal ties with regional and 
international powers.
 
In order to preserve its independence and sovereignty in the Arab context, 
Lebanon tried to demonstrate its engagement with Arab states within the framework of 
the Arab League, becoming one of its founding members on 25 September 1944. As 
such, Lebanon also contributed to the drafting of the League’s charter, known as the 
Alexandria Protocol, which contained a special clause on the status of Lebanon 
reaffirming ‘the independence and sovereignty of the Lebanon within her present 
                                                          
92
 David Gilmour, Lebanon: The Fractured Country (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), p. 70. 
107 
 
frontiers.’93 Nevertheless, the Muslim majority quickly grew more and more discontent 
with the system and in 1953 published a manifesto, Moslem Lebanon Today, asking for 
‘effective steps to abolish state sectarianism and afford equality of opportunity and 
treatment to all Lebanese, irrespective of their religious preferences’.94 Worries were 
also voiced that dominance by the Maronites would ‘split Lebanon from the rest of the 
Arab world’.95 The thirteen points put forward in the manifesto included calls for a 
census, a constitutional revision of the sectarian system, and the establishment of a 
completely secular state.  
The political situation in Lebanon had become aggravated by regional events, 
especially the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and the wave of Palestinian refugees 
arriving in Lebanon as a result. Given the precarious sectarian balance of the country, 
the influx of a large number of predominantly Sunni Muslim refugees was considered a 
danger to the system by the Maronite elites.
96 
Palestinian Christian refugees (who 
numbered around 28,000) and a smaller number of Armenian Christian refugees were 
granted citizenship throughout the 1950s. The same right was not extended to 
Palestinian refugees of Muslim faith which, of course, led to criticism by Lebanese 
Muslims who claimed such policy was only ‘to support the officially propagated myth 
of a Christian Lebanon’ and furthermore was considered making ‘a mockery of the 
religious freedom and equality clause of our constitution.’97 Fears grew among the 
Lebanese Muslims that some radical Christian elements wanted to ‘create an anti-Arab 
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and anti-Moslem separatist state in Lebanon’98, while the Christians were afraid of the 
possible influence of Hashemite unity projects in the region, as well as the growing 
influence of Nasser on the Muslim population from the mid-1950s onwards.  
In fact, regional developments decisively impacted Lebanese domestic 
developments and the Muslim community was infected by ‘the virus of the “new” Arab 
nationalism.’99 The first manifestation of this ‘infection’ was the declaration of a 
popular uprising by the leader of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) that 
accused the Lebanese government of being responsible for the ‘bankruptcy of Arab 
nationalism’. The ‘uprising’ was quickly halted by the Lebanese army and collapsed 
completely after only 72 hours.
 100
 In 1952, President Bishara al-Khoury was forced to 
resign amidst sectarian tensions, and Camille Sham’un was elected his successor in 
September of the same year. However, tensions were further aggravated by Sham’un’s 
domestic policies, specifically changes in the electoral system which reduced the 
number of deputies from 77 to 44. As Traboulsi notes, ‘[w]ith the majority of Muslim 
leaders outside parliament, the Muslim ‘street’ was massively attracted to the Nasserist 
nationalist and anti-colonialist discourse.’101 This attraction was further nurtured by 
Sham’un’s foreign policy. Following a neutral stance, Lebanon had joined neither the 
Western-imposed Baghdad Pact between Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and Iran, nor the Arab 
Defence Pact between Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria which was created in response. 
However, Sham’un issued a joint communiqué with the US, linking Lebanon to the 
Eisenhower Doctrine which inflamed domestic and international tensions and entangled 
the country in Cold War dynamics in the region. Furthermore, it led to claims from pro-
Arab elements that alignment with the Western powers was a breach of the covenant of 
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1943 as it turned the country into ‘a bridgehead and base for imperialism’.102 This led to 
mounting opposition, growing allegations of corruption, and the joyous welcome by 
Lebanese Muslims of the founding of the United Arab Republic (UAR). Pro-Arab 
sentiments were also stimulated by propaganda from the newly established Arab state 
asking for ‘the return of those predominantly Muslim areas which had been joined to 
the old Lebanon in the time of the French mandate.’103 Riots and disturbances occurred 
in Tyre, Biqāc and Šūf districts as well as the Hermel area.104 As Hanf says, the 
escalation of regional developments into an internal crisis has to be considered the result 
of the continuously existing split on an ideological level within the Lebanese population 
and the vague formulation of the National Pact that made it possible that ‘controversies 
over foreign policy […] dragged the question of national identity into the political 
arena.’105 
The deteriorating situation weakened the position of President Sham’un and 
created strong opposition to his re-election not only from the majority of the Muslims 
majority but also a ‘substantial fraction of Christians’.106 By June 1958, the situation 
had become very serious and it was evident that Sham’un would not be able to control 
it. When the Iraqi monarchy fell to rebel army units on 14 July 1958, American fears 
over an increasing disintegration of the region greatly intensified. Hence, when 
Sham’un asked for US military intervention, the US agreed and sent marines within 
days. As had been anticipated by the British, the mere presence of American soldiers led 
to a quick ending of the crisis.
107
 Small skirmishes, known as the ‘counter-rebellion’, 
continued for another three weeks until there was agreement on the formation of a 
reconciliatory four-man cabinet comprised of two representatives from the loyalists and 
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two from the rebels. Furthermore, ‘with discreet American mediation’ the election of 
Fuad Shihab as the new President was agreed.
108
 Emile Bustani asserted that the fear of 
an aggravated confrontation facilitated the quick end of the confrontation and was 
confident that ‘[t]he Lebanese in all their factions have learnt their lesson.’109 This 
assessment, however, does not take into consideration that agreement was only reached 
after external intervention and the basic issues underlying the confrontation were still 
left unsolved. In fact, the end of the 1958 crisis is often described by the slogan of ‘No 
Victor, No Vanquished’. 
 
From ‘Shihabism’ to social crisis  
Attempts were made to solve the issues at the root of the conflict over the following 
decade, first under President Fuad Shihab (1958-1964) and then President Charles 
Helou (1964-1970). The period of the two presidencies has become known as the era of 
‘Shihabism’, characterized by policies focused on the development of the physical and 
political infrastructure of the country and, most importantly, on attempts at nation-
building by creating allegiance to the nation as a whole rather than allegiances to 
individual leaders and communities.
110
 The desire to develop the physical infrastructure 
of the country reflected Shihab’s awareness of the growing economic gap in the country 
and the increasing anger of the inhabitants of the more deprived areas. The fact that 
Beirut had become the main port connecting the Arab hinterland to international 
markets had resulted in a flourishing economy with an impressive average growth rate; 
yet it was completely dependent on external factors such as the price of oil and Arab 
capital being transferred from abroad. Furthermore, this favourable economic 
development was mainly confined to Beirut which resulted in increasing social tensions 
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as it widened the economic gap between the city and the rural areas. Infrastructure 
development was considered the first step towards the more equitable distribution of the 
economic prosperity of the country and was accompanied by a rise in spending on 
government schools and a social security system. Measures guaranteeing economic and 
social justice were also meant to help correct the failures of the sectarian system. Yet, 
instead of working towards an abolishment of the latter, the general power-sharing 
framework was basically re-affirmed even though a ‘principle of strict parity’ was 
introduced.
111
  
The new policy soon met with opposition from the traditional business oligarchy 
and the traditional political elites who saw their influence in the administration 
marginalised. Shihab’s political support came mainly from parties that shared similar 
ideas regarding modernization and Shihab was able to win a solid and inclusive base 
within the population. The quickly foiled attempted military coup d’etat on New Year’s 
Eve 1961, led by officers from the SSNP, further helped to rally large sectors of the 
public around the president and his politics.
112
 On the foreign policy level Shihab 
restored Lebanon’s traditional neutrality regarding Arab politics and sought closer 
collaboration with the UAR. While this rapprochement met with opposition from pro-
Western Christians and members of the Sunni bourgeoisie who feared Nasser’s example 
of nationalisations in Egypt in 1961, it ‘calmed tensions between the opposing forms of 
national definition: they were not removed, but much reduced.’113  
The elections of 1964 resulted in a clear victory for the Shihabists, even though 
he refused to extend his term, stating he did not want to become the focus of 
personalized loyalties.
114
 Charles Helou, a compromise candidate, was elected the new 
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president of the country; throughout his time in office he found himself embroiled 
between Shihabists and their opponents. It became more and more obvious that the 
system introduced by Shihab had not been able to close, or even decisively narrow, the 
gap between rich urban populations and poorer inhabitants of rural areas. This 
obviously hampered the overarching goal to create a wider loyalty to the Lebanese 
nation. The government attempted to displace criticism of the economic situation by 
blaming external forces: ‘poverty was attributed to strangers and social problems seen 
as manifestations of a “foreign” conspiracy aiming at destabilising the economy’.115 The 
relatively peaceful and hopeful period of Shihabism in Lebanon was finally shattered by 
the Six Day War in June, 1967.  
 
The Civil War and its settlement  
After the disastrous defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the 
expulsion of the PLO from Jordan following Black September in 1970
116
, Lebanon 
became the main base for the Palestinian guerrilla struggle. Initially there was 
widespread support for Palestinian resistance within Lebanon, but it was soon realized 
that guerrilla raids against Israel from Lebanese territory constituted a threat to Lebanon 
itself. Retaliatory Israeli cross-border shelling was often intentionally directed against 
the Lebanese rather than against the Palestinians in order to turn the population against 
the resistance movement and to put pressure on the Lebanese authorities.
117
 Aside from 
the physical threat of becoming the target of Israeli retaliatory attacks, the presence of 
the fīdā’īn and the fact that they were using Lebanese territory to launch their fight 
turned into a political and ideological issue. As Cobban pointed out, alignment for or 
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against the Palestinian guerrilla movement turned into the key issue, replacing the 
question over alignment for or against Nasser.
118 
Furthermore, protests in support of the 
Palestinian movement were often linked to socio-economic issues prevailing in the 
country, and often ‘such protests seemed devoid of confessional content [...] – a 
dangerous development for the ruling class in a country where the privileges of the elite 
rested on the pillars of a sectarian status quo.’119 The popularity of the Palestinian 
movement constituted a threat to the role of the traditional Lebanese political leaders
 
since parts of the population, specifically in the rural areas in the south, did feel a 
stronger affinity for the Palestinians than for traditional elites or central authority. The 
Sunni Prime Minister, Rashi Karami, tried to regulate the situation in 1969 through the 
conclusion of the Cairo Agreement that basically recognized the legitimacy of the 
Palestinian armed presence in the country and granted it freedom of movement. 
Responsibility for the camps and their inhabitants was to be taken over by local 
committees ‘in cooperation with the local Lebanese authorities within the framework of 
Lebanese sovereignty.’ Furthermore, ‘non-interference in Lebanese affairs’ by the 
organization and its members was also to be guaranteed.
120 
While the agreement 
stressed Lebanon’s independence and sovereignty, it effectively compromised the latter 
as Palestinian refugee camps were no longer under the control of Lebanese authorities 
thus creating small pockets of autonomous, armed forces.  
Furthermore, as a result of ongoing uneven economic development and 
continued Israeli retaliation in the south, more and more members of the rural 
population started moving to the cities, mainly Beirut, and settled in the poverty belts 
around them. A large number came from the Shi’ite rural areas in the south and the east 
of Lebanon. While the Shi
c
a community had remained relatively passive in the 
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Lebanese political arena, its demographic growth, the growing socio-economic gap and 
the appearance of a charismatic leader, Imam Musa Sadr, resulted in the mobilisation of 
the community and its claims for more participation in the sectarian system.  
Rising inflation and living costs further contributed to socio-political tensions 
and the emergence of socially-oriented movements. In fact, for a short while this 
resulted in sentiments of class solidarity and ‘introduced class identities that challenged 
traditional identity patterns based on religion, tribe or region.’121 However, identity 
based on sectarian divisions was quickly reaffirmed after the civil war broke out in 1975 
and went through different phases over the course of fifteen years.
 
The outbreak of hostilities in Lebanon is usually identified with the 
c
Aīn ar-
Rummaneh bus shooting on 13 April 1975, after which violence spread quickly. What 
started as a confrontation between Palestinians and the Maronite Phalange swiftly also 
pitted the latter against the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), which consisted of a 
variety of Sunni, Shi
c
a and leftists groups under the leadership of Kamal Jumblatt.
122
 
The first phase of the civil war ended after direct military intervention by the Syrian 
army and the establishment of the Arab Defence Forces (ADF) by the Arab League in 
the summer of 1976. In 1978 Lebanon witnessed the first direct military intervention by 
Israel on Lebanese territory. This first intervention was followed four years later by the 
invasion of South Lebanon as far as Beirut by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), and 
after the evacuation of the PLO to Tunis, Lebanon was to experience yet another round 
of civil war. While the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon was seriously weakened after 
1982, the remaining militant forces in the refugee camps quickly re-armed themselves. 
This brought them into confrontation with the Shi
c
a ‘Amal movement that, prior to the 
Israeli invasion, ‘had [already] tired of paying the cost – in blood, sorrow, and wealth - 
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of the armed guerrilla presence in their midst’ and started to actively fight the fedayyin 
which led to direct confrontation of the latter by Syria.
123
 Between 1984 and 1987 there 
was fighting between the ‘Amal, backed by Syria, and the Palestinians over the control 
of the refugee camps, known as the ‘War of the Camps’, one of the many sub-conflicts 
of the Lebanese civil war.
124
 Violent conflict during this last phase of the war also 
spilled over into various Lebanese communities. The fact that the whole conflict from 
the beginning had been fuelled by the uncertainty over the identity of the country, which 
was intrinsically linked to sectarian affiliations, left all attempts at reconciliation 
unsuccessful. Following the assassination of Prime Minister Rashid Karami on 1 June 
1987, and the end of President Amin Gemayel’s term of office in September 1988, the 
country witnessed the existence of two parallel governments for a short while. A 
Christian military government established under Michel Aoun, was mainly recognized 
in East Beirut whereas a Sunni civilian government under Selim al-Hoss controlled 
West Beirut. After Aoun’s confrontation with Syria and its allies in Lebanon, he fled to 
exile in Paris at the end of 1990.  
In the meantime, an Arab League committee had started to formulate possible 
solutions to the conflict and during a meeting in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia an agreement was 
reached between Lebanese parliamentarians and ratified on 4 November 1989. The Ta’if 
Agreement included quite a large role for Syria in Lebanon and basically was a 
reaffirmation of the political power-sharing system based on the constitution and the 
1943 National Pact. Once again institutionalised sectarianism was kept alive even 
though the civil war actually witnessed the development of quite a cohesive national 
awareness amongst the Lebanese of all denominations, as will be elaborated later on in 
this study. 
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CONCLUSION 
Towards the end of European control, both Eritrea and Lebanon were not only in a 
similar position with regard to having the prospect of independence at hand, both exited 
the period of European domination in a multi-communal state within the boundaries 
created by the colonial/mandate power, with a system of constitutionally enshrined 
power-sharing and an elected government. However, while Lebanon had become an 
internationally recognized sovereign state, the international community had decided that 
Eritrea would be federated with Ethiopia as an autonomous unit. The Eritrean 
constitution and political system constituted a novelty and were created and enacted by 
the United Nations. While the territory had been under a single administrative unit 
during Italian colonialism, they were now to represent themselves for the first time and 
jointly take decisions concerning internal matters of their autonomous entity. In 
Lebanon on the other hand, both the constitution and the political system were 
continuations of the ones that had been in place during the French mandate, albeit with 
some modifications concerning the equality of representation. Therefore, in both 
countries the foundation for a syncretistic nationalism was existent when the European 
powers departed.  
Preceding this outcome, the populations of both countries had been divided over 
the identity of the country and this division was expressed through opposing nationalist 
aspirations. These clashing identifications were largely ascribed to the religious 
dichotomy of both countries, composed of more or less half Christians and half 
Muslims. In the Lebanese case, competing nationalist aspirations had already 
crystallized prior to the creation of the territorial state when the population first faced 
the prospect of self-determination, and they endured throughout the mandate period. 
However, agreement came about to do away with the mandate and foreign domination. 
During the rather short mandate period, the Muslim communities that had envisioned 
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joining their co-religionists in Syria rather than being part of a multi-communal state 
dominated by a Christian minority had created some allegiance to the new territorial 
state. However, this was not based on reconciliation regarding the question of the 
identity of the country but rather on the experience of political and economic 
participation in the state. Therefore, the pre-condition to join forces against the French 
was more equal participation and an agreement that would, at least superficially, 
reconcile the contentious issue of the identity of Lebanon. This was found through the 
compromise formula of the National Pact. In the Eritrean case, nationalist aspirations 
had only developed towards the end of the colonial period and, as in the case of pre-
mandate Lebanon, the prospect of self-determination and independence led to the 
expression of diametrically opposed positions, albeit both anti-colonial and related to 
the unity of the territorial state created by the Italians, and articulated for the first time 
during the British Military Administration. The opposing forms of national aspiration 
failed to reconcile when the future of the territory was to be decided upon and the 
outcome of the decision must largely be ascribed to the international powers involved. 
The result was federation, and the supporters of both nationalist aspirations 
accommodated themselves to co-exist in the autonomous unit. However, the meddling 
of the Ethiopian authorities in what was supposed to be an autonomous Eritrean 
government during the federation and subsequent annexation contributed to the growing 
urge for self-determination through independence, and finally burst into a violent 
struggle to realise nationalist aspirations. As in the case of Lebanon, nationalist 
aspirations started to reconcile in order to end foreign domination, albeit this time by 
another African country, and in the face of serious repression and the forceful 
imposition of an identity alien to both sides of the Eritrean divide. The territorial state 
created by the colonial power and the autonomous symbols installed by the UN were to 
constitute the reference points for national identification and claims for self-
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determination. In Lebanon on the other hand, while the existence of the state in its 
mandate boundaries was no longer a matter of contention except for tactical reasons, the 
only superficial reconciliation of the different interpretations of national identity 
through the National Pact together with the institutionalized sectarian system, left the 
country vulnerable to events in the instable Arab region. Disagreement over such 
developments led to a number of internal crises and finally culminated in the protracted 
15-year long civil war starting in 1975.  
The following chapter will look at the nationalist discourse in Eritrea and 
Lebanon that, in both cases, reflected definitions of national identity linked to the 
opposed nationalist aspirations examined in this chapter before moving towards a 
tentatively more civic and transcending definition influenced by the different 
experiences of both countries after the departure of the European colonial/mandate 
powers. 
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Chapter 3 – The discourse on identity: Whence one nation?  
 
The formation of national identity in newly created territorial states such as Lebanon 
and Eritrea has to be considered a political exercise as well as a cultural one. While the 
first exercise mainly describes the institutionalization of the new identity, for instance 
by incorporating it into the constitution, the second one works towards the socialization 
of the population within the new entity. Both forms ultimately work towards the 
creation of shared forms of understanding, the foundation for a common civic culture 
and ideology which is described by Anthony D. Smith as one of the elements necessary 
to make up a civic nation.
1
 The intellectual discourse concerned with the identity of the 
new state, its role and vocation, is part of the cultural exercise taking place on the elite 
level. As Wodak et al. elaborated, national identity is ‘the product of discourse’ since it 
is constructed and conveyed through it.2  
In both the case of Lebanon and Eritrea this discourse can, however, be seen as 
also being part of the political exercise since most of the participating figures were not 
only intellectuals but also politicians or at least had great influence on the national 
politics of the state. In fact, the linkage between intellectuals and politics was a common 
trait of new territorial states created by colonial and mandate powers, and the educated 
elites have often been understood as ‘intermediaries’ in the development of popular 
nationalism.
3
 Furthermore, it was specifically the elite of ‘powerful social groups and 
institutions’ that had access to and control of the various types of public discourse.4 
While the reception of the discourse at the elite level by the population can hardly be 
tested, its analysis helps to identify competing ideas and diverging narratives of national 
identity. Usually it holds true that  
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[i]n imagining national singularity and homogeneity, members of a national community 
simultaneously construct the distinctions between themselves and other nations, most notably 
when the other nationality is believed to exhibit traits similar to those of one’s own national 
community.
5
  
Yet in both Eritrea and Lebanon it was exactly this ‘creation of difference’ that proved 
to be difficult since strong links were felt by parts of the population to the neighbouring 
entity, largely based on common religion and traits.  
This chapter will analyse the discourse at the elite level in Eritrea and Lebanon 
and show how it developed in both cases from the presentation of conflicting ideas of 
national identity towards a more transcending concept, based on civic values such as 
self-determination and the will to live together. In both cases the discourse emerged 
under similar circumstances, namely in the context of imminent decision with regards to 
the future of the territory, and was initially marked by opposing nationalist aspirations 
largely linked to religious affiliation. This chapter will argue that a reconciliation of the 
competing interpretations of national identity took place in both cases despite the 
decisively different circumstances after the departure of the European colonial/mandate 
power. In Eritrea, this development was largely fostered by Ethiopian suppression and 
annexation which enabled consensus and the overcoming of divisions based on religion 
or different historic claims. In Lebanon, in comparison, the presentation of conciliatory 
approaches and a more civic interpretation of the national identity by members of the 
elite were motivated by ongoing frictions related to divisions over the identity of the 
country. However, the institutionalised and accepted confessional system hampered a 
consensus on civic values without putting the system itself in question.     
 
ERITREA 
The ‘awakening’ of a discourse in Eritrea  
Like most colonial states, Eritrea did not witness any open intellectual debate during the 
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colonial period; such was not aspired to by colonial powers, especially not with regard 
to the national identity of the people since they were rather expected to be loyal subjects 
to the colonial rulers. Any discourse on identity would have been considered prone to 
endangering the Italian colonial administration. Hence, intellectual discourse only 
emerged with the increasing politicisation of the population and a future yet to be 
decided upon during the BMA.  
After taking over the administration of the former Italian colony of Eritrea, the 
British immediately suspended the Fascist controlled paper Corriere Eritreo, and 
established the English Eritrean Daily News and the Italian Quotidiano Eritreo, to allow 
the population to experience ‘for the first time in many years the lesson of objectivity in 
the presentation of news’.6 Moreover, the British declared ‘that Eritreans, both Moslem 
and Christian, shall not forget their mother tongue in learning Italian – or English’7 and 
introduced the first newspaper in Tigrinya (and Arabic) in 1942, the Semunawi Gazetta 
(Eritrean Weekly News). However, during the first half of the 1940s the organization of 
parties, as well as the expression of political thoughts and ideas, was still rather 
constricted. Consequently, open debate initially did not really exist in the print media, 
although some journalists tried to express political ideas indirectly by using short stories 
or parables.
8
 When political parties started establishing themselves in the wake of the 
arrival of the Four Power Commission, most of them also started publishing their own 
party organs. The two main party newspapers were the Sawt Al Rabita Al Islamiya 
(Voice of the Muslim League), published by the Muslim League in four languages and 
the Hebret (Union)/Ethiopia, published by the Unionist Party mainly in Tigrinya and 
Arabic, with a few articles in Italian. Expression of political opinions and ideas through 
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these media was allowed by the BMA but they were still monitored by the authorities, 
and harsh punishments were imposed for publishing anything that would incite or 
distress the population.
9
 After its formation, the Independence Bloc started publishing 
Hanti Eritra (One Eritrea), which in the wake of the federation was voluntarily 
suspended and replaced by the organ of the Muslim League (renamed Dehai Eritrea 
(The Voice of Eritrea)) in September 1952. The latter’s stance was to support the 
autonomous status of Eritrea within the federation, but, due to increasing Ethiopian 
pressure the paper was not able to publish continuously, and finally, after less than two 
years, ceased to exist in December 1954.
10
 
Although quite a number of avenues opened through which ideas and beliefs 
concerning the future of the territory and its identity could be communicated and 
discussed, their dispersion amongst the population has to be considered as limited since 
most Eritreans, especially in rural areas, were still illiterate at the end of the 1940s.
11
 
Furthermore, what was formulated in the early stage were, according to Quehl, merely 
‘thoughts and reflections about the nation, carried by a patriotism gaining strength, but 
hardly programmatic or ideological lines’.12
 
Yet the importance of the existence of 
diverse media in the country should not be underestimated. For the first time Eritreans 
actually had the chance to openly express their ideas, and ‘[n]ewspapers in Eritrea were 
thus essential to nation-building and garnering political support and set the stage for 
nascent Eritrean nationalism to be played out in the public sphere’.13  
In preparation for the arrival of the Four Power Commission to Eritrea, the 
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Quotidiano Eritreo defined its role as giving a public platform for all political opinions, 
even the most opposed ones, while it would itself ‘maintain an attitude of the most rigid 
impartiality between the various political parties and groups’ at the same time.14 
However, this declaration has to be assessed carefully since the newspaper was still 
under the firm control of the British authorities who had their own vision with regard to 
the future of the territory. In fact, the British administration actively used the newspaper 
to try to manipulate the discourse on identity and the future of the country by having 
fake articles, that supported a division of the territory, translated and published in their 
attempts to silence critical voices in the territory.
15
  
One of the people playing a crucial role in developing the discourse on Eritrean 
national identity was the Protestant Woldeab Woldemariam, often called ‘the father of 
Eritrea’16. Saulsberry notes that Woldemariam switched his position quite frequently 
during the 1940s ‘based on the convenience and options available on world stage’. But 
from 1949 onwards he has to be considered one of the most devoted advocates of 
Eritrean independence who laid the foundation for what would later largely be adopted 
by the EPLF as defining Eritrean national identity.
17
 He started writing and working as 
an editor for the Weekly Newspaper in 1941, which he used as a forum to present his 
ideas in a series of essays published throughout the 1940s and early 1950s, and for a 
while, even to carry out disputes with political adversaries.
18
 In retrospect, though, 
Woldemariam viewed the role of the Weekly Newspaper rather negatively, stating that it 
simply ‘was another clever British strategy to control Eritrea. It provided a forum for 
Eritrean discussion, and diverted attention from political organization’.19 After he was 
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forced to leave Eritrea and sought exile in Cairo, he became very active in broadcasting 
radio programmes from Cairo into Eritrea, calling for the unity of the Eritrean nation, 
and quickly became an important figure to the liberation fronts. 
The following analysis will trace the most dominant strands of the discourse on 
Eritrean national identity based on selected essays published in the different 
newspapers, mainly the most accessible one, Quotidiano Eritreo. It will also be 
supplemented by a few documents and/or speeches of national leaders and intellectuals 
concerning the question of the history and identity of the country.  
 
Eritrea between Ethiopian history and distinctive national history  
The discourse emerging in the 1940s concerning the identity of the country was very 
much shaped by the question of the future of the territory. Consequently, two main 
currents developed: a pro-Ethiopian interpretation of identity and a pro-independence 
one, insisting on the distinct identity of the former colony. Both sought to legitimize 
their claims by referring back to their own versions of pre-colonial history. This meant 
that while one side claimed that Eritrea had always been an integral part of the 
Ethiopian Empire, the other insisted that it had never completely belonged to the latter 
in terms of all the parts making up the territory today. These parts had instead been 
linked to each other, not Ethiopia, to form a distinct territorial entity throughout history.  
The pro-independence arguments described the inhabitants of Eritrea as being 
‘subjected to strong pressure from without, which they withstood only because of a 
deeply-rooted love for their country and their freedom’.20 This country referred to was 
Medri Bahari (The Country of the Sea), which was argued to have endured numerous 
invasions, and when the Empire of Ethiopia was established still managed to retain 
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some autonomy:  
Modern Eritreans nov [sic] consider this territory, the old MEDRI BAHARI, as the cradle of 
their resurrection after the fall of their ancient kingdom; as the sacred birthplace of their 
traditions; as the land of their ancestors; in one word as their fatherland. Here, in this land 
bordered by Ethiopia, the Nile valley and the red Sea, Eritreans of ancient stock mixed with the 
newcomers, refined their language and traditions, set up their organization, created a safe balance 
between the country’s two religions: the Christian faith, that had come to them in the IV 
Century, an [sic] the Mohammeddan creed, that was introduced much later. […] there was 
created the new fatherland, so much dearer to the hearts of the people in that it had come into 
being through their sweat and toil.”21  
Portuguese maps from the 17
th
 century
 
were cited as evidence, as well as reports by 
European explorers referring to the territory of the Medri Bahari and describing it as ‘a 
federal republic’.22 In addition, the fact that the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik concluded a 
treaty with Italy in 1889, granting Italy the right to occupy the land of the Medri Bahari, 
was interpreted as a clear sign of Ethiopia considering the territory as not being part of 
the Empire. The Axumite Empire, often brought up by pro-Unionists to prove a 
common history of Ethiopia and the territory of Eritrea, was in fact recognized as 
having had its centre in Eritrea. Yet,  
the Eritreans have never recognized the present Ethiopian Empire as the continuation of the 
Axumite Empire and therefore they have never considered themselves as part of it. As a matter 
of fact: ever since the fall of the Axumite Empire Eritrea has never been part of the present 
Ethiopia.
23
 
 
The Italian community, who considered their interests would be better represented in an 
independent Eritrea, possibly under Italian trusteeship, supported the pro-independence 
argument of an Eritrean pre-colonial history distinct from that of Ethiopia:  
We deny that there is a right of Ethiopia to incorporate Eritrea for reasons of historical or ethnic 
nature. The territory that constitutes Eritrea, according to the royal decree of 1 January 1890, no. 
8692, corresponds almost exactly with the <Medri-A-Baha>: a territory that for historical and 
ethnic reasons was almost always separated from the real territory of the Ethiopian Empire 
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itself.
24
 
In accordance with that, the Axumite kingdom was considered to not have been an 
Ethiopian creation but rather the product of traces left by Semitic emigration on the 
development of the population in the area. In addition, the Medri A-Bahar were ‘quasi 
always effectively independent from the Ethiopian Empire, even if its <Bahar Nagassi> 
recognized the high authority’.25
 
Ethiopian claims of the opposite were considered to be 
prompted by economic reasons, namely the need to get access to the sea through 
Eritrean ports.  
These allegations were directly answered by a representative of the Unionist 
Party.  R. Tesfit asserted that the ethnic differences of the northern regions had been 
exaggerated in an attempt to use them as ‘historical proof’ in favour of the argument 
that Eritrea was never part of the Ethiopian Empire, and pointed to the lack of historical 
documents to support the claim.
26
 
Similarly, he asserted there was no proof of how far 
the Semitic incursion actually went and which territories it included. In fact, his main 
argument appeared to be that no historical proof had been presented to affirm 
assumptions that Eritrea used to be a territorial entity autonomous from the Ethiopian 
Empire. Additionally, autonomy as described in recognition of the sovereignty of the 
Empire was to be considered as ‘relative autonomy and not complete independence [...] 
Historically for us, autonomy is a general phenomena [sic] for all of Ethiopia. 
Autonomous Eritrea existed only because these parameters existed amid other 
autonomous Ethiopian regions’.27
 
Therefore, the Bahri Negasi was not independent but 
rather had autonomous regional administration just as had existed elsewhere in 
Ethiopia. Other replies to the pro-independence Italian position were less factual and 
rather harsh. An unknown author voiced the opinion that the whole question was not 
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even any business of the Italians and that they had no right to ‘falsify our Ethiopian 
history or to contaminate our Ethiopian-ness with childish statements’.28 Referring to 
the arguments raised by the Italians actually supporting the aims of the Independence 
Bloc, he described them as ‘disgraceful statements that from time to time appear in the 
local newspapers and bear the signatures of some illiterates or former pastors of 
camels’.29
 
A more conciliatory approach was presented by the pro-Ethiopian Haddis 
Teodros who affirmed the great joy, after sixty years of separation, of finally having the 
chance of returning to the mother country:  
 
We Eritreans that, without even giving way to words without sense and place, want the union 
with our Motherland and live within its motherly frame, in communion with our brothers the 
Galla, Amhara, Muslims and Christians, supporting us mutually in those dark and those happy 
hours.
30
 
 
His claim that unification with Ethiopia was very much wanted and had been demanded 
for centuries was questioned in an article in reply to his piece. Garzoni wondered why if 
that was, in fact, true, there had never been any evidence of it during the sixty years of 
Italian rule? Even more interesting, in his opinion, was the fact that ‘during the Italo-
Ethiopian campaign Eritreans joined willingly and enthusiastically under our flag and 
fought with a courage and a passion that certainly did not suit brothers that were 
involuntarily pushed to fight against brothers’.31 
Another, quite conciliatory, approach was adopted by Woldemariam for some 
time. While aiming at establishing a new kind of distinctive Eritrean citizen, his 
intention was to promote a nationalism that ‘entailed pride in the commonality of 
ancient Ethiopia and Eritrean history’.32 This shift has to be understood, though, in the 
context of his desire for Tigray – Tigrinya unity, which he promoted for a period. 
                                                          
28
 ‘Il futuro dell’Eritrea’, Il Quotidiano Eritreo, 31.07.1947, p. 2. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Haddis Teodros, ‘Abbiamo la Commissione quadripartite in casa – Il pensiero degli Eritrei’, Il 
Quotidiano Eritreo, 25.11.1947, p. 2. 
31
 Ezio Garzoni, ‘Risposta a Haddis Teodros’, Il Quotidiano Eritreo, 02.12.1947, p. 2. 
32
 Nicole D. Saulsberry, thesis, p. 20. 
128 
Guided by the belief in linguistic and cultural affinities between the Eritrean highlands 
and the northern Ethiopian region of Tigray, a plan to join the two regions was devised 
by a limited circle of Eritrean notables and Tigrayan nobility.
33
 
With regard to the colonial period, there was no praise really for it with the 
exception of contributions made by resident Italians, former askaris and half-castes. 
Expounding on the various countries marking their claims on the Eritrean territory, 
Woldemariam noted in one of his pro-Ethiopian essays in 1947 how Italy had purposely 
divided Eritrea from Ethiopia and ‘it should feel regret about isolation of Eritrea from 
Ethiopia. It should strongly support Eritrean unity with Ethiopia as it was the main 
factor of the isolation’.34 
The negative experience of colonial domination and cruel treatment by the 
Italians was emphasized by Ethiopian officials as well as pro-Ethiopian Eritreans as this 
statement by Fitaurari Tesfa Mikael Gobaze shows:  
 
Many of you Eritreans were made “Shum-Bash” by the Italians. I also was a “Shum-Bash”, and I 
know the kind of mark they left on our backs. Do not forget that mark. We know how the enemy 
played with us making us, though in our own country, as men without home and without 
country. 
35
 
 
Furthermore, it was stressed that while restraint was to be advised, feelings of revenge 
towards the former colonial power had to be understood as Italian racial politics and 
actions in the territory could never be forgotten.
36
 
Yet, pro-independence voices actually propounded the positive aspects of sixty 
years of Italian domination as it allowed the people and the territory to progress and 
achieve a greater civilization than other African countries. Furthermore, referring back 
to the country of Medri Bahari, it was asserted that the Italians did not artificially create 
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the territory but ‘Italy merely acknowledged and confirmed a centuries-old truth: the 
existence of this country as an entity by itself, with characters of its own’.37 
Even Italian voices that generally did not agree with staunch pro-independence 
positions, as they considered that at the very least a cordial relationship with Ethiopia 
was essential for Eritrea’s economic survival, stressed the relevance of the colonial 
experience for the future of the territory:  
For sure, the rule of an European country for sixty years cannot, through the immigration of 
people educated to a system of superior life, not have had any influence on the soul of the natives 
which, in contact with a more developed civilization, got accustomed to broader outlooks and 
have, albeit limited, adopted habits of a more comfortable life not yet spread, undeniably, 
throughout all of Ethiopia.
38
 
Aside from evaluating Italian politics as positive or negative, the fact remained that a 
territorial entity was created and given the name Eritrea, and exactly this common 
experience would be translated into a historical foundation for an inclusive Eritrean 
nationalism.  
Religious dichotomy or equal partnership? 
The discourse on the national identity being so closely linked with the imminent 
decision on the future of the territory certainly contributed to it being coloured mainly 
by political opinions. Yet, views were often closely linked to religious beliefs on an 
ideological level as the example of Woldemariam demonstrated. Despite propagating an 
inclusive approach to identity regardless of religious or regional backgrounds, his 
Christian beliefs found expression in relation to his understanding of the nation:  
 
A man should love his God above all. Then, he should love his family and then his country. If he 
doesn’t follow this path and says that he loves his country he is wrong. How can a man who 
doesn’t love his mother, father, brothers and wife claim that he loves his country? [...] A nation 
does not mean the fields, rivers, lakes, houses, or monuments. A nation means the people. They 
are the people who live in the same place where you and your grandfathers lived, with the same 
colour and the same tongue as yours. They are your country. If you don’t love them, you must 
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understand that you are a person who does not love his country.
39
 
 
 
Such reasoning based on religious beliefs continued throughout his essays, but he also 
tried to reconcile it with a more scientific position. While he directly referred to the 
Bible to describe how everything was God’s creation and how all human beings were 
created equal, he also accepted the fact that science had a different explanation for the 
creation of the world, its division into different nations, and the existence of a diversity 
of languages.
40
 However, he ultimately seemed to be convinced that the best way to 
create national consciousness and a cohesive nation was a belief in God and love.
41
 In 
fact, he addressed the Eritrean youth to remind them that: ‘Our homeland is a gift of 
God. We are living here not only for our daily activities but also to accomplish God’s 
task’.42 Consequently, everyone should be willing to sacrifice for the fatherland, just as 
the forefathers have done.  
Woldemariam’s use of non-denominational religious terms has to be analysed in 
light of the pro-independence and pro-union division towards the late 1940s/early 
1950s. These divisions on a political level were often equated with religion as 
supporters of union were predominantly Christian while supporters of independence 
were predominantly Muslim. While this carried the inherent danger of developing into a 
religious conflict, specifically during violent clashes, relegating differences to the 
political level while affirming equality regardless of adherence to different 
denominations has to be considered his attempt to bring about unity. This appears of 
special importance in the face of the federation looming at the beginning of the 1950s, 
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within which the opposed camps were to live together in an autonomous unit congruent 
with the country shared under Italian colonial rule. Consequently, Woldemariam’s 
description of the dual nature of the world and society did not refer to divisions based 
on religious, ethnic or linguistic lines but to the endless struggle between good and bad 
in the world. His examination of internal enemies, who he considered to be stronger and 
more dangerous due to their inherited nature, rather appeared to promote overcoming 
any differences with the help of God.
43
 Reflecting on the early period of political 
organization in one of his later essays, he hints at peaceful coexistence between the 
religious communities in Eritrea before the political divisions seemingly alienated the 
Christians and Muslims:  
 
Do you remember when we gathered in Saleh Kekiya’s house in 1944 and ate a chicken 
slaughtered by a Muslim, then oathed [sic] on the Qur’an? Also we ate a chicken slaughtered by 
a Christian and oathed on the Bible? Then we promised each other to avoid any difference, 
religious or regional or racial?
44
 
 
 
The appearance of conflicts within Eritrea being based on religious affiliation was 
largely ascribed to Ethiopian politics of manipulating the Coptic Church and stirring 
dissent between Muslims and Christians in order to achieve its goal of annexation.
45
 
This went as far as exploiting the pro-independence attitude of the Italians to disregard 
the large number of Muslim pro-independence supporters to claim, as the pro-Ethiopian 
Haddis Teodros did, that ‘[...] the Muslim, for the simple fact that he is Muslim, can 
never conceive of a life in common with the Christian, having by now developed a self-
perception of accepting an inferiority towards the White’.46 
This demonstrates, however, a disregard of the fact that the pro-independence 
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movement was not solely Muslim, just as the pro-Ethiopia movement was not 
exclusively Christian. The spiritual Muslim leader and head of the Muslim League, Said 
Bakhri el-Morgani, confirmed in an interview that not all Muslims in the territory 
followed the League but noted that this did not create any problems since any Muslim 
was ‘politically free to join the movement that most pleases him, as long as it is not 
contrary to the fundamental laws of our religion. [...] Politically, they are then free to 
profess ideas that are most in line with their opinions’.47
 
Yet concerns were also raised 
about the way Muslims were treated in Ethiopia, noting that Muslims were regularly 
discriminated against, being blocked from high-level positions in the administration, 
and having difficulty accessing the education system.
48
 
 
The discussion on whether Eritreans and Ethiopians actually shared a common 
culture and traditions appeared more important than religious affiliations. According to 
the pro-Ethiopianists, there was a strong correlation between legends and stories in 
Eritrea and in Amhara culture. This would allude to an ‘ethnic and historic unity’ that 
could not be denied:  
 
It is history consecrated by the blood in the age-long struggles for the defence of these rocks of 
the Ethiopian Highland, common heritage of the mother Ethiopia and its daughter Eritrea. We 
wanted to defend this history, our history. We stop here. The rest will soon show to be a 
construction of interests without historical foundation.
49
 
 
 
Proponents of the thesis of historical, ethnic and cultural links thought their claim to be 
the only real form of nationalism since ‘ours is the legitimate love towards ourselves, 
towards the individuality of our nation, Ethiopia, and of our race’.50 Such claims were 
refuted by Muslim and Christian supporters of independence alike. Referring back to 
European scholars such as Conti Rossini, it was affirmed that, in fact, the ancestors of 
the Eritreans came from the Arabian Peninsula and mingled with the indigenous 
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population. The result was the population of Eritrea with its own language and culture, 
named Habasha.
51
 
 
Discourse during the struggle for independence  
After the decision on federation, the discourse calmed down as the Eritrean political and 
intellectual elite was mainly concerned with the establishment of Eritrea’s autonomous 
institutions. However, when it became obvious that Ethiopia was not going to abide by 
the rules of federation, the discourse on independence was revived. Not surprisingly, the 
Voice of Eritrea was quickly banned, and its editor imprisoned despite the right to free 
expression established through the Eritrean constitution.
52
 This move by the Imperial 
government followed harsh criticism voiced in the paper concerning the legality of the 
actions of Addis Ababa in Eritrea.
53
 In fact, what was asked for by Eritrean nationalists 
in the early years of the federation was not the dismissal of the same, but rather the 
establishment of and adherence to a clear federal structure within which an autonomous 
Eritrea with its democratic government and constitution would exist. The employment 
of a repressive policy by the Ethiopian government and the focus on safeguarding 
Eritrea’s autonomous institutions resulted in a lacuna in the discourse during the period 
of federation. The various memoranda sent to the Ethiopian and Eritrean governments 
as well as to the UN by representatives of the Muslim League were concerned with the 
dismantlement of Eritrea’s autonomous structure rather than with nationalist ideology.54 
The same is true for many of the early pamphlets produced by the ELF after the 
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annexation of Eritrea.
55
  
Reference to the colonial period as a basis for a unified Eritrean national identity 
did not develop immediately, but largely throughout the 1970s, notably the period when 
the movement witnessed a large influx of Christians. Hence, the arguments promoted 
constitute a common ideological basis of the previously opposed religious communities 
of Eritrea. Reconciliation was made possible by the assertion that under the Italians 
‘Eritrea was not formed as a nation-state but as a multi-nation state.’56 Reference to 
earlier times was considered unnecessary as was noted in the earliest pamphlet ascribed 
to the EPLF:  
 
If we remember ancient history, we find it almost unrelated to what we have in this modern age. 
If we were to re-establish actions and determine borders based on ancient history, we would have 
to create a new world consisting of few nations.
57
 
 
 
Consequently, a unified identity cannot be traced back to ancient times; it rather 
developed in the transformation period under Italian colonization. This has to be 
considered a valid argument since there was no benchmark of how ‘old’ a people has to 
be to consider itself a nation.
58
  
The discourse on Eritrean identity and Eritrea’s right to self-determination found 
increasing support from outside sources. However, the same was true for support of the 
Ethiopian position. Ethiopian claims to the territory, supposedly based on historical 
grounding, were widely endorsed, in Ethiopia as well as internationally. As Reid notes,  
 
the centralizing, unified Ethiopian state thesis from the direction of Addis Ababa […] was an 
ideological edifice, effectively and cunningly built by authors both local and expatriate, and it 
was only destroyed – and then only partially – with the unexpected achievement of Eritrean 
independence toward the end of the twentieth century.
59
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Specifically Western support for ‘Ethiocentrism’ appears of interest and is explained by 
Reid as Ethiopia always having been considered as somehow separated from the rest of 
black Africa and being closer to Europe.
60
 
In terms of scholarly support for the Eritrean position, the prolonged struggle 
saw the development of what Akinola called the voix Érythrée,  
 
a uniform and Unitarian depiction of Eritrean identity and the nationalist agenda that has been 
predominant since c.1978. [...]voix Érythrée was not founded on free-flowing debate; it has 
thrived on discourses essentialized in either-or, we-they terms. Heterodoxy was not highly 
valued; hence, viewpoints contrary to the prevailing official thinking or arguments on its margins 
were consistently spurned, discounted, de-legitimized or demonized. [...], nearly all groups 
tended to keep away from debate on the constitution of the Eritrean national self.
61
 
 
 
This seems to agree with Erlich’s early 1980s analysis, namely that the Eritrean 
nationalism that had developed during the first decades of the independence struggle 
was ‘based essentially on the negation of Ethiopianism’.62 This conclusion though, 
grossly disregarded the fact that there was an active ideological engagement with 
questions concerning Eritrean unity and identity, as clearly shown in the earliest 
pamphlet ascribed to the EPLF, Nehna Elaman (Our struggle and its goals), for 
instance.  
It certainly cannot be denied though that Ethiopia continued to play a decisive 
role in the way the discourse was formed within Eritrea, especially after the Dergue 
regime had taken over. This is hardly surprising given the repressive politics against 
Eritreans even within Ethiopia, such as the Association of Eritrean Students.
63
 Large 
numbers of Eritrean-born elites joined the independence forces after having become 
estranged from the Ethiopian regime. Others went into exile and started supporting the 
independence struggle from abroad. In fact, Akinola claims that some of the best known 
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supporters of the voix Érythrée were from the Eritrean diaspora.
64
 He names Araia 
Tseggai and Kassahun Checole, the former becoming editor of the Journal of Eritrean 
Studies, the latter founding the Red Sea/Africa World Press which published numerous 
books on Eritrea, authored by Eritrean and Western scholars alike. Probably best known 
to Western observers was Bereket Habte Selassie, who ‘became the preeminent elder 
statesman of Eritrean studies in the West and helped put Eritrea at the center of a new 
liberationist discourse on Africa and the world’.65 A professor of Law and International 
Politics, former fighter and observer for the EPLF at the UN, he edited and co-edited 
numerous books on Eritrean history and the struggle for independence, most notably his 
1989 collection of essays Eritrea and the United Nations.
66
 It has to be noted though 
that Habte Selassie turned into a divisive figure after Eritrean independence, largely due 
to the mixed reception of his books published after 2000 in which he critically assesses 
Eritrea’s descent into dictatorship.67 
Commentaries by Eritrean exiles in the late 1970s largely promoted Eritrea’s 
right to self-determination based on historical and legal arguments. In fact, the right to 
self-determination had already been broached in the early stages of the struggle, in 
combination with references to the UN Charter’s paragraph on refraining from use of 
force against other states, a prohibition which had clearly been broken by Ethiopia.
68
  
1978 finally saw the coming ‘into its own’ of the voix Érythrée which was 
strongly linked to the political and military developments of the time, mainly the 
‘strategic’ retreat of the EPLF and the huge blow the ELF had to deal with. In the 
intellectual sphere attempts were made to bring together the various discourses 
concerned with the wider Horn of Africa region in order to work towards reconciliation. 
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However, endeavours such as the journal Horn of Africa were quickly criticized for 
giving room and credence to biased accounts and for helping to reinforce ‘myths about 
the region’.69 While the Ethiopians continued clinging to the argument of a supposed 
common history, the Eritreans under the EPLF had already developed a position of 
insisting on the international right of self-determination, and the will of all the Eritrean 
people in the territory to live together as an independent nation.  
In order to be able to claim the right to self-determination, as enshrined in the 
UN Charter of 1945
70
, the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal of the International League for 
the Rights to Liberation of Peoples in its report on Eritrea of 1980 also referred back to 
the colonial period to root Eritrean nationalism:  
 
A social entity endowed with a national conscience had evolved in the territory of the Italian 
colony during the colonial period, and was considerably reinforced during the period of struggle. 
This can be maintained despite a number of evident contradictions: the presence of a small 
number of Eritrean intellectuals in the Ethiopian administration, social contradictions of class in 
Eritrea which reveal the dialectical character of the struggle which is not only national but also 
social, and the existence of two fronts hampering the progress of the struggle. But all of this does 
not call into doubt the existence of a national consciousness.
71
 
 
 
Only one year later the International Commission of Jurists came to a similar 
conclusion, noting that after 20 years of struggle it was about time that the issue was 
discussed on the international level, especially since the matter was ‘a source of 
embarrassment both to the United Nations itself and to almost all “interested parties”’.72 
It noted that, regardless of what happened before the UN Resolution for federation, once 
the latter was unilaterally abrogated by Ethiopia that ‘was a fundamental breach of the 
agreement, which must lead to a revival of the people’s right to self-determination’.73 
This conclusion is based on the fact that, even if the Eritrean people had agreed to 
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become part of a federation as an autonomous unit, integrating it into the Empire 
without their consent was not in compliance with the principal of equal rights and self-
determination.  
In fact, while nationalist sentiment was voiced by a limited number before the 
independence struggle took momentum, it clearly developed throughout the struggle. 
Hence, it does not really matter how strong it was before, the fact that it existed and 
gained strength made it impossible to simply dismiss it as Ethiopia often attempted to 
do. Nationalist sentiment existed, and was strengthened in opposition to Ethiopia.  
 
LEBANON 
Environment for open debate in Lebanon  
The case of Lebanon has to be seen as unique in the Middle Eastern region, since a 
relatively open constitutional and intellectual debate had existed ever since 
independence.
74
 In addition to that, a large number of independent newspapers were 
already being published during the French mandate and even more thereafter. However, 
‘independent’ basically means that although they were not published by the 
government, they largely represented and supported certain groups or communities. 
Hence, they concentrated more ‘on the presentation of views and opinions than on news 
and facts’.75 This became even more evident during the civil war when publications 
were used for the ‘manipulation of news for purposes of political or sectarian 
mobilization’.76 Furthermore, the independent character of newspapers was often 
challenged by a number of regulations decisively limiting the freedom of the press.
77
  
The existing atmosphere of open and rich intellectual debate at the time of 
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Lebanon’s early independence allowed for an open discourse on matters concerning the 
state, its problems and identity. This discourse found expression in various forms, the 
most prominent being Les Conférences du Cénacle (The Conferences of the Cenacle, 
henceforth referred to as Cénacle Libanais) that took place from 1946 until 1968. The 
institution of the Cénacle Libanais has been rated as ‘probably the most significant to a 
study of dominant currents of thought’78 as it constituted a ‘threshold that signaled [sic] 
the emergence of indigenous initiative for self-determination and national discourse.’79
 
The conferences were, in fact, intended to serve as a forum for the expression and 
discussion of the various ideological views that existed in Lebanon’s pluralistic society, 
with the objective of reaching consensus on the basics of a coherent Lebanese national 
identity. Michel Asmar, the founder of the Cénacle Libanais, described it as ‘a 
committed platform which helped us to get to know ourselves, without prejudices and 
without preconceptions’.80
 
He felt there was a need, especially by the Lebanese youth, 
‘to bring together every authentic Lebanese value, to make these values work together 
to rediscover the essence of our country that reaches back six millennia but whose 
identity has been hidden by long Ottoman rule and 25 years of mandate’.81
  
While the Cénacle Libanais could be viewed as a forum for Lebanese Christian 
nationalism in its early years, it was gradually taken more and more seriously by other 
groups and developed into an active forum discussing all the issues present in the young 
independent state.
82
 Its conferences became impatiently anticipated events that found 
dispersion amongst the population through radio broadcasts, as well as the publishing of 
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a periodical, presenting selections of the 435 lectures given between 1946 and 1968.
83
 
Hence, while it was a discourse taking place at elite level, great emphasis was put on 
reaching a broad audience and the conferences ‘exercised great influence over the 
formulation of Lebanese nationalism and the development of political ideas in the First 
Republic’.84 
The analysis of the intellectual discourse in this chapter will mainly be based on 
a selection of these conferences. In addition, the analysis will be supplemented by a 
number of articles published between 1941 and 1970 in the Lebanese newspaper 
L’Orient, which Dajani describes as having ‘played a major role in early Lebanese 
politics’.85
 
The person who played the lead role in this context was Georges Naccache, 
who authored a large number of articles and commentaries in L’Orient in the relevant 
time period. He was known to have been a supporter of the idea of a smaller, Christian 
Lebanon in the early 1930s. From the late 1930s on though, he dedicated himself to 
finding a viable solution for Greater Lebanon and supported the idea of the Cénacle 
Libanais, where he would become a frequent participant. He appeared on its stage in 
1950 for the first time and affirmed the importance of the forum and its vocation as an 
invitation to Lebanese history. On the role of the Cénacle Libanais he said that ‘[i]f a 
Lebanese synthesis is feasible […] then it is under the moral conditions brought 
together by an institution like this, that such project has the most chances to come 
about.
86
 While the discourse on Lebanese identity and unity in the 1920s and the early 
1930s had been strongly marked by the opposing views of Lebanese nationalists and the 
supporters of Arab nationalism, a common interest in attaining independence from the 
Mandatory developed in the late 1930s and early 1940s. This development ‘brought the 
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inhabitants of Lebanon closer together politically than ever before.’87 However, the 
discourse on the questions of identity, national unity and the future of the entity 
continued to be characterised by the dominant and recurring issue of Christian-Muslim 
coexistence and the multi-confessional nature of Lebanese society. In fact, the questions 
on the identity of the country and the institutionalised confessional system must be 
considered to be at the heart of a variety of other problems raised and discussed in the 
intellectual discourse in the following years. These problems, therefore, cannot always 
be separated easily.  
The main issues addressed concerned the question of the identity of the 
Lebanese nation, socio-political problems - mainly related to the institutionalised 
confessionalism - and persisting feudal structures, as well as the role of the country in 
the regional context. The large number of conferences and articles would allow for a 
much more detailed portrayal and analysis than is attempted here. However, a selection 
has been taken for the scope of this presentation, and the focus will be kept to issues 
discussed on the ideological level.  
Phoenician history vs. Arab history  
The main problem of today’s Lebanon – our only problem at a moment when, after an alienation 
of six centuries, we are cast completely naked in history – is to recreate us a historical 
consciousness.
88
 
 
This statement, made by Georges Naccache during his first talk given at the Cénacle 
Libanais in June 1950, highlighted the continuous importance placed on the history of 
the country with regard to the necessity of defining the identity and vocation of the 
Lebanese state. In fact, the ‘invitation to history’89 was considered an essential function 
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of the Cénacle Libanais in its early years as it aimed to ultimately turn it into ‘the 
expression of Lebanese consciousness’.90 
The idea of most theories dealing with nationalism and national identity of a 
common history being one of the denominators that facilitate the identification of a 
nation was shared by a large number of speakers at the Cénacle Libanais. Most of them, 
such as former president Alfred Naccache, supported the idea that it was, in fact, the 
long common history that would qualify the Lebanese as a nation.
91
 
While the questions discussed by the speakers at the conferences generally 
revolved around the problems the state encountered at the time, many of the 
elaborations were accompanied by investigations of Lebanese history. What was 
striking is the fact that most of these investigations clearly displayed an affiliation to a 
Lebanese Christian reading of history, tracing the history of the country back to the 
ancient Phoenicians. A large number of speakers made only indirect references to the 
Phoenician ancestry, others clearly expressed, and elaborated on, this view. The 
affiliation to such narrative has to be ascribed to the aforementioned predominance 
within the circle of a moderate Christian Lebanese nationalism that favoured dialogue 
with Islam ‘through which it is hoped Arabist ideologues can be convinced that 
Lebanon is also theirs and that it serves as a conduit for modernization and progress not 
only for Lebanon but for the whole Arab world’.92 
One of the representatives of a less extremist Lebanese Christian nationalism 
was Michel Chiha, whose contributions to the Cénacle Libanais were highly influential 
in the early years of the intellectual discourse.
93
 He advanced the view that knowing the 
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roots of the country in history would be one of the prerequisites of stability. In that 
sense, he followed the argument of common history as a unifying factor for the 
Lebanese nation. In a speech given four years before the inauguration of the Cénacle 
Libanais, he stated that ‘[…] the Lebanon of today is practically the same as the original 
Lebanon-Phoenicia’,94 reiterating this position over the years. Confident in his 
conviction that the Lebanese people ‘must accept an ancestry that goes much further 
back than the one adhered to arbitrarily by some people in the interests of a certain 
policy’,95 he clearly dismissed the Arab nationalist point of view that considered at least 
parts of the Lebanese state as belonging to a larger Arab entity.  
While the ancient history of the country had the potential for many different 
interpretations, the discourse on more recent events also displayed discord. The 
discussion and assessment of the creation of Greater Lebanon by the French mandate 
authority in 1920 could be seen as one example of such varying interpretation. 
Referring to earlier history, Mobarak, in his paper given in January 1948, viewed its 
creation as a rightful, positive step as it constituted ‘the reintegration of the regions torn 
away through the protocols of 1860-64 into the borders of the Lebanese state’.96 
 
In fact, 
according to him this act should be considered a positive contribution by the mandate 
authority as it represents ‘the first step towards the realisation of the unity of the 
nation’.97 Moreover, he indicated a number of additional positive effects of the mandate 
period for the country as it opened the doors to the Occident and helped the country’s 
entry into the international arena.  
Kamal Joumblatt, in March 1949, presented a less positive reading of the 
mandate authority and the creation of Greater Lebanon. He described the creation as an 
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accident and ‘the unilateral will of General Gouroud’.98 Furthermore, he pointed out the 
negative role that colonialism had played in creating national and religious discord. In 
fact, he dismissed all attempts to trace the roots of both Lebanese and Arab nationalism 
back to ancient times as useless, arguing that they have to be seen as recent and linked 
to the development of capitalism. In 1961, Saeb Salam presented an alternative 
interpretation of the events of 1920. He asserted that there had, in fact, been calls for the 
creation of Greater Lebanon by a number of Lebanese, but it is doubtful whether the 
actual creation was realized to answer these demands or rather to fulfil a specific self-
interest of the mandate authority. He argued that the latter might have been the case, 
given the fact that the Muslim-Christian split within the newly created entity could be 
used by the French to strengthen their authority.
99
 
 
Muslim vs. Christian? Orient vs. Occident?  
Disagreement over the foundations of the Lebanese nation was at the root of dissension 
over the identity of the nation. This was not only reflected in the ongoing intellectual 
discourse but also in growing inter-communal tensions. Yet, the lack of agreement on 
an ideological level and the ongoing contestations on a political level can be considered 
as being mutually dependent.  
The disagreement over the identity of the country is best illustrated by two 
statements that represent the diverging views persisting throughout the years. The first 
was published in L’Orient in 1955 and affirmed that ‘[i]f we want it or not, we are from 
the Occident. We are so for our ideas, our morals, our tastes – for all the burden of our 
five millennia’.100 With the question ‘Who are we?’ persisting, Saab gave the following 
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answer in his talk in 1968, the last year of the Cénacle Libanais:  
 
We are Lebanese and we are Arabs. Our quality as Lebanese is not particularly worth anything if 
not in the quantity in which we are Arabs. Arabs for a community of fate, of language, of 
culture, of tolerance, and of interest.
101
 
 
 
These different answers reveal the divergent orientations within the country towards 
two different poles. In an attempt to reconcile these antithetic orientations, definitions of 
the country as ‘link between the East and West’102 were brought forward, depicting it as 
a place ‘where two of the biggest religions of mankind are meeting at every step, 
without trying to mix up. Two religions, that is to say somehow also two civilisations 
and two cultures of core and of different tendencies’.103 Describing Lebanon as the 
oldest place of peaceful cohabitation of Christianity and Islam has to be seen as an 
attempt to give a positive definition to the actual bipolarity of the country. At times this 
went as far as elevating the country to the level of a model of religious co-existence for 
the rest of the world as ‘Christianity and Islam are necessary for each other, because 
both are necessary for peace and unity of the world’.104 In that sense, Lebanon is not 
only necessary to both religions but is itself the alternative to allegiance to Christianity 
or Islam, Occident or Orient.
105
 In this context, the term ‘Mediterranean’ has become 
frequently used to somehow describe the position between the two poles. Chiha uses 
this term in an attempt to define the identity of the Lebanese, leaving the people 
concerned rather confused:  
[…] we shall say that the population of Lebanon is Lebanese, quite simply, and that, with due 
reservations made in the case of those very recently naturalized, it is at present no more 
Phoenician than Egyptian, Aegean, Assyrian or Medic, Greek, Roman, Byzantine or Arab, with 
or without consanguinity, or European by alliance or Turk for that matter. At the very most we 
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say that it is a Mediterranean type, probably the least easy to determine. It has a structure all its 
own, and no other.
106
 
 
Such a conclusion not only left the field wide open to various interpretations, but also 
was a negative identity, merely stating who the Lebanese are not. While differentiation 
from ‘the others’ actually constitutes a very important part of defining national identity, 
it cannot be sufficient alone and a void remains that has to be filled. If not, people might 
resort to other or maybe older allegiances which, in the case of Lebanon, not only 
related to the different communities within the country, but to the two poles of the 
world. However, the definition of the identity of the country in between these poles was 
officially enshrined through the formula of the unwritten National Pact of 1943. The 
Pact tried to accommodate both camps by emphasizing the Arab face of the country as 
well as its special bond to the Occident, while not really being part of either one of 
them. However, from the beginning there have been mixed opinions about this 
agreement with its formula of compromise both on the ideological and the political 
level. Criticism was soon voiced that the Pact, although providing some stability, did 
not unite the two camps on an ideological basis and thus create a commonly accepted 
identity. Rather it provided, once again, a negative description as criticised by Georges 
Naccache in his often-quoted article ‘Deux Négations ne font pas une Nation’ (Two 
Negations do not make a Nation) of 10 March 1949:  
 
What kind of unity can be derived from such a formula? What one half of the Lebanese does not 
want can be seen clearly. And what the other half does not want can be seen equally clearly, But 
what both halves want in common cannot be seen. [...]  
 
The folly is having elevated a compromise to the level of a state doctrine – having dealt with an 
accident as something stable – having believed, finally, that two «no» could, in politics, produce 
a «yes». For the fear of simply being what it is, and by force not wanting to be neither this nor 
that, it realizes that it now risks being nothing at all.[...]  
 
A state is not the sum of two non-powers -and two negations never make a nation.
107
  
 
 
And time, in fact, proved that the ‘two Lebanons’ that have existed since the creation of 
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Greater Lebanon did not become ‘one Lebanon: one row, one heart, not Muslim or 
Christian, not negative or positive’108 through the National Pact.  
Tensions between the different camps were growing and commentaries in 
L’Orient urgently called on the people to learn to love all the diversities of the country 
and see them as its strength. In these diversities they should try ‘to find themselves on 
this territory where, unless negating Lebanon itself, no contestation between us is 
possible […] if we are not able of such accomplishment than we do not deserve to be a 
nation anymore’.109 The lack of recognition of the bipolarity of the country and failure 
to identify with this bipolarity was seen by Fouad Boutros as one of the main reasons 
for the failure of the unity the National Pact attempted to create. However, he ascribed 
this to the fact that the Pact was created by two individuals and its ideology has never 
been rooted in the population.
110
 
Boutros’ observation, made in 1961, came after one 
consequence of this lack of identification, namely the escalation of political and 
sectarian tensions leading to the crisis of 1958.  
These tensions had been building up since the Suez Crisis of 1956 and evoked 
by the fundamental problem of the Lebanese identity. Arising out of the disagreement 
over support for the Egyptian government in the crisis, L’Orient identified the bipolarity 
of the country as being at the heart of the problem:  
 
Saying that the problem is not a Muslim-Christian problem means looking for a solution in an 
excuse. Our problem is exactly that -and there is no other. […] We could say that there exists a 
primary adherence of the Lebanese Muslim to his Lebanese homeland: his interest, his habits, his 
culture itself and his sensitivity are linked to it. But at the bottom of his heart he keeps the dream 
of a second homeland – of this super-homeland that would be this magnificent and almighty 
Arab Empire – where moreover he knows that he would get lost…Saying that one wants to re-do 
Lebanese unity pretending to ignore this given thing, that would mean basing Lebanon on a lie. 
That is finally – in all ‘loyalism’ – refusing Lebanon...111
 
 
 
To guarantee the continuity of Lebanon would thus require finding measures that could 
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accommodate Lebanese Arab nationalists within the preservation of the country. While 
such analysis clearly displays a moderate Lebanese Christian attitude, other views of the 
underlying problem have been advanced. Salam argues that the Arab face of Lebanon, 
as agreed upon in the National Pact, is often seen as an inflicted condition or even an 
obstacle. Such a position can lead to a loss of balance in the Lebanese structure and 
cause a crisis as in 1958. Hence, it has to be realized, that being Arab is not a condition 
but rather an unchangeable characteristic of the country.
112
 While this claim might be 
considered by the Lebanese Christians as infringing upon their allegiance to the 
Occident, the assertion already made by Joumblatt in 1949 can certainly be considered 
valid: any building of the country without taking the Muslim population into account 
would be a ‘folly’ and a ‘utopia’.113
 
 
Despite the continuous existence of different views, the events of 1958 and the 
tensions preceding the crisis seemed to have led to some general awareness that a 
positive definition of the identity would be needed:  
 
Of the double renunciation of 1943 an adherence has to be born, that means a positive act 
without restrictions or reservation. We should leave aside the slogans such as “neither winner nor 
loser” or “one Lebanon and not two”. […] There can be no winners after 1958, but there has 
been more than one loser.
114
  
 
Claims to define the true common will of the Lebanese people increased because 
without such definition, the very existence of the country would be in question. In fact, 
the Lebanese intelligentsia had already attempted to develop such a positive, commonly 
acceptable definition in its discourse.  
 
A common will of the Lebanese nation?  
 
The study of the different interpretations of historical events reveals the problems of 
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using history as a fundamental and common denominator in the case of Lebanon. The 
awareness of this problem might have been the reason for a group of speakers to 
represent a more humanistic view, proposing an attachment to certain values as the 
common foundation of the nation. Representatives of this argument, such as Charles 
Helou or Georges Ammoun have been criticised by Georges Naccache for their ‘anti-
historic’
 
attitude.
115
 The representatives of the humanistic point of view, however, did 
not dismiss the role of history out of hand: on the contrary, they pointed out its 
importance and affirmed that its negation would be ‘as criminal as stupid’.116 Still, they 
identified the raison d’être of the country as being a common respect for law built on a 
spiritual foundation, and the vocation of Lebanon as being a country of liberty, peace, 
justice and equality. The fact that the country was composed of associated minorities 
was seen as ‘an affirmation of the primacy of spirituality’.117 While the moral order was 
regarded as one of the basic factors on which the nation was built, the principal factor 
should be the will to live together.  
There was disagreement, however, whether such common will really did exist. 
While the revolution of 1943, leading to the National Pact, could be interpreted as the 
expression of such common will, the question remained as to whether this expression 
was something deeply-rooted or rather a unique moment, born out of the common 
interest in bringing the mandate to an end. Mobarak asserted that, in fact, the unifying 
factor behind the revolution was such a common desire. Yet it was driven by ‘the will to 
live together of all the inhabitants of this country’118, a will based on the principles 
exhibited by the representatives of the humanistic view: equality and justice, as well as 
dignity and probity. He further claimed that this will had existed long before 1943, 
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‘throughout the centuries and the ages’,119 and that the revolution was just the 
consequence of a long evolution. This directly contradicted an observation that had been 
presented just one year earlier by Charles Issawi who remarked that still nothing could 
be said about a common will of the Lebanese people. A larger solidarity, necessary for 
the survival and the viability of the country could be seen emerging. However, the 
development of such solidarity into a genuine common will to live together would 
require some time.
120
 
 
This realisation touches on an aspect expressed by Salam some fourteen years 
later in 1961, namely that the combination of all the factors described as fundaments of 
the Lebanese nation would bring about the identification with the country as a 
homeland:  
 
Homelands are not gifts to be granted, neither taxes to be imposed. They grow in the land, 
strengthened by the bonds of values and interest as well as the common pains and hopes. 
Empowered by the unity and will of their children.
121
 
 
 
In fact, the attributes offered by the representatives of the humanistic view remained 
rather universal. As such, they could possibly have served as the basis for a 
transcending national identity since they left enough space for identification for all the 
various Lebanese communities. Yet the institutionalized sectarian system ruled out the 
efficiency of such attributes, since the gaining of political goals and political 
representation would still always be linked to affiliation with a community. 
 
Conclusion  
The analysis of the discourse on the identity of the respective countries exposed 
remarkable similarities between Eritrea and Lebanon in its initial phase. Yet the 
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circumstances and the extent of the discourse, as well as its impact, have to be 
considered as being rather different. 
In the case of Eritrea, open discourse only became possible during the BMA, yet 
was highly politicized due to the impending decision on the future of the country. After 
annexation, the discourse became very restricted due to suppressive Ethiopian politics 
in the territory which resulted in most accounts coming from outside the territory. 
Independent Lebanon, on the other hand, provided a relatively free environment for any 
sort of political discourse. Despite the difference in the setting, the tracking of the 
discourse in both countries reveals a move towards a civic understanding of national 
identity, which envisioned a transcending identity based around common values, the 
will to live together, and the realisation of self-determination.  
The initial divide between proponents of an identity linked to a larger 
neighbouring country by history and religion and supporters of a narrative that argued 
for a separate identity was largely replaced by this new understanding in Eritrea. This 
was facilitated by the fact that shortly after federation Ethiopia became perceived as the 
enemy by proponents of both of the previously opposed views. In Lebanon the 
voluntaristic understanding was presented by a few members of the intellectual elite, 
largely influenced by growing civil unrest in the wake of the 1958 conflict. Open 
criticism and calls for reforms were proof of the awareness within the intelligentsia of 
the problems created by the lack of an integrated national identity which effectively 
divided the country in two, and the hampering effect of the institutionalised 
confessionalism. However, even when there was consensus on the core of problems, 
there was still disagreement over how to handle them. Moreover, despite the 
conciliatory nature of the Cénacle Libanais, the affiliations of most of the speakers, 
even though not expressed explicitly, revealed themselves most of the time through 
their portrayals of certain events or details. The fact that the rifts showing in and 
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hampering the politics of the country also appeared in the intellectual discourse 
illustrates how deeply-rooted they were in Lebanese society, especially with regard to 
the elite. The prospects of a voluntaristic understanding serving as the basis for a 
predominant, transcending national identity remained, therefore, rather bleak. Within 
the deeply-rooted sectarian system it could become a form of identity, but only one that 
would be superseded by communal identities whenever conflicts over power arose. 
In Eritrea, on the other hand, despite continued Ethiopian efforts to manipulate 
the discourse from outside by maintaining claims to historical ties between both 
countries, the Eritrean nationalist movement was able to find consensus in an identity 
rooted in the common experience of Italian colonialism and strongly based on the 
common will to live together and the right to self-determination. Since the liberation 
movement was composed of members of all Eritrean communities, the developed 
consensus certainly had the potential to develop into a transcending national identity 
joining all communities. The splits and the civil conflict that the movement witnessed 
during the struggle for independence were political in nature and did not constitute 
negations concerning the will to live together in the aspired to independent Eritrea.   
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Chapter 4 – Unity, diversity, or unity in diversity: Political parties and 
  movements  
 
While the placement of representatives in government positions is generally identified 
as the major goal of political parties
1
, they should first and foremost be considered 
‘[f]ormal organizations for representing the aims and interests of different socio-
economic forces in the political sphere.’2 The emergence of ‘Westphalian’ nation-states 
with clearly demarcated boundaries and a certain level of socio-economic development 
that facilitated the transfer of traditional forms of representation to new centres predated 
the appearance of political parties.
3
 Yet, the societies of the nation-states were still 
marked by social divides based on various factors such as religion, region and 
education. Hanley reminds us that it was exactly these divides from which parties arose 
in the European context, reflecting ‘the social interests of groups polarised on to either 
side of these cleavages.’4 Usually cleavages were class or culture based, or represented 
splits such as between the centre and the periphery. States were thus never run by a 
single political class, but by coalitions and alliances of the representatives of existing 
segments or sub-entities.  
Since political parties represent the ideologies and goals existing within a given 
society, their analysis is highly relevant to the understanding of national identity. 
Exploring the divides through a part-whole framework relates to the question of  
how to reconcile private existence and public coexistence, anarchy and order, differences and 
harmony. Whether the initial unit is the individual, primary or secondary group, or a national 
community, at each level the ultimate problem is: How does the smaller unit relate to, and 
integrate with, the larger unit? [...] How can it be made that a part does not endanger unity, and 
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how can a part be put to use for the benefit of the whole?
5
 
These questions are of special relevance in post-colonial/post-mandate territories where 
the territorial entity and a new centre were created by the powerful colonial/mandate 
administration, and which are now striving to maintain themselves without relying on 
external force. The main issue is that such territories usually display a rather segmented 
society structure whether poly-ethnic or multi-confessional and persisting pre-
colonial/mandate loyalties to family, clan, sectarian and regional communities are 
expected to be transferred to the territorial state. Usually political parties function as 
intermediaries; yet, as Hanf pointed out, in multi-communal states ‘the communities and 
their political organs are the most important intermediaries, at least as long as they have 
not been completely depoliticized’.6 The political parties that develop from the various 
segments automatically lead to a political party system that has to be labelled as 
segmented pluralism, in which parties form along the various existing divides. Lijphart 
suggests several factors necessary to make consociation work in a fragmented society, 
including the ability of elites to recognize the inherent dangers of a fragmented system 
as well as their commitment to its maintenance. Furthermore, elites have to be able to 
go beyond existing cleavages and create solutions to accommodate subcultures.
7
 This is 
especially important when political systems are based on communities and their 
political organs, or ethnic/sectarian parties, since one of their characteristics is their 
clientelistic mobilization and, often, also reliance on ‘a single charismatic leader’.8 In 
other words, the elites have to develop a concept of syncretistic nationalism which 
facilitates the co-existence of communities in the territorial state.  
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This chapter will examine the development of political parties in Eritrea and Lebanon 
and show that although in both countries early political parties were largely based on 
ethnic/sectarian divisions, multi-ethnic parties also existed. With few exceptions, all 
parties accepted the territorial entity created during the colonial/mandate period; 
however, party formation mainly took place around members of the elites for whom the 
parties were instrumental in achieving their nationalist aspirations. It will be 
demonstrated that a more conciliatory approach towards coexistence and a shared 
identity developed throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Yet, in the face of war/civil war, a 
reorganization of parties took place and old divisions were revived. Nonetheless, I will 
argue that it was mainly the struggle over hegemony rather than opposed interpretations 
of national identity and/or religious divisions that account for this development. A more 
civic and multi-communal understanding of identity had already developed and could 
have facilitated the development of a true syncretistic nationalism.  
  
ERITREA 
The emergence of political parties 
At the end of the Italian colonial period, most social groups and traditional institutions 
in Eritrea had survived the foreign domination. As the British rightfully noted, ‘[i]t was 
the policy of the Italian Administration to prevent the emergence or growth of any 
political consciousness’9 and, therefore, it is hardly surprising that no political or civil 
society movements, in the Western sense, had officially developed during the Italian 
colonial period. However, socio-economic developments together with the Italian racist 
policies in the territory had resulted in an anti-colonial sentiment which found 
expression in form of the Mahber Feqri Hager (Association for the Love of the 
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Country, MFH). The MFH was founded shortly after the beginning of British military 
occupation in May 1941, emerging out of a committee of twelve mediators, six Muslims 
and six Christians, who received Eritrea’s first British military administrator.10 
Members all shared the desire to end Italian domination and frequently complained to 
the BMA about the continued presence of Italian colonial administrators in the country. 
Iyob delivered one of the most detailed accounts on the MFH and pointed out that, aside 
from the religious balance, ‘[i]ts membership included old and new elites, those with 
ties to the pre-colonial ruling classes, and self-made individuals and intellectuals’ and, 
therefore, the MFH ‘served as a common arena where traditional resistance groups, 
syncretic movements, and economic interest groups interacted’.11 While such an arena 
has indeed to be considered an important stepping stone towards national integration 
and the development of a transcending Eritrean national identity, the different motives 
behind the anti-colonialist sentiments of the old and the new elite, and the lack of a 
shared political agenda beyond the end of colonial rule, contributed to its rapid 
fragmentation.   
The imminent threat of partition of the country as envisioned by the British, 
together with the more liberal political climate in Eritrea, fostered the emergence of 
various political parties out of the MFH centred around the mainstream ideological 
positions of pro-Unionists and pro-Independence supporters. An attempt was made to 
preserve the MFH and reconcile political differences, the Wa’la Bet Ghergish, a 
meeting organized by moderate leaders of the association in November 1946. It took 
place in anticipation of political parties being formally legalized, but was unsuccessful. 
At least five political parties were to emerge out of the MFH by the end of 1946/ 
beginning of 1947, and they ‘were essentially formed with a view to the arrival of the 
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Commission of Investigation.’12 In fact, their function was primarily to present to the 
international powers a considerable number of supporters that would convince them of 
their aspirations for the future of the country. In the following the main parties emerging 
out of the divide of the MFH will be presented. 
 
The Unionist Party 
 
The creation of the UP, to a large part, has to be ascribed to the influence of Emperor 
Haile Selassie who had returned to Ethiopia in April 1941. Immediately after his return 
he started working towards creating ‘irredentists’ movements in both the former Italian 
colonies of Eritrea and Somalia to have them ‘return’ to the Empire.13 In Eritrea he 
started using the existing MFH from 1942 onwards with the help of the Eritrean Coptic 
Church. Playing on ‘religious and kinship ties between Ethiopia and the Christian 
Highlands’ he was able to attract pro-unionist elements in the MFH and ‘precipitated 
the resurgence of ethnic, religious, and provincial cleavages that had been subordinated 
to the more universal anti-colonial and nationalist sentiment.’14 In Addis Ababa, the 
Ethiopian government sponsored a bureau for ‘Free Eritrea’, founded by Ethiopian 
government officials, and which the British in Eritrea saw as ‘evidently intended as a 
centre for irredentist propaganda in Eritrea.’15 However, the British legation in Ethiopia 
noted that its propaganda was aimed at winning over Eritreans based in Addis Ababa, 
and its success had to be considered limited since a considerable number of the 
Eritreans in Ethiopia had ‘little confidence in the efficiency and justice of the Ethiopian 
Government’.16   
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Inside Eritrea, the propaganda of the Ethiopian Government for the incorporation of 
Eritrea was ‘the only organised propaganda’ and proved to be rather more successful.17 
Following the failed reconciliation at Wa’la Bet Ghergish, the pro-Ethiopian remnants 
of the MFH were reconstituted into a political party named Mahber Hager Fiqri Ertra: 
Ertra ms Ethiopia (Association for Love of the Country: Eritrea with Ethiopia), 
commonly known as the Unionist Party (UP). A new leadership was appointed by the 
head of the Eritrean Orthodox Church in December 1946, and Tedla Bairu became the 
party’s first Secretary-General. Its political programme was simple: opposition to any 
form of foreign rule, whether Italian or a foreign trusteeship, and unconditional union of 
all of Eritrea with Ethiopia.
18
 
 
While the party was dominated by Highland Christians and the Eritrean Coptic 
Church, its actual membership demonstrates that cleavages did not run strictly along 
religious lines. Almost half of the Central Committee were Muslims, mainly belonging 
to the nobility or merchant classes, and the party placed great importance on pointing 
out the number of Muslim adherents to emphasize that it stood for unity between 
religious groups and was not based solely on religious affiliations.
19
 Negash claims that 
it was the deep religiosity of leaders that united Muslim and Christian supporters in the 
belief ‘that the ultimate goal of union with Ethiopia would find support in the eyes of 
God.’20 However, while this fits his thesis of depicting the later incorporation as the 
final achievement of a desire long-held by all Eritreans, it is hardly convincing. 
Bereketeab noted that the political identity of the party remained rather unclear and 
questioned ‘whether the UP represented Ethiopian nationalism – or was driven by a 
group of aristocrats who thought that their interests would be better served in union with 
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Ethiopia.’21 Indeed, the participation of Muslim elites can be explained by the fact that 
the party created its power-base around the traditional ruling class in Eritrea that was 
preoccupied with the restoration of its traditional privileges.
22
 Italian intervention in the 
social and political organization of the peasantry had resulted in the weakening of pre-
colonial feudal structures. Under the British, the serfs of the lowlands sought to advance 
their emancipation and revolts spread over the Western lowland of Barka and the 
Northern highlands.
23
 As Gebre-Medhin stated, the UP acknowledged these problems, 
yet Muslim aristocrats trusted that the Ethiopian Government would ‘not be 
unfavourably disposed toward their feudal privileges.’24 This does, indeed point to the 
party fulfilling a rather instrumental aspect.  
As discussed earlier, the Eritrean Church played a decisive role in securing 
supporters amongst the ordinary Eritrean Christians for the Unionist movement, yet a 
certain extant pro-Ethiopian sentiment among the Christians of the plateau cannot be 
denied. The UN Commission for Eritrea acknowledged that ‘[t]he Coptic Church 
certainly wields considerable influence, but it must not be overlooked that the Unionist 
movement in the highlands has many of the characteristics of an expanding popular 
movement.’25 Accusations of being behind the increased shifta activities from 1947-
1952 were vehemently denied by the party.
26
 Evidence showed though that the party, or 
at least some of its followers, resorted to violent means such as bombings and attempts 
on the lives of prominent leaders of the independence movement. The UP and its 
activities were, aside from conventional membership fees, also supported by the 
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Ethiopian government through the Ethiopian liaison officer in Asmara.
27
  
 
The Moslem League  
In December 1946, The Moslem League (ML, Al Rabita Al Islamiya) was established in 
Keren. The League was founded by Ibrahim Sultan, who had grown considerably 
uncomfortable with increasing unionist support in the MFH and drafted the League’s 
programme after the failed Wa’la Bet Ghergish meeting. He was able to garner much 
support among the Muslim communities except, as he said in an interview, ‘those who 
were blinded by the Christians’ propaganda.’28 Ibrahim Sultan was elected as secretary-
general of the newly-established party, and Said Abubakr al-Migrani, Mufti of the 
Eritrean branch of the Khatimiyya Brotherhood, as president.  
The new party was marked by strong opposition to any sort of association with 
Ethiopia, and its main aim was to preserve Eritrea within its colonial boundaries. 
Independence was to be achieved either immediately or after a ten year British or UN 
trusteeship. While the attitude towards the Italian community in the country was 
described as respectful and even affectionate in a way, Italian trusteeship was strongly 
rejected due to the overall rather negative experience of Italian colonialism.
29
 Britain, on 
the other hand, was viewed as being a ‘better’ colonial power and seemingly 
considering the needs of the colonized people.
30
 To counter allegations by the Unionists 
that the ML was a purely Muslim organization, the presence of Christian followers in 
the party was emphasized and it declared that all communities in Eritrea were to live 
together and all should become citizens with equal rights and duties.
31
 
However, as Miran points out, the ML used the banner of Islam to rally Eritrean 
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Muslims that were ethnically and linguistically rather heterogeneous and, thereby, made 
‘religious identity an essential component of nationalist aspirations.’32 In fact, Ibrahim 
Sultan himself later claimed that he based the founding of the ML largely on ‘the cause 
of Islam’ to counter the Unionists essentially rallying around the Eritrean Orthodox 
Church.
33
 The joining of the Muslim communities was also facilitated by developments 
under the British administration that resulted in the centralization of Eritrean Islamic 
institutions and the introduction of Arabic as a common language in the field of 
education.
34
 Another important aspect of mobilization amongst the Muslim peasants 
was Ibrahim Sultan’s role as a serf spokesman who were seeking freedom from feudal 
Muslim landowners, mainly in the Western plains and in the lowlands surrounding 
Massawa. His active promotion of more rights for serfs attracted large numbers of them 
into the League, especially so as the UP was very popular with the nobility and 
promoted their traditional rights.
35
  
   
The Liberal Progressive Party (‘Eritrea for Eritreans’)  
This party was founded by the local notable Ras Tessema Asmeron and his son Abraha 
in Adi Keyh in February 1947. One of its most active members was the Protestant 
Woldeab Woldemariam who served as a representative for the party abroad after going 
into exile. Woldemariam had already left the MFH in 1944 and established a 
clandestine movement for independence from which the LPP descended to a certain 
extent. Negash asserts that this early movement had been instigated by British Chief 
Administrator Stephen Longrigg, to advocate for unity of the Eritrean highlands with 
the Ethiopian province of Tigrai to bolster British plans of partition.
36
 However, ceding 
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territory was not an option for Woldemariam or the LPP; rather the party would have 
accepted the annexation of the Ethiopian province of Tigrai, as a way of uniting regions 
that were perceived as being connected by ethnicity, language and religion and had been 
linked, even throughout the colonial period, through ‘trans-frontier migration, trade 
between Tigrai villages and Eritrean markets and intermarriages of influential 
families’.37 The movement strongly opposed any dominance by the church and sought 
the support of traditional Christian elites that did not aspire to union with the Ethiopian 
state. 
In March 1947 a communiqué was issued by the party in support of the 
principles established by the Muslim League, specifically the call for Eritrea’s 
independence. Yet, any form of foreign trusteeship was categorically rejected by the 
LPP. The party attempted to promote a secular Eritrean identity which was to be based 
on the collective experience of Italian colonisation. Since that had been shared by 
Muslims and Christians alike, no distinction was to be made between adherents of the 
different faiths.
38
 The party was said to have around 53,000 members and was financed 
through membership fees.
39
 After a short participation in the Independence Bloc, the 
party disintegrated and dissolved by the end of 1950.  
 
The Independence Bloc  
During a session of the UN in the spring of 1949, a number of pro-independence parties 
amalgamated to form the Independence Bloc (IB) under the leadership of Ibrahim 
Sultan. This coalition was first formed by the New Eritrea Pro-Italy Party, the ML and 
the Italo-Eritrean Association before being joined by the LPP, the National Party of 
Massawa, the Veterans’ Association, the Independent Eritrea Party, and the Intellectual 
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Association of Eritreans. In its programme, an inclusive approach was taken 
considering all communities in the territory and expressing the awareness ‘that 
independence, true freedom and progress, can only be achieved through cooperation, 
with respect, the protection of work and the honest initiatives of all the people.’40 This 
statement also included the Italian community in the territory, and it was asserted that 
they and the indigenous population would indeed feel united ‘by a brotherly spirit of 
nationalism’.41 The IB sought complete independence without any economic 
dependency, a democratic government and territorial integrity.
42
 Essays attached to the 
programme argued that Eritrea was economically viable and self-sufficient and 
described the new nation of Eritrea in which any social, religious or racial differences 
would not matter but only ‘the life that one has lived together, the dangers one has faced 
together, the blood that one has shed together’ as well as the ‘deep sentiment of unity 
and the firm belief that all belong to the same family.’43 The Bloc was not overly 
sympathetic towards the British, largely due to accusations that the British purposely 
instigated conflicts between Eritreans based on religious or racial differences in order to 
further their proposal of partition.
44
 
While the British considered the actual strength of the IB to be 75 percent of the 
population, the American envoy Arthur Paddock estimated it at around 65 percent.
45
 
Numbers produced by the final report of the UN Commission, however, seemed to 
support estimates showing a Unionist predominance. The Bloc was quickly attacked by 
pro-Unionists. Aside from the allegation that the parties calling for independence were 
only brought into existence for the Commission of Investigation, it was further claimed 
that their joining of forces was engineered and financed by the Italians in order to 
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promote their own interests.
46
 On these allegations the UN Commission noted that  
 
as far as the Independence Bloc is concerned, its close association with Italian political interests 
is apparent from its composition. [...] However, at most Independence Bloc meetings real 
enthusiasm was encountered and this invalidates any charge that the Bloc is entirely a creation, 
and under the direction, of the Italians and does not represent a substantial trend of opinion.
47
 
 
However, Ibrahim Sultan’s decision to join with pro-Italian movements was not 
unanimously agreed upon within the Bloc. A large number of pro-independence 
Eritreans still mistrusted the Italian community in Eritrea and its links with the former 
colonial power. The repercussions of this started to show by the beginning of 1950 
when declining support from Sultan’s co-religionists became more and more obvious. 
The unity of the Bloc was further shattered during a string of violent shifta attacks in the 
winter of 1949/1950. The IB finally fragmented due to the external pressure and internal 
disunity. Specifically the ML witnessed the break-away of splinter groups, most notably 
the Muslim League of the Western Province (MLWP) under the leadership of Ali Radai, 
and the Independent Muslim League, which joined the pro-Unionist camp after it was 
given guarantees concerning Unionist respect for Muslim institutions and the teaching 
of Arabic in schools.
48
  
The fact that the IB quickly disintegrated certainly weakened the independence 
movement in general and, as Bereketeab notes, the split was especially damaging since 
it occurred in the middle of the UN debate on the fate of the territory.
49
 However, the 
very existence of the Bloc, albeit short, reflected that an Eritrean nationalist sentiment 
had developed across various religious and ethnic communities in the territory who 
defined their identity separately from the Ethiopian nation.  
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Political representation during the federation and after annexation  
The decline of political parties 
Shortly after the UN adopted its resolution deciding the future of Eritrea, all the political 
parties in the territory held a ‘Peace Congress’ in Asmara on 31 December 1950. The 
result was a joint communiqué in which all parties, ‘in view of the necessity to bring 
about general pacification’, promised to respect the decision to create a federation with 
Ethiopia and to co-operate in all aspects.
50
 It was also made clear that the aim of uniting 
forces was to ensure, ‘at the earliest possible date, the progress and prosperity of the 
Eritrean people.’51 Both the Unionists and the pro-independence movements agreed to 
work together in the UN-mandated autonomous Eritrean institutions for the creation of 
a democratic Eritrean state. The remnants of the IB further decided to change its name 
to Eritrean Democratic Front (EDF) ‘in order to adapt it to the new situation.’52  
The first elections took place in March under the British Administration 
Electoral Proclamation 121, which, it was envisioned, would be replaced by an 
Electoral Law to be passed by the first Eritrean Assembly.
53
 Of all the parties in 
existence at the end of the 1940s only the UP, the EDF and the MLWP managed to 
garner sufficient electoral support and took thirty-two, eighteen and fifteen seats 
respectively in the first Assembly, evenly divided between Muslims and Christians. The 
remaining three seats were filled by splinter groups.
54
 Following the federation with 
Ethiopia, Eritrean political parties witnessed a decisive decline. As the former advisor to 
the Emperor admitted, ‘there was nowhere a disposition to develop political parties at 
that juncture’ mainly because ‘the danger was too great that such parties might take on 
regional colorations’ and that other regions of the state could follow the Eritrean 
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example.
55
 The renunciation of political parties can hardly be considered a surprise in an 
authoritarian, traditionally party-less country such as Ethiopia, where power was 
considered to be given by God, not the people. The Eritrean autonomous unit, with a 
constitution based on democratic principles and the existence of political parties, was a 
bizarre anomaly in the Ethiopian State from the first day of the federation.  
Due to increasing Ethiopian interference and the dictatorial and pro-Unionist 
orientation of the Chief Executive of Eritrea Tafla Bairu and his successor Asfaha 
Woldemichael, the Electoral Law was never passed by the Eritrean Assembly and 
elections continued to be held under Proclamation 121. Together with repressive 
measures this allowed Woldemichael to place government-sponsored candidates in most 
constituencies for the 1956 elections.
56
 The result was a predominantly pro-Ethiopian 
Assembly and the noticeable absence of affiliation with political parties of its members. 
A report on the results of the elections by the British Consulate-General in Asmara 
shows that while twenty-nine members were from the Unionist Party, eight were 
described as ‘Anti-Unionist’, and twenty-seven ‘did not publicly express their political 
affiliation’.57  
After the elections in 1956, public meetings were prohibited and political parties 
banned. However, well into the late 1950s the ML tirelessly released memoranda urging 
the Emperor to adhere to the federation resolution and the Eritrean constitution.
58
 The 
only exception to the party ban was the UP, which was reorganized and financed in 
order to promote the complete incorporation of Eritrea into Ethiopia. Consequently, 
together with ongoing repression against any form of opposition, the 1960 elections 
resulted in an Assembly packed with Unionists and largely obedient to Ethiopia. Yet, 
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even within the UP discontent with the steady erosion of the autonomous structures had 
emerged and it collaborated with anti-Union elements in order to try and stop the 
attrition. As the British Commissioner of the Eritrean police noted: ‘The ‘union or 
death’ attitude has changed and their cry is now ‘federation or death’.’59 Increasing 
numbers of Unionists also defected from the party and embraced Eritrean nationalism.  
 
Nationalist mobilization through workers’ and students’ movements  
Although political parties ceased to exist, the 1950s witnessed the development of a 
workers and student movement which kept nationalist mobilisation alive, and largely 
fed the new pro-independence organizations that were beginning to emerge by the end 
of the 1950s.  
 In 1949 strikes were organized by dockworkers in Massawa and Eritrean 
Railway workers prompted by inequalities and discrimination at their workplace, which 
led to the liberalization of the BMA’s labour policy.60 By early 1951, ten labour unions 
had emerged in Asmara alone.
61
 In January 1952, the British administration recognized 
a national confederation of trade unions, the Syndicate of Free Eritrean Workers which 
was established by Woldeab Woldemariam after he had been approached by trade union 
leaders for advice.
62
 As Woldemariam noted in a 1983 interview, there was no ethnic 
conflict within the syndicate, and it contained Muslim as well as Christian workers.
63
 A 
labour code was also introduced by the British, first through proclamation and later by 
Article 33 of the Eritrean Constitution.
64
 With a claimed membership of about 10,000 
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workers, the Syndicate represented a considerable social force in federated Eritrea.
65
 
However, just as with political parties, trade unions and labour movements were not 
viewed favourably by the Ethiopian Government, and the Syndicate soon faced 
repression, followed by its banning in 1954 which forced it to go underground. The 
extension of Ethiopian control over the port facilities in Massawa and the Eritrean 
railroad, together with the deteriorating economic situation, resulted in the first attempts 
to launch a general strike in 1956.
66
 The passing of a new Labour Code by the Eritrean 
Assembly in October 1957, severely restricting workers’ rights, was the last spark that 
ignited a nationwide general strike in early 1958. The strike ‘was greeted with an 
outpouring of support’ and about 80,000 residents of Asmara gathered and asked for the 
resignation of Asfaha Woldemichael.
67
 While the strike was forcefully suppressed by 
the police and resulted in the destruction of the Eritrean labour movement, it had 
mobilized a large part of Asmara’s population that had grown increasingly discontent 
with the Eritrean government and Ethiopian repressions. As Killion notes, the support 
of Asmara’s Christian population was especially remarkable since it ‘clearly 
demonstrated the sea-change in political attitudes that had taken place since 
Federation’.68 In fact, while the defections of UP members from the party had shown 
that this change had taken place on the elite level, the support of the strike demonstrated 
the growing embracement of Eritrean nationalism on the grassroots level. 
 The strike also had a decisive impact on students in Asmara who, from the late 
1950s onwards, had also expressed their general discontent through spontaneous action. 
Wolde-Yesus Ammar, himself a leader of the early 1960s Asmara Student Movement, 
detailed in an article about the latter how these spontaneous actions included individual 
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actions like writing graffiti, or group actions such as strikes and damaging school 
furniture.
69
 In the summer of 1956, the authorities intervened to clamp down on actions 
in Asmara’s secondary schools.70 In 1960, students of two high schools in Asmara 
marched in large numbers to protest Ethiopian policies in the territory and the 
increasing moves towards annexation. In May 1962, another demonstration was staged 
and spread from Asmara across the country. The authorities hastily subdued the 
demonstrations with brutal force; yet the suppressive measures failed to silence the 
students. The next demonstration in March 1965 resulted in the arrest and detention of 
over 2000 high school students. Many of the student leaders were to play an important 
role in the liberation movement that had already formed outside the territory, and the 
formerly rather unstructured student movement became more organized through its 
links with the liberation movement after 1965. 
 
The Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM)  
In November 1958, a group of young Muslim Eritrean nationalists in Port Sudan formed 
the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM). The movement was also known as the 
‘Seven-Organization’ (Mahber Shew’ate) in the Eritrean Highlands because of its cell 
structure, or Haraka an abbreviation of its name in Arabic, Ḥaraka Taḥrīr Irītrīa.  
While based abroad, the ELM quickly worked on spreading its influence into 
Asmara and other areas of the territory through a clandestine cell network using social 
organizations inside Eritrea. As Iyob stated, the movement appealed to a broad spectrum 
of society because it voiced ‘a general sense of betrayal at the hands of traditional 
rulers’ who had been co-opted by the Ethiopian regime.71 Members included a large 
number of students, workers and employees of mixed religious affiliations that had 
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already mobilized throughout the 1950 and for whom the party provided an outlet and a 
clandestine organizational structure. The ELM’s link with the Sudanese Communist 
Party through one of its founders, Mohammed Seid Nawud, inspired its strategy of 
clandestine agitation and gave it a ‘more left’ orientation.72 
The ELM propagated a strategy of secularization in order to prevent differences 
based on religious affiliations. The founding principle of the party centred on the unity 
of Muslims and Christians which ‘was what made Eritrea a nation.’73 Woldeab 
Woldemariam, who strongly influenced the emergence of a secular Eritrean nationalist 
feeling through radio broadcasts from Cairo, joined the movement in 1960/61 after 
being approached by Eritrean students in Cairo. He summarized the main objectives of 
the party as follows: ‘The Liberation of Eritrea, the establishment of an Independent and 
Democratic State of Eritrea and the Unity of the Eritrean people and integrity of 
territory, resolutely opposing factionalism, regionalism and organizations based on 
religious or tribal lines.’74 
The ELM planned to achieve independence through a revolutionary coup d’état. 
This distinguished it from the second movement emerging shortly after the ELM, the 
Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), and seemed to make co-existence of the two possible; 
yet, the ELM’s support base became decisively weakened by competition between the 
two. The pressure of this competition together with the decisive weakening of the party 
inside Eritrea after it was uncovered and many of its leaders arrested by Ethiopian 
security forces in 1962 prompted the decision of the ELM to turn to direct military 
action in September 1964.
75
 After officially refusing to join forces with the ELF, a small 
guerrilla troop of 30 to 50 people was sent into Eritrea by the ELM but was quickly 
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stopped by ELF forces. This defeat signalled the official demise of the ELM. Despite its 
short-lived existence, Iyob asserts that it left behind a legacy that was an essential 
component in the later development of Eritrean national consciousness since its ideal of 
a ‘secular Pan-Eritrean nationalism’ had a decisive impact on the generation of Eritreans 
that would later ‘construct the basis for modern Eritrean nationalism.’76 In fact, since it 
had the characteristics of a grassroots movement, it has to be considered proof of the 
will to live together of the Christian and the Muslim communities and the possible 
foundation for a syncretistic nationalism to develop.  
 
The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)  
After prominent exiled Eritrean nationalists had experienced the futility of raising the 
case of Eritrea before the UN, the idea of an organization that would launch an armed 
struggle was developed. In 1960 the ELF was formed in Cairo by Muslim veterans of 
the pro-independence movement including Idris Mohamed Adem, Idris Osman 
Galadewos and Taha Mohamed Nur, largely spurred on by the support and 
encouragement of Eritrean students and workers in Arab countries such as Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia and Sudan. The founders were exclusively Muslim, and the founding document 
stated that the movement was formed ‘in the name of Allah and in the name of the 
Eritrean people’.77 With the leadership based in Cairo, the armed struggle inside Eritrea 
was launched with the help of Muhammad Sheikh Dawd in the Western lowlands and 
the initially rather small Eritrean Liberation Army (ELA) was led by Hamid Idris 
Awate. As both Iyob and Connell noted, the ELF had, at that point, not developed a 
long-term strategy since it expected the armed uprising would provoke a UN 
intervention.
78
 While there was no reaction from the international community the ELF 
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was able to increase its support within the population, attracting large numbers of ELM 
supporters that had grown increasingly discontent with what was perceived as inaction 
by the ELM. Many simply supported an armed struggle; yet they did not really know 
the difference between the ELM and the ELF.
79
 After the demise of the ELM, the ELF 
took on the role of the prime opposition movement. 
 While the movement grew in numbers, its organization remained ill-defined. 
Idris Mohamed Adem, Idris Osman Galadewos and Osman Saleh Sabbe (the latter 
joined in late 1961 and was crucial in soliciting support from Arab countries), formed 
the self-appointed Supreme Council (ELF-SC). To coordinate this outside leadership 
with the field, a Revolutionary Command (ELF-RC) was set up in Kassala. Due to the 
growing influx of fighters coming from various different, regional, religious and 
educational backgrounds, the ELF divided the field into four zones following its 1965 
congress. This directly reintroduced earlier divisions since fighters ‘were required to 
join the zone that represented their ethnicity and place of origin.’80 As Haile Woldensae, 
later founding member of the EPLF, notes, this division was ‘an excuse to create power 
bases’ for Idris Osman Galadewos and Osman Saleh Sabbe who were fighting over 
influence in the movement.
81
 In 1966, a fifth division was established on the plateau for 
the Christian fighters, largely as a result of the ongoing Ethiopian suppressions that 
forced the ELF leadership to accommodate Christians and urban political activists. In 
fact, the links sought by the ELF to the student movement in Asmara after the 1965 
demonstration and the forming of cells supporting the ELF in Eritrean secondary 
schools and at the university of Addis Ababa, resulted in a large number of Christian 
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students joining the Front.
82
  
The division into zones based on ethnic and religious loyalties ‘in effect 
established a system of allied warlords, each autonomous, who lived off the people in 
their area by collecting taxes, levying fines and looting livestock and property.’83 In 
addition, personal rivalry amongst the leaders of the divisions also prevented 
collaboration between the zones. This led to the emergence of a reform movement, 
known as Eslah, after the disastrous Ethiopian offensive in 1967, led ‘by younger, more 
politically sophisticated fighters and civilians from both Muslim and Christian 
communities.’84 Many of them were former members of the student movement, 
including Issayas Afewerki and Haile Woldensae, who were appalled by the situation 
they found in the field when joining the Front.
85
 A meeting of political commissioners 
from three zones resulted in the creation of a United Front that became known as the 
Tripartite Unity (TU). A letter of the progressives to the ELF-SC and the ELF-RC 
presented their demands for reform which not only included the abolition of the zonal 
structure, the unity of the fighters and a leadership based in the field, but also more 
democracy and equality, and clearly defined principles.
86
 Even though some of the 
demands were met by the leadership in the resolutions passed in the Adobha conference 
of August 1969, they were quickly supplanted and internal dissent was harshly 
suppressed. Some of the reformist fighters were arrested, 500 were forced to give up 
their arms and expelled to Sudan, and others were killed in their units.
87
 This resulted in 
the emergence of several break-away groups. Osman Saleh Sabbe, who had put his 
support behind the TU in order to assert his own leadership, moved to Jordan with some 
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of his followers and established the ELF-General Secretariat (ELF-GS). 
 
The  ELF  itself  became  increasingly  influenced  by  the  Labour  Party  that 
emerged during the reform movement. Young recruits ‘imported’ Marxist and Maoist 
ideas  from  China,  Cuba  and  some  Arab  states  and  a  leftist  philosophy  started 
developing in the mid-1970s.
88 
The First National Congress, held in 1971, implemented 
some important reforms and Kibreab asserts that ‘the ELF was evolving as a broad 
church/mosque where all Eritreans who unquestioningly accepted its leadership and 
program could be part of it regardless of one’s identity.’89 In fact, all the Christian and 
Muslim ELF fighters interviewed noted the freedom of expression within the ELF 
throughout the 1970s. However, the fact that the ELF upheld the principle that ‘there 
can be no more than one struggle, one organization, one organization and one leadership 
in our country’90 made reconciliation with the break-away groups impossible. It became 
embroiled in two civil wars with the EPLF that emerged out of the break-away groups, 
and was expelled to Sudan in 1982. 
 
The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) 
 
The  EPLF  developed  out  of  the  Eslah  movement  as  the  merger  of  three  of  the 
breakaway groups from the ELF. However, its creation was only officially announced 
during a conference under the leadership of Issayas Afewerki in January 1977. 
In addition to the ELF-GC, the breakaway groups that formed out of the ELF 
were the People’s Liberation Forces (PLF, also known as Sduha Eyla) under the 
leadership of Romedan Mohamed Nur, the Selfi Natsnet/Ala group (also referred to as 
PLFII) under Issayas Afewerki, and the Eritrean Liberation Forces (also known as Obel 
group) around Adem Saleh. While all the breakaway groups that emerged in 1970/71 
were convinced that change within the ELF was impossible, they were of different 
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ethnic compositions and their reasons for leaving differed to a certain degree. During a 
meeting in Beirut in early 1972, the PLF and Selfi Natsnet agreed to establish a united 
front, yet the actual merger took place in 1973 amidst the civil war with the ELF. The 
Obel group joined the new coalition, named Eritrean People’s Liberation Forces, after 
it was attacked by the ELF and was ‘pushed by the fighters to merge.’91  
The first known pamphlet generally ascribed to the EPLF (though issued by the 
Selfi Natsnet) dates from 1971, Nehna Elaman (Our Struggle and its Goals), and its 
content is in many points  similar to the principles and goals outlined in the letter that 
had been sent to the ELF-SC and the ELF-RC by the progressives. It emphasized that 
religious division should not be considered the major difference in Eritrean society but 
rather a major issue that had been used by foreign oppressors to exploit the Eritrean 
people through a policy of ‘divide and rule’. Yet, all differences would not matter as 
‘through ages of a common colonial experience, the Eritrean people already related 
history, economy, political development, languages, culture and traditions have been so 
interfused [sic], interred and intertwined that today they stand on the same 
foundation.’92 According to the pamphlet, the mistake made by the ELF was that it 
lacked a clear political obstacle and used Islam as a supporting ground. This obscured 
the national struggle from the beginning since the national resistance of the 1950-61 
‘was devoid of religious antagonisms; it was a common struggle of Moslems and 
Christian highlanders and lowlanders. This experience unified the people and raised the 
level of their political awareness.’93 The only difference within the Eritrean population 
that had to be overcome according to the movement was the difference of class, 
everything else was actually part of the Eritrean ‘make-up’, hence of the national 
identity of the country. Accordingly, the revolution had to follow two stages: liberation 
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from imperialist domination, and specifically from Ethiopian colonization, followed by 
liberation from any form of oppression through fighting the existing class system with 
the aim of forming the basis of a socialist society. It was stressed that the Eritrean 
revolution was not a socialist one, but a nationalist and democratic one intended to form 
the basis for a future socialist revolution.
94
 
In January 1977, the first organizational congress of the EPLF was held in the 
liberated areas. A number of resolutions were passed, including a Draft National 
Democratic Programme, a Draft Constitution, an elected Central Committee, and 
Insignia and Flag of the Organization. The name of the organization was also officially 
confirmed as the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front. On a political level the most 
important point was the confirmation of the necessity of national unity in order to be 
successful in the struggle for independence. Great emphasis was put on political work 
done abroad and on raising the political consciousness and knowledge of the masses of 
combatants. The programme of the second EPLF congress in 1987 basically reaffirmed 
that adopted at the first congress but did make a few terminological changes in order to 
make it more acceptable to possible supporters from the international community. After 
independence it was found that a clandestine Marxist party, the Eritrean People’s 
Revolutionary Party, had existed inside the EPLF, largely shaping the visions, 
programme and direction of the Front. It had emerged out of the same context as the 
Labour Party that dominated the ELF following the Adobha conference, yet never 
really functioned as a distinct political force and its leaders were more or less identical 
with those of the EPLF.
95
  
The EPLF took over the role of the sole front in the field after it had expelled the 
ELF to Sudan. The experience of civil war together with an internal crisis in 1973 
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convinced the leadership of the EPLF ‘of the need for brutal discipline.’96 This resulted 
in the EPLF adopting a rigid authoritarian structure and ethos that would endure beyond 
the struggle into independent Eritrea.   
 
LEBANON 
Political tradition and parties in Lebanon  
Unlike in Eritrea, political consciousness and organization developed early during the 
mandate period and was able to mature with few restrictions. Of course, this has to be 
ascribed to the difference between the mandate and the colonial regime. While France 
certainly attired to exert as much control over the territory as possible, its official 
mandate was to prepare the country for independence and, consequently, the country 
was given a constitution in 1926 and a Chamber of Deputies and Senate were set up ‘to 
represent sects and regions.’97 In fact, the Lebanese electoral system was designed in a 
way that rather worked against political parties and saw most of the seats in the 
Lebanese Parliament taken by Zu’ama - patrons or prominent personalities recognized 
by their clients/community to speak for them and who passed this status on to their 
descendants.
98
 The role of the Zu’ama and clientalism, how it developed from pre-
mandate times and persisted throughout independent Lebanon has been widely 
studied.
99
 While traditional forms of clientalism in Lebanon had been largely based on 
kinship and fealty, the enactment of the Règlement added sectarian allegiances as a 
mode of social organisation and enshrined it in the political system. New generations of 
politicians emerging from the late 19
th
 century and during the mandate adapted to this 
form of political organization and, consequently, their legitimacy was largely based on 
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sectarian allegiances. Furthermore, as the new elite became established, ‘some aspects 
of hereditary rule were maintained […] within the framework of modern political 
institutions and under new labels.’100 Modernization also resulted in a new form of 
political clientalism, labelled party-directed clientalism by Hamzeh.
101
 However, the 
role of political parties has to be seen as subordinate to most clan and sectarian 
organizations which largely fulfilled the role of recruiting political leaders. Hence, 
political parties in Lebanon often remained either tied to a traditional notable or 
confessionally-based. This was further facilitated by the fact that different nationalist 
aspirations were linked to religious affiliation. Ideology played a rather insignificant 
role with the notable exception of multi-communal, secular parties. 
The years 1935 to 1937 saw the increasing ‘activity of political parties and 
paramilitary organizations of a novel type.’102
 
Inspired by forms of political 
organization in Germany and Italy at the time, these parties were based on protest 
against the existing government and older generations and, therefore, incorporated ‘the 
young and vigorous as distinct from the ‘old gang’ of local politicians.’103 New also 
were the adoption of concrete programmes and the rather widespread organization of 
the new parties. Nonetheless, they remained based predominantly on sectarian 
affiliations; non-confessional parties were rare, the main exceptions being the Syrian 
Social Nationalist Party, the Communist Party (Ḥizb al-Sha’b al-Lubnāni) and the 
Republican Party for Independence (Ḥizb al-Istiqlāl al-Jumhūrī).  
While non-sectarian political parties were the rare exception, religious 
organizations deserve a special mention as laymen often not only represented a cultural 
establishment but a political one as well, and representatives of the religious 
communities played a decisive role as political actors. This became quite obvious in the 
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run up to the civil war in 1975. The most significant amongst these religious groups 
were the Maronite League, the Permanent Committee of General Superiors of Lebanese 
Religious Orders (four Maronite and four Greek Catholic superiors), the Supreme 
Islamic Shi
c
ites Council (as of 1969), and the Muslim Benevolent Society (Maqāṣid), 
which was established by the Sunni Muslim community in the late 19
th
 century. While 
the Christian and Sunni organizations and societies had been active for a long time, the 
Shi
c
a community only really started to organize itself during the 1960s.  
In general, political parties in Lebanon could be categorized as follows: non pan-
Arab transnational parties, Arab nationalist transnational parties, religious and ethnic 
organizations and exclusively Lebanese parties. The Lebanese parties, in turn, could be 
divided into Muslim-Druze or Christian majorities.
104
 These classifications reveal that 
the huge variety of parties taking part in Lebanese politics closely mirrored the religious 
fragmentation of the country rather than representing political ideologies. In fact, this 
was true for most social organisations; for instance, there was both a Christian and a 
Muslim Boy Scout group. Political parties in Lebanon could also be classified according 
to the time of their emergence, with those formed during the mandate period belonging 
to the ‘first generation’, a ‘second generation’ after independence, and a ‘third 
generation’ during the civil war (1975-1990).105 
In the following, some of the early political parties in Lebanon, representing the 
different existing strands, will be examined. 
 
Les Phalanges Libanaises/Lebanese Kata’ib Party  
 
The Phalanges Libanaises, originally an offshoot of the Party of Lebanese Unity, 
represented purely Lebanese and mainly Maronite interests. Inspired in its style by para-
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military and fascist movements, the Munazzamat al-Kata’ib al-Lubnānīya (the 
Lebanese Phalange Organization) was founded on 21 November 1936 and started as ‘a 
school of integrated citizenship and unlimited nationalism’.106 While it initially 
professed to be non-political, it soon evolved into a considerable force in the social and 
political arena. Pierre Gemayel, who founded the organization together with others such 
as Charles Helou and George Naccache, was elected Chief Superior of the Phalange in 
April 1937. Worried by its increasing membership (22,000 by 1939)
107
, the French 
authorities dissolved the organization a number of times, and it was only after its 
engagement in the struggle for independence that the Phalange was recognized as a 
legal organization in December 1943. After having focused largely on social issues in 
the first decade of its existence, the party decided to enter the political arena and 
presented its own candidates for the first time in the 1947 elections.
108
 In May 1952 the 
organization began to operate as ‘a real political party’ under the name of Phalanges 
Libanaises (al-Kata’ib al-Lubnānīya),109 and after the events of 1958 it became an 
influential participant in the Lebanese political system.  
The organization did not have a strong ideological basis in the beginning but was 
engaged in fighting any non-Lebanese or trans-Lebanese nationalism. Despite officially 
denouncing sectarian action and propounding a brand of Lebanese nationalism 
including all inhabitants of the country within the 1920 boundaries, the Phalange often 
served as a spokesperson for the Maronite community. With regard to the Arab world, 
certain common aims and sentiments were admitted, but Lebanon’s ‘unique cultural 
mission’ and its difference in ‘thought, civilization, and race […] from any other 
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country or people, including the Arabs’ were continuously emphasized.110 The French 
General Paul Beynet described the Phalange in 1944 as ‘the most important political 
group of the Lebanon’, and its leader, Pierre Gemayel, as a pious Christian who was 
disturbed by the political views of the Muslim elements in the country.
111
 In fact, 
Richani asserts that the Phalange initially very much played the role of ‘the defender of 
the political system and protector of the prevailing power structure.’112 Following the 
1958 crisis, the Phalange developed their militia, extant since the 1940s, into one of the 
biggest and most active in the country as it was convinced that the Lebanese army was 
not able to defend the Government and, most importantly, the Maronite elite.
113
 While 
the protection of the status of the Maronite community was indeed an important goal, 
the party was not satisfied with the system of clientalism prevailing in the Lebanese 
political system and protested it together with the an-Najjada in a memorandum in 
1946,
114
 and by briefly joining the Patriotic Socialist Front (PSF) which was largely 
dominated by secular leftist parties in early 1950.
115
 Gemayel himself did not belong to 
the Lebanese traditional elite but to the generation of young politicians that entered the 
political scene during the mandate. This was reflected in the modern and bureaucratic 
structure of the Phalange. Yet, the party organized itself by adapting to the Lebanese 
system and, as Khalaf noted, ‘by supplanting the local notables, kept on fulfilling his 
traditional functions, but at a much higher level of efficiency and organization.’116 
From the late 1960s on, the party moved away from its nationalist ideology of 
‘Lebanonism’ towards a new, quite secular ideology and ‘overtly accepted 
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interconfessionalism as an integral part of the Lebanese nationalist concept.’117
 
In a 
memorandum to the President of the Republic and the Patriarch of the Maronites on the 
eve of the civil war in 1975, the party reaffirmed its belief in dialogue between all 
groups and parties and the necessity of consensus among the Lebanese:  
The characteristic of Lebanon is that the multiplicity and variety of its confessional communities 
do not diminish its capacity to gather them together in a nation. If some of us are Muslims, some 
Christians, other Jews, others atheists, this does not prevent us all from being Lebanese. 
Accordingly, a distinction must be made between confessional affiliation and national 
representation.
118
 
In the same statement the temporary character of the power-sharing formula in the 
constitution and the guarantee of religious freedom in the country were emphasized.  
 
an-Najjada Party  
Like the Phalange, an-Najjada started out as a para-military youth movement but was 
far less efficient than the Phalange, and the fact that it represented purely Arab 
nationalism led to frequent clashes with the former. Founded in 1936, the movement 
was reorganized with a party-like structure on 10 November 1937 by Adnan al-Hakim. 
The two movements did, in fact, mirror very clearly the classification of Lebanese 
political parties into those with a Muslim majority versus those with a Christian 
preponderance. Yet, they cooperated in the struggle for the abolishment of the French 
mandate, and after independence in criticizing the government for nepotism and 
clientalism in a common manifesto and both joined the PSF.  
As a party, an-Najjada claimed to be non-sectarian and did, in fact have a 
number of Greek Orthodox members running for the party in elections. However, its 
programme was tailored to attract mainly Sunni Muslims, and its understanding of 
                                                          
117
 Ibid., p. 47. 
118
 Memorandum of the Kata’ib Party to the President of the Republic and the Patriarch of the 
Maronites, published in an-Nahar newspaper on 24.08.1975, in: Center for the Study of the Modern 
Arab World/ Saint Joseph’s University, Religion, State & Ideology, CEMAM Reports, Vol. 3, (Beirut: Dar 
el-Mashreq, 1975), p. 53. 
183 
 
Arabism was ‘closely linked with Islam’.119 The pro-Arab identification of the 
movement specifically appealed to lower Sunni classes who blamed their low social and 
economic status on the Western-backed Maronite Christian groups.
120
 While its first 
years were marked by periods of dissolution and internal disagreements it was 
decisively revived through the struggle for independence. However, the dissolution of 
all paramilitary organizations by the Lebanese government in 1949 also included an-
Najjada. Only its reshaping as a political party allowed the movement to return to the 
political arena. This happened in 1951, when the movement became Ḥizb an-Najjada, 
only to be dissolved again during the civil war of 1958. Its contradictory ideology was a 
matter of contention, especially its consistent call for federation with other Arab 
countries while at the same time strongly defending Lebanese independence and 
sovereignty. Since the party drew its support largely from Beirut where al-Hakim was 
based, El Khazen labelled it a ‘provincial party’.121 
 
The Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) 
Founded in Beirut in 1949 by Kamal Jumblatt, the leader of one of the main Druze 
factions, the Ḥizb at-Taqaddumi al-Ishtirāki based its ideology and programme mainly 
on the ideas of socialism. By the mid-1950s, the party started to adopt a more Arab 
nationalist view which was clearly revealed during the civil war in 1958 when Jumblatt 
was one of the fiercest opponents of the Sham’un government. Since 1951, the party has 
consistently had members in the Lebanese Parliament, claimed to be non-sectarian and 
to have members from all religions in its leadership. Yet, the party was tailored very 
much towards Jumblatt and hence a large number of supporters were Druze peasants 
who supported the party out of loyalty to their leader. In fact, with the appearance of 
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‘other socialistic as well as more Arab parties […], the PSP began to look more and 
more like a vehicle for Jumblatt’s ambitions and those of office-seekers interested in 
furthering their personal interests.’122 
The ideology of the party was also based on Jumblatt’s personal and very 
philosophical interpretation of socialism. One of his main concerns was the elimination 
of all sorts of divisive elements in society, including the confessional system in 
Lebanon.
123
 In terms of practical politics, Jumblatt was known to swiftly change his 
alliances according to what served him best. His assassination in March 1977 was a 
turning point; as the party was strongly shaped by his personality, it never recovered 
from his death. His son, Walid Jumblatt, was elected his successor, mainly to satisfy the 
traditional Druze support base of the party.
124
 This election seemed to contradict the 
leftist, secular ideology and programme of the party and revealed how deeply 
entrenched traditional elite politics had become in Lebanese society. Richani asserted 
that ‘Kamal Jumblatt’s original intention behind the establishment of the PSP [… was] 
to transcend the same power base that acted as a constraining social force even after his 
death.’125 In fact, to preserve the interests of the Druze community in the Lebanese 
political arena, it had to compete by the rules of sectarian representation. As the Druze 
community lacked a church or mosque hierarchy from which the traditional elite could 
emerge, therefore, the party could possibly serve as a substitute. The fact that the party 
was not exclusively Druze and actually promoted an anti-sectarian policy might make 
Jumblatt’s supposed intention look peculiar, yet it was the only way within the 
Lebanese political system to extend the power-base of his family beyond the Druze 
community.  
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Re-organization and formation of new alliances in the wake of the Civil War 
  
A study conducted by Ilyas Harik on voting participation revealed ‘a growing tendency 
toward sectarian accommodation and moderation of communal attitudes among voters’ 
by the mid-1970s.
126
 This does, in fact, seem to reflect the move of previously hard-line 
communal parties such as the Phalange towards a more inter-confessional approach as 
well as the expansions of leftist parties since the late 1960s. Political divisions, such as 
over reforms of the Lebanese sectarian system, did, indeed, not run along sectarian lines 
and El Khazen concludes that ‘[p]olitical parties and leaders of all political and 
ideological persuasions saw in the parliamentary and presidential elections in 1976 a 
possibility for altering the political balance in their favour.’127 Yet, it has to be noted 
that, in general, political parties in Parliament and membership of the electorate in 
political parties still did not play a significant role in the early 1970s.
128
  
When the continued and increasing presence of armed Palestinian fighters on 
Lebanese territory, and the fact that they were outside the control of the Lebanese state 
and army, turned into a serious issue of contention, political parties re-aligned along the 
different approaches on how to deal with it. These, in turn, were strongly linked to 
differing perceptions of the identity of the country and divided the Lebanese in two 
opposed camps. Most parties also started developing military wings throughout the late 
1960s and early 1970s. The SSNP, for instance, had a ‘thoroughly trained and 
disciplined militia’ at the outbreak of conflict in 1975.129
 
The formation of these militias 
was justified by the army’s lack of capacity and also as a defence against already 
existing militias. Since this preoccupation was not only felt by political parties, the 
country witnessed an increasing amount of not only political militia forces but also of 
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religious and private ones which are, however, beyond the scope of this study.
130
  
The early phases of the civil war were marked by the main opposing coalitions, 
the LNM and the PLO on the one hand, and the Lebanese Front/Lebanese Forces, on 
the other. Traboulsi called this ‘[a] duel [...] between two ‘modern’ populist forces that 
sprang from the country’s social crisis’.131 The two coalition forces will be analysed 
below with a focus on their ideological programme and their concept of Lebanese 
identity. The rise of the Shi
c
a community and the development of parties representing it 
will also be addressed.  
 
The Progressive and Nationalist Forces and Parties  
This coalition would become known as the LNM and had started to organise itself 
around the leadership of Kamal Jumblatt by the end of the 1960s. In addition to 
Jumblatt’s Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), the coalition was joined by a number of 
parties of the Lebanese left as well as secular Arab nationalist parties, most notably the 
SSNP, the Lebanese Communist Party, and the Independent Nasserites – al-Murābitūn.  
The coalition followed a pro-Arab orientation with a special emphasis on the 
importance of supporting the Palestinian struggle, viewing it as ‘an Arab force fighting 
not only for the liberation of its homeland and in self-defence but also in defence of 
Lebanon.’132 This orientation was reflected in the military wings of a large number of 
LNM parties which became ‘largely integrated into their respective allied Palestinian 
organization’, with the al-Murābitūn and its sponsorship by Fatah being the most 
striking example.
133
 
The movement aspired to create a Lebanon that was to be both progressive, 
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democratic and Arab nationalist. The political system was the main target since it was 
considered the primary obstacle to the establishment of a democratic system. 
Consequently, the abolition of political confessionalism was the first and most 
important point of the reform programme presented in 1975.
134
 Yet, the LNM was an 
extremely heterogeneous coalition that only came together and gained relevance thanks 
to Jumblatt who moulded it ‘into a politico-military force to be reckoned with.’135 
Despite having adopted a common reform programme, the movement was quite divided 
concerning most of the relevant political and ideological issues. El-Khazen described it 
as lacking a well-defined structure and being a rather ‘loose grouping of political 
allies’.136 Some of the coalition parties, such as the Baath parties of Lebanon, did not 
even follow purely Lebanese agendas since they affiliated themselves with the regimes 
in Syria and Iraq, and consequently their identities as Lebanese parties were called into 
question.137 
In fact, the secular agenda of the majority of the parties in the LNM soon turned 
into a major problem for the coalition which was trying to operate in Lebanon’s extreme 
sectarianism. Not only were secular parties marginalized, the assassination of the 
LNM’s leader, Kamal Jumblatt, in 1977 combined with the Syrian policy of co-opting 
the movement strongly restrained its development. The movement had tried to use the 
military strength gained through its alliance with the PLO to change the balance of 
power inside the country. Yet it was this alignment with the PLO which resulted in 
deeper sectarian divisions in Lebanon and cost the LNM much popular support.
138
 After 
Jumblatt’s assassination, the movement lacked a strong leader to hold it together and 
since differences were too deep to preserve unity, the LNM went into an inactive period. 
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The coalition was finally disbanded by Jumblatt’s successor in the PSP, his son Walid 
Jumblatt, in the first half of the 1980s.  
 
The Lebanese Front/Lebanese Forces (LF)  
Created in 1976, the Lebanese Front united a number of political, mainly Christian, 
parties under its umbrella to counter the LNM and as a ‘response of the Lebanese 
people to the Syrian-Palestinian aggression’.139 Within this coalition, each party and 
personality placed great importance on preserving its own political identity. It was 
headed by the leaders of its two largest member parties, the Phalange and the National 
Liberal Party (NLP), Pierre Gemayel and Camille Sham’un, and described itself as ‘a 
Directory Council for Christian Leaderships.’140 It coordinated the Christian militias, 
mainly the Phalange’s paramilitary wing and the NLP’s Tiger militia, in order to avoid 
intra-Christian strife. This became especially necessary following the withdrawal of 
Syrian troops in 1978, and when clashes between Christian militias became frequent.  
The Front formed the United Leadership of the Lebanese Forces and Bashir 
Gemayel was elected president of the Council of Leadership. As Traboulsi noted, a 
deeper social subtext can be seen when looking at the constituents of the LF since 
‘[t]hey represented the rise of new social forces [...] all opposed in one way or another 
to the traditional Christian leaders’141; yet they shared the same idea of a Christian 
Lebanese identity. In 1980, following an attack by Gemayel on the Tiger militias, the 
Council of Leadership underwent a formal restructuring and became the executive 
organ of the Front, controlling its administration as well as the armed forces. It managed 
to dominate a large part of the Christian areas of the country and established a form of 
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civil administration during the war.
142
 
The basis of the political programme of the LF was a strong commitment to the 
6000 year old unique history of Lebanon which implied the negation of the ‘Arabness’ 
of the country. The unity of the territory within its internationally recognized borders 
was considered untouchable. The most important principles were independence, 
sovereignty and freedom.
143
 Relations with any other state were to be based on 
sovereign equality. Yet the traditional and essential relations with the West, based on 
adhering to the same values, were underlined and reaffirmed.
144
 The modification of the 
formula of 1943 was considered a necessary step. The Front favoured ‘some kind of 
decentralization, federation, or confederation, within a comprehensive framework of a 
single unified Lebanon.’145 Such a system would help in what was considered by the 
Front as one of the most important issues, the protection of religious minorities and 
religious freedom, but it was propagated mainly to protect the Christian minority. The 
Front’s stated aim was the coexistence of all minorities on equal terms and the creation 
of a ‘new society’ that would be based on a number of general virtues such as 
truthfulness, freedom, respect, community spirit, rule of law, etc.
146
 Hence, what was 
envisioned was a syncretistic nationalism with an overarching civil national identity. 
The early 1980s saw the LF establishing its political autonomy from the Phalange, 
turning it into the ‘most decisive political force within the Maronite community’.147
 
 
The Shi
ca ‘awakening’: From Ḥarakat al-Mahrumīn to Hizb’allah  
Even though the Shi
c
a were recognized as the third largest confessional group in the 
census of 1932, its community remained surprisingly inactive and hence more or less 
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irrelevant on the Lebanese political scene up until the late 1960s.  
However, as the community with the highest birth rate in Lebanon and also 
suffering the most from social deprivation, the Shi
c
a started developing a collective 
sense of being ‘the deprived of the country’. This strongly related to the sectarian 
system since, over the years, it had kept the Shi
c
a numerically underrepresented, 
especially in comparison to the traditional Maronite and Sunni elites of the country. Yet, 
the main reason for what looked like a ‘sudden’ appearance of the Shica on the political 
scene was the process of modernization and profound change that was affecting all of 
Lebanon during the 1960s.
148
 In addition to the increasing infrastructure and mobility of 
the Shi
c
a population, the modernization of the political leadership has to be seen as the 
most crucial development. The growing dislocation of a large number of Shi
c
a due to 
the overall economic developments of the country led to the loosening of ties to the 
traditional Zu’ama. In looking for re-orientation, many Shica initially turned towards the 
Communist Party since it was non-sectarian, or towards the Palestinian fighters as the 
Shi
c
a community identified with their plight. Turning towards these groups was largely 
caused by the fact that no other movement or organization existed that could appeal to 
the Shi
c
a as a community. That, however, changed with the appearance of Imam Musa 
Sadr.
149
 He was not only able to attract a large number of supporters and profit from the 
growing political consciousness of the community, he viewed the community as a 
whole and ‘succeeded in giving many Shicis an inclusive communal identity.’150 
In 1967, the first independent, representative body for the Shi
c
a, the Supreme 
Shi
c
a Council, was established, and on 18 May 1969 Sadr was elected its first chairman. 
In March of 1974, he launched his popular movement Ḥarakat al-Mahrumīn 
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(Movement of the Deprived) during a rally addressing the social grievances of the Shi
c
a 
community in Lebanon. As Kippenberg notes, Sadr has to be credited with changing 
‘the ideal of passive endurance of injustice’ to a rather activist view.151 He blamed the 
establishment running the country for their grievances and demanded equal rights for all 
citizens. He further blamed the state for not being able to protect the south from Israeli 
attacks and vowed to start arming and training his own Shi
c
a militia.
152
 However, 
Norton asserts that the majority of the Shi
c
a still remained with the multi-confessional 
parties they had joined before the emergence of Imam Musa’s movement.153 The 
Ḥarakat was initially a member of the LNM, but left the coalition after the start of the 
civil war in 1975 because it wanted to remain neutral.
154
 However, the movement would 
soon become embroiled in the ongoing war as well.  
The political influence of the Shi
c
a was decisively consolidated in a revitalized 
form by the beginning of 1979. The first major Israeli invasion in Lebanon, the 
disappearance of Imam Musa during a visit to Libya, and the Islamic Revolution in Iran 
all contributed to internal consolidation of the Shi
c
a. The disappearance of the Imam 
boosted his importance since it seemed to mirror the Shi
c
a dogma of the hidden Imam 
(al-Imam al-Gha’ib). In its 1974 Charter the movement stated that ‘[p]olitical 
sectarianism in the Lebanese system prevents political development, divides citizens, 
and upsets national unity. For that reason, our movement rejects it and considers it a 
manifestation of political backwardness in our country.’155 Consequently, the movement 
did not consider itself sectarian but rather representing all deprived people while 
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promoting ‘true religious spirit’.156 This attempt to brand itself a political reform 
movement rather than a religious movement was also reflected in the new leaders 
emerging towards the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s who were members of the 
middle class and not clerics. They traced the roots of the sectarian system back to the 
mandate period when the French enshrined privileges for the Maronites of the country 
and claimed that as a result of the continuation of the system, the building of a ‘unified 
and cohesive society’ was prevented, and the state remained highly vulnerable.157 The 
Shi
c
a community had been an integral part of the country since the establishment of 
Greater Lebanon and fulfilled all its ‘national duties’; yet it was deprived of adequate 
participation and representation.
158
 The origins of the movement were further explained 
by increasing Arab pressure towards the end of the 1960s/early 1970s. The problem was 
not only with a possible lack of Arab identity amongst the Shi
c
a (because they 
considered their roots to be in Iran) but mainly with the perception amongst the Sunni 
Muslims that the Shi
ca community was not committed to a ‘real’ Islam.159  
The movement was not only devoted to Lebanese national sovereignty, but also 
to the indivisibility and integrity of the motherland, and the defence of the South was 
considered of utmost importance since it formed an integral part of the country. The 
acceptance of the special character of the country was considered essential for the 
national integrity as emphasized in the Charter:  
 
National sovereignty is influenced directly or indirectly by the mutual attraction between the 
various civilizations that are founded on the cultural components of the divine messages. This 
reinforces Lebanon’s status as a cultural window at which the West, with its practical 
experiences, meets the East, with its faith and spiritualism. National sovereignty is therefore an 
essential requirement in preserving the motherland’s special cultural role.160
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Despite its increasing influence, Ḥarakat’s militia ’Amal never developed a firm 
hierarchy; and despite the existing programme, it embraced a variety of ideological 
lines.
161
 Yet, the Shi
ca movement developed ‘the social institutions that [they] would 
actually have expected the state to provide’ and when Israel first invaded in 1978, it was 
the ’Amal that ‘took on the task of protecting the villages.’162
 
 
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 had a crucial impact on the further 
development of the Shi
c
a community. With its youth eager to follow the Islamic 
revolution in Iran, the Israeli invasion and the occupation ‘pushed the Shica further in 
this direction’ and facilitated the emergence and flourishing of a second party, 
Hizb’allah.163 Usually the year of the invasion, 1982, is referred to as its founding year; 
yet, it was only in the mid-1980s that Hizb’allah achieved a structured and organized 
form. Both its attitude towards an Islamic state and Israel were important factors in 
making this new movement popular among the Shi
c
a. It was fashioned mainly after the 
Iranian model and inspiration from Iran was clearly stated in the 1985 ‘Open letter 
addressed by Hizb’allah to the downtrodden in Lebanon and the world’, the document 
that officially presented the ideology of the movement for the first time.
164
 Moreover, 
while claiming that the new movement would not exclude anybody, it described its 
identity as belonging to the Islamic ‘umma in the world.165 Islam was considered a 
worldwide political bond and the new movement could hardly be described as non-
sectarian. While cooperation with groups whose ideas did not stem from Islam was 
considered acceptable, the document included an invitation to the Christians of Lebanon 
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to free themselves from sectarianism and join Islam.
166
 Not surprisingly, Israel and 
Zionism were considered the main enemies, and the US was described as the ‘mother of 
evil’.167 Consequently it was the elimination of these forces from Lebanese territory and 
the end of foreign influences and domination that formed the party’s first objectives. 
Furthermore, Hizb’allah asked for more than just political reforms; it sought a change to 
the entire Lebanese political system, from its very roots, and the adoption of a new 
system, one that ‘the people establish, of their own free choice and freedom’.168 
Hizb’allah evolved into a serious rival to ’Amal, establishing itself in both the 
South and the suburbs of Beirut. It also started a ‘social offensive’, providing social, 
medical and educational services to the population, thus winning over large numbers of 
the Shi
c
a community. It was the competition with this new and more militant movement 
that saw ’Amal ‘driven into a corner’ throughout the 1980s.169  
 
CONCLUSION  
Towards the end of European administration, political parties had emerged in Eritrea 
and Lebanon and, as common in segmented colonial/mandate societies, they largely 
formed along existing cleavages. In both cases, these were predominantly based on 
religious affiliation which correlated with different nationalist aspirations linked to the 
region. While pro-unionist aspirations in both countries included the incorporation of 
the colonial/mandate territory into a larger neighbouring entity, partition essentially was 
not an option for either side. Political party formation took place around members of the 
new and old elites whose primary interest was not the bridging of cleavages but the 
enforcement of the nationalist aspiration that would further their own interests. In 
mandate Lebanon a sectarian system was in place that based access to office on 
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religious affiliation and enforced the formation of parties according to these affiliations 
but kept them subordinate to clan and sectarian organisations. In Eritrea, the parties 
initially only had the function to present nationalist aspirations to the international 
committees of investigation. It has to be acknowledged that support of opposing 
nationalist aspirations was not completely clear-cut along sectarian lines and, therefore, 
multi-communal and secular parties also emerged in both countries; yet, the strong 
correlation of religious affiliation and opposed interpretations of the identity of the 
country made it almost impossible for them to sustain themselves.  
Despite this rather fragmented political system, communal attitudes became 
more conciliatory in both countries throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In Eritrea, the 
previously opposed political parties, accommodated with the compromise solution of 
federation, were set to compete over power in the autonomous institutions established 
by the UN. As in the case of Lebanon, these institutions were based on a political 
system of sectarian representation and, consequently, religious communities would have 
remained the primary intermediaries. However, ruthless suppression and the process of 
dismantling the federation by Ethiopia resulted in political parties being banned as well 
as civil society organizations. Therefore, from the mid-1950s onwards political 
mobilization took place clandestinely on a grassroots level and largely contributed to 
the emergence of new, multi-communal movements dedicated to the common struggle 
for self-determination. The first official movement, the ELM reflected this approach of 
accommodation and moderation of communal attitudes. In Lebanon, a more 
accommodating attitude developed starting from the 1960s and could be seen not only 
in the increasing support for multi-communal, secular, leftist parties but also in the 
movement of sectarian parties such as the Phalange towards a more civic and secular 
understanding of Lebanese national identity that would allow the bridging of communal 
cleavages and for a syncretistic nationalism to evolve. 
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This momentum seemed lost when political parties and movements formally 
reorganized in the face of armed conflict: In Eritrea, the ELF took over the role of prime 
liberation movement and introduced a zonal division based on old regional, religious 
and sectarian divisions. This soon caused a rift within the movement and the breakaway 
groups and the emerging EPLF became embroiled in civil war with the ELF. In 
Lebanon, conflict over the Palestinian presence led to the outbreak of the first round of 
civil war and political parties aligned themselves in two opposed camps representing the 
old Muslim/Christian division. However, for both sides of the divide in both Eritrea and 
Lebanon, accommodation and co-existence were at the heart of their political 
programmes, even though this was aspired to be achieved through different means and 
under different leadership. As such, the reorganization of political parties and 
movements reflected the struggle over power rather than a relapse into deeply rooted 
sectarian and ethnic divisions which, nonetheless, had remained an important factor in 
mobilization.  
  The following chapter will show that the civil conflict in both countries was not 
so much over communal differences or different interpretations of the identity of the 
country but rather over hegemony and control, in Lebanon within the established system 
and in Eritrea within the system aspired to for the freed and independent country.  
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Chapter 5 – Civil War and Violence: Whither the nation? 
War and violence often play a key role in the process of identity formation as the 
experience of common suffering can build ‘bonds of solidarity’ and establish ‘group 
boundaries’.1 However, while national identity can be strengthened by this experience 
of solidarity in case of interstate wars; the inter-communal violence of civil wars can 
have a rather detrimental and divisive effect on national identity. 
A large number of explanations for the causes of civil war have been presented 
by political theorist, anthropologists and economists alike and it has been pointed out 
that, in general, fragmented or multi-communal societies are more likely to experience 
civil war in the first place.
2
 Kalyvas cautioned that civil wars are difficult to 
characterize and, while they are often described as binary conflicts based on the 
perceived overarching issue dimension or what he calls ‘master cleavage’, they are 
largely ‘the convergence of local motives and supralocal imperatives’.3 In fact the 
causes of civil war have for a long time been explained by the juxtaposed interpretative 
frames of ‘grievances’ vs. ‘greed’. However, as it is ‘impossible to entangle political, 
cultural, and economic elements, as each is embedded in the other’, it does indeed 
appear difficult to classify a civil war into one or the other category.
4
 A convincing 
concept has been developed by Frances Stewart, namely that of ‘horizontal 
inequalities’, which postulates that ‘vulnerability arises where there are severe 
horizontal inequalities, that is inequality in political, economic, and/or social conditions 
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198 
 
among culturally and/or geographically distinct groups.’5 This concept seems, indeed, 
most apt for most cases of domestic conflict in multi-communal states.   
This chapter will look at the periods of civil war in Eritrea and Lebanon, analyse 
the cleavages underlying the conflicts and the impact of civil war on the development 
and perception of national identity. It will argue that in both cases the ‘master cleavage’ 
- the differing perceptions of identity and nationalist aspirations largely correlating with 
religious affiliations – while the underlying motivation for civil conflict, was not the 
sole cause. Rather this cleavage was linked to and aggravated by economic grievances 
and power interests and/or hegemonic claims by the elites of certain 
communities/groups, which took predominance with the protraction of the conflict. 
Furthermore, the chapter will show that despite the conflict, the sense of collective 
national identity that had started to develop prior to its outbreak among the population 
of the territories was not shattered, but rather strengthened by the shared experience of 
prolonged periods of conflict and violence in both cases.  
 
ERITREA 
From reform movement to descent into civil war 
Despite the existence of a common enemy that should have facilitated the establishment 
of a united front, Eritrea twice witnessed civil war during the early stages of the 
independence struggle. This has often been accredited by scholars to the 
Muslim/Christian divisions within the former Italian colony that had found expression 
in the opposed nationalist aspirations in the late 1940s. Pateman traced the division 
directly back to the Italian colonial period and asserted that the policies during that 
period ‘led to separate development of Muslims and Christians, leading to divisions 
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within the liberation ranks’.6 Thus, he considered the internal conflict during the 
struggle for independence as caused by the deep entrenchment of these divisions. Quehl, 
on the other hand, argued that the Eritrean independence struggle was not simply the 
result of a growing independence movement but was rather part of a modernisation 
process gone wrong, which would also explain the outbreak of civil war. He viewed the 
emergence of conflict between identities as a natural result of the process of 
decolonisation, ‘whose targeted result is the attainment of national statehood’, and 
explained the accumulation of existing differences and disagreements within and 
between the various groups in the territory as due to structural changes that had taken 
place after the departure of the European colonial powers.
7
  
In fact, the causes of the civil conflict within the Eritrean liberation movement 
have to be traced back to the period of ELF hegemony and the occurrence of splits 
within the movement. While the emergence of the first centralised pan-Eritrean 
nationalist organization with a secularist orientation, the ELM, was facilitated by the 
growing inter-communal grassroots movement inside Eritrea, the establishment of the 
Muslim-dominated ELF quickly resurrected old divisions and disagreements. In a 1983 
interview, Woldemariam claimed that the Muslim elites in Egyptian exile actually 
refused to form a united front with the Christians, and initially even felt inclined 
towards partition since ‘they said the Christians exploited the federation and the 
Muslims suffered’.8 However, while the Muslim veterans who founded the ELF in 
Cairo were certainly influenced by the wave of pan-Arabism sweeping through the 
Middle East and northeast Africa by the late 1950s to some extent, and the ELF 
membership was very much based on the rural communities of the Western lowlands 
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and profoundly influenced by Islam, religious division was not the prime cause that led 
to the establishment of the ELF. It was rather dissatisfaction with the ELM’s non-
military strategy and the irresponsiveness of the UN to Eritrean calls for intervention 
amidst Ethiopian dismantlement of the federation. While multi-communal efforts by 
exiled Eritrean elites to gain support from Western countries and the UN continued well 
into 1963 under the leadership of Ibrahim Sultan and Woldeab Woldemariam in the 
form of the Political Committee of the Eritrean People’s Legal Representatives 
Abroad,
9
 the ELF leadership shifted its search for international support to the Arab 
states after even the armed uprising failed to gain a UN reaction. Iyob asserted that ‘the 
choice of Arab supporters was more a matter of necessity than a reflection of enduring 
Arab identity’, and that there were not really any other options left.10 In fact, all efforts 
with the UN and Western countries were to no avail, and Ethiopia enjoyed wide support 
from within Africa due to its role as a champion of African unity.  
However, as Quehl noted, the inscription of the Eritean struggle within the pan-
Arab framework prevented the development of a single national movement and also 
resulted in a weakening of the legitimacy of the Front both domestically and 
externally.
11
 Due to its strong Muslim membership and its link with pan-Arabism and 
Arab countries, the ELF became perceived, and depicted, as a foreign-instigated, Arab 
movement by Ethiopia and international scholars alike. Yet, as the ELF constituted the 
sole liberation movement after the demise of the ELM, Eritrean Christians who wanted 
to support the independence struggle continued to join the Front to fight Ethiopian 
suppression. In an attempt to weaken the growing independence struggle, religious 
divisions were deliberately targeted by the Ethiopian counter-insurgence strategy, which 
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tried to endow the conflict with an ethnic tone and thereby exacerbate religious and 
ethnic affiliations. Measures taken by the Ethiopian government, such as infiltrating 
Christian  ‘spies’  into  the  ELF,  generated  deep  mistrust  of  the  highland  Christians 
among the Muslim parts of the population and aggravated cleavages along religious 
lines.
12  
It should be noted though that this mistrust was not based on religious 
differences, but on the fact that the Christian highlanders had largely supported union 
with Ethiopia prior to the UN decision on federation, and the sincerity of their changed 
attitude when joining the Front was questioned.
13 
The mistrust was felt by Christian 
fighters in the ELF and, as Haile Woldensae recounted in a conversation, ‘any Christian 
at that time had no guarantee. […] Even in battles, you prefer to guard yourself mainly 
from bullets that come through behind, rather than from the front.’14 
While  Ethiopian  policies  contributed  to  the  disunity  within  the  Eritrean 
 
liberation movement to a certain extent, it was largely the ELF’s strategic decision to 
divide the territory into military zones and the general reorganisation of the Front along 
regional and tribal lines at the ELF congress in Khartoum in 1965 that decisively 
exacerbated divisions as this worked directly against unifying the struggle and the 
development  of  any  inclusive  national  identity  that  would  reflect  the  diversity  of 
Eritrean society. In addition, the ELF was specifically characterized by the absence of a 
clear ideological line or programme and its leadership seemed to be more concerned 
with  matters  relating  to  the  military organization  of  the  armed  struggle  than  with 
building a strong ideological base for Eritrean nationalism. ELF documents and 
pamphlets from the 1960s predominantly reaffirmed its aim to liberate the territory, yet 
shed little light on what was actually meant by the concept of an Eritrean nation, and 
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how the various ethno-linguistic and religious groups would fit into this category.15 
The original leaders of the ELF, who had already been criticised by 
Woldemariam for their leadership style and patronage system in one of his radio 
broadcasts in June 1962, remained in control of the Supreme Council in Khartoum and 
the newly established Revolutionary Command in Kassala following the first congress 
of the ELF in 1965.
16
 The organization of the territory into military zones, based on the 
model of the Algerian National Liberation Front, largely followed ethnic lines which 
invoked old kinship and clan loyalties and basically reflected related power divisions. 
Furthermore, the various zones also constituted power bases for the ELF leadership, 
especially Osman Saleh Sabbe and Idris Osman Galadewos who were competing for 
control of the ELF-SC. The fifth zone, established to accommodate the increasing 
number of recruits from the highlands, and generally referred to as the ‘Christian zone’ 
even though the fighters within this zone were not purely Christian, was continuously 
exposed to attempts by both Sabbe and Galadewos to extend their patronage to it. As a 
result of the divisions of the zones along ethnic lines and the ongoing competition, the 
ELF-RC based in Kassala was often side-lined by the members of the ELF-SC who 
favoured their own constituencies in terms of religious and ethnic affiliations.
 
The 
military divisions all worked separately from each other and, as Woldensae recalled, to 
such an extent ‘that every division would not allow fighters from the other division to 
go around their area.’17 Yohannes noted that the fact that there was no support but rather 
competition between the zones meant ‘that the dual preoccupations of the divisions with 
mutual rivalry and with battling the Ethiopian troops corroded the organization, 
operational effectiveness, and overall coordination of the national army.’18  
The ELF policy not only exacerbated competition between zone commanders 
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and revived tribal conflicts but also alienated the increasing number of Christians 
joining the liberation movement in the second half of the 1960s, as well as a number of 
Muslim fighters and the general population. As a veteran Muslim fighter recounted, due 
to the zonal divisions ‘many fighters were left in between and went back home or 
migrated to the Sudan. Tribal and regional rivalries bedevilled the army and we started 
to hate the so-called Algerian model.’19 After the devastating effect of the first major 
offensive by Ethiopia in 1967, and the continuous ‘individual and systematic 
discrimination’ within the Eritrean Liberation Army (ELA) against Christian recruits,20 
a number of them turned themselves over to Ethiopian authorities in Kassala. The ELF-
SC reacted with a purification campaign which resulted in the massacre of several 
hundred Christian recruits and critical elements. A general amnesty was issued by Haile 
Selassie and the Christian leadership of the fifth zone under Woldai Kahsai defected 
with over 100 Christian fighters.21 Within the field, the reform movement Eslah formed 
around concerned Muslim fighters and Christian recruits. Aside from the abolition of 
the zonal divisions and the basing of the leadership in the field, the demands of the 
movement also included the respect of human rights and the rights of the Eritrean 
people.22 The latter point referred to food raids constantly carried out by commanders of 
the various zones in order to obtain supplies for the fighters, which contributed to the 
alienation of the people from the independence struggle. Reforms were openly directed 
against the ELF-SC which was ‘criticized and rejected in all levels’.23 The 
discriminatory policy of the ELF and its pan-Arab orientation was a further issue for 
Christian members of the reform movement. Kidane Kiflu, one of its Christian 
organizers, in a letter to the American journalist Jack Kramer, criticised the ELF leaders 
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for  identifying  ‘themselves  as  Moslems  and  not  as  Eritreans’  and  ‘the  Front  as  a 
Moslem and Arab movement’, which not only presented the independence struggle as a 
religious movement but also ignored the fact that half of the Eritrean population was 
Christian and thus could not support the struggle whole-heartedly because of this 
identification.
24 
In a later letter he further claimed that because of their better education, 
the Christians would be ‘the capable ones, who if [they] wholeheartedly join the Front 
[…] could be the real liberators of Eritrea.’25 In fact, the main figures of Eslah were 
recruits that had either been active in the student movements abroad, or fighters that had 
been sent by the ELF for training to countries such as China, Cuba or Syria where they 
were exposed to different forms of revolutionary and Marxist ideas which they brought 
back to the field. Hence, the more politically sophisticated fighters that led the reform 
movement were not solely Christians, even though the Christian highlanders at that time 
generally  had  a  higher  level  of  education.
26   
Romadan  Mohamed  Nur,  who  would 
become one of the leading figures of the EPLF together with Issayas Afewerki, is 
probably the most prominent example of a young Muslim fighter who was trained 
abroad and later influenced the movement through the revolutionary ideas he was 
exposed to during his training in China at the time of the Cultural Revolution. 
The Eslah conferences in Aredaib and Anseba in June and September 1968 
resulted in the formation of the Tripartite Unity (TU) by the leadership of zones 3-5. As 
Mahmoud Sherifo, himself a member of the TU noted, at that point it was ‘just a 
general hatred of what was happening, a general opposition that created the unity of the 
three forces’.27 A link was even maintained with Osman Saleh Sabbe, despite him being 
a member of the criticised ELF-SC and having adopted a system of patronage, for 
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logistical reasons. In an attempt to resolve the crisis, the ELF-SC started negotiations 
with the TU and, at the conference in Adobha in August 1969, a number of concessions 
were made and resolutions passed in reaction to the criticism voiced by the reform 
movement. A provisional General Command (ELF-GC) based in Eritrea and consisting 
of elected members from all zones, replaced both the ELF-SC and the ELF-RC and 
preparations began for a national congress that was envisioned to take place within one 
year. However, conflict between Sabbe who announced the formation of his own new 
body to replace the ELF-SC, the General Secretariat (ELF-GS), and the ELF-GC 
established at the conference quickly resulted not only in Sabbe’s departure to Jordan 
but in violent reactions by the ELF-GC.
28
  
Kibreab notes that the following liquidations of fighters of the ELA, among 
them Kidane Kiflu, was largely based on ‘their religion and ethnicity’, and aside from 
supporters of Sabbe targeted mainly fighters from the Christian highlands.
29
 This 
development not only resulted in the supplanting of the resolutions of the Adobha 
Conference but, most importantly, the sectarian violence reinforced suspicions and 
mistrust and resulted in a number of groups splitting from the ELF. The impetus for the 
defections came from the conviction that that change was not possible within the ELF, 
yet the underlying reasons differed between the groups. While the Selfi Natsnet was 
certainly motivated by the ongoing religious discrimination within the ELF, the split of 
the other groups was spurred by regional clan and personal loyalties as well personal 
power struggles. The ELF tried to solve the crisis by inviting the breakaway groups to 
what became known as the Awate Conference, with the aim of setting up a preparatory 
committee for a National Congress as stipulated at the Adhoba Conference. However, 
with the exception of some members of the Obel group none of the defectors attended 
and the following First National Congress of the ELF took place without their 
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participation. The Awate Conference had already been accused of being ‘intended to 
start civil war’30 by members of the dissident groups, and this seemed to be confirmed 
by the First National Congress of the ELF which took place from 14 October -13 
November 1971. Not only did the congress affirm that ‘there can be no more than one 
struggle, one organization, one organization and one leadership in our country’ it also 
established a deadline for the dissidents to return and authorized the leadership ‘to take 
military measures’ against those who failed to do so.31 The refusal of the dissidents to 
re-join the ELF ultimately resulted in the outbreak of civil war that lasted from 1972 to 
1976.  
 
From civil war to uneasy coexistence  
Many scholars, as well as the later EPFL, argued that ‘[t]here was no option left for 
these elements, but to separate from the older leadership (ELF) and form a new front’.32 
Kibreab questions this argument that he calls ‘the “Lack of Alternative” Hypothesis’ 
and argues that many resolutions adopted at the ELF congress had addressed the issues 
raised by the reform movement and ‘had they been embraced by the breakaway groups 
[they] would have definitely laid the foundation stone for national unity and democratic 
change.’33 However, the premise set by the ELF that the Eritrean field could 
accommodate only one movement as well as the threatening of the dissident groups 
with military punishment leaves this assumption questionable at least. In fact, it was 
horizontal inequalities – both real and perceived – that prompted the actions of the 
breakaway groups and ultimately resulted in civil war. Furthermore, events prior to the 
congress had created deep mistrust and there was little reason for the breakaway groups 
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to believe the congress would change things decisively.  
A more convincing argument made by Kibreab is that the breakaway groups did 
not really represent non-sectarian alternatives.
34
 In fact, while the civil war and 
concurrent attacks by Ethiopia spurred the merger of the breakaway groups in 
September 1973, the newly established EPLF immediately faced criticism from within 
its ranks. While the official ideology of the movement was based on an inclusive 
approach across ethnic and religious lines, the internal opposition that became to be 
known as Menkaa’e (Tigrinya for bat) not only criticised the ‘feudal’ leadership-style 
and asked for more democracy and participation in decision-making, it also denounced 
the prevailing regionalism and ethnic discrimination.
35
 The internal dissent was quelled 
by arresting its proponents and executing the most rigid of them. This early experience 
of internal opposition had a decisive impact on the EPLF; it prompted the leadership to 
adopt a heavy-handed and strict leadership style and to create an internal security unit to 
prevent any further internal opposition.   
The military presence of the EPF in the field was initially rather limited, but the 
link with Sabbe, who had strong relations with a number of Arab governments, helped 
the movement to get access to arms and funding.
36 
Confrontations with the ELF initially 
largely took place along the Red Sea Coast and in Sahel. It was only in 1974 that 
fighting also spread to the highlands.  
 The overthrow of Haile Selassie in September, 1974 momentarily raised hopes 
on the Eritrean side since General Aman Andum, of Eritrean origin, was appointed 
President of Ethiopia. He did actually ‘raise the slogan of “a peaceful solution” of the 
Eritrean problem’37 but was quickly executed in November of the same year and 
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followed by Mengistu Haile Mariam whose stance towards Eritrea was even more hard- 
line than that of Haile Selassie. Yet in the wake of the regime change in Addis Ababa 
there was a short period in which people were able to move freely in the territories 
which had been liberated by independence movements. Eritreans from all communities, 
amongst them many religious leaders, used this time to intervene in the ongoing civil 
war, pressing for a ceasefire between the ELF and the EPLF. Large numbers came from 
different cities, as well as from Ethiopia-occupied Asmara, to pledge with the two 
Fronts.
38  
While the interventions were not always successful and could not prevent all 
 
the clashes and attacks, they finally resulted in the liberation fronts at least agreeing to 
coordinate their activities against the Ethiopian armed forces. In January 1975 they 
formally declared the end of the civil war. 
However, competition regarding new recruits flocking to the liberation forces 
continued. Ex-fighters interviewed all confirmed that the choice of which Front to join 
was not linked to support of either one of them in the civil confrontation or specific 
knowledge of the actual programme of the Front.
39 
However, once they had joined the 
movement they were extensively indoctrinated and brainwashed through political 
education not only to submit themselves wholeheartedly to the movement but also ‘to 
inculcate a sense of superiority vis-à-vis all the other national, civil and political 
organizations.’40  Kibreab noted that this was true for both the ELF and the EPLF; 
however, the latter was far more efficient and successful in its indoctrination.
41 
In fact, 
 
former ELF fighters all praised the freedom of expression they enjoyed within the ELF 
 
while the EPLF was said to be known as very strict, disciplined and uncompromising 
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when it came to any form of opposition.
42 
This was also observed by Connell during his 
stay in the Eritrean field: 
 
The ELF fighters were a happy-go-lucky bunch, far less stiff and somber than the earnest 
comrades of the EPLF, but also considerably less efficient. Things seemed to happen more by 
chance than design, discipline was loose, and the guerrillas within the ELF appeared to have 
more diversity of outlook than those in the EPLF.
43
 
 
 
 
In fact, the EPLF demonstrated its organizational efficiency by establishing learning 
and medical centres to cater for the needs of the population and engaging in land reform 
during its struggle against both Ethiopia and the EPLF. Specifically the active land 
reform not only constituted a cornerstone in its policy of social transformation, but also 
resulted in the EPLF membership coming largely from the peasantry. The ELF, in 
contrast, was described by an eye-witness as ‘a loose alliance of traditional regional, 
tribal  and  religious  segments  of  Eritrean  society,  relying  heavily  on  traditional 
leadership and a merchant class.’
44  
This probably explains why the ELF wanted to 
 
postpone   social   transformation   until   after   independence.   Other   than   this,   the 
programmes  of  both  Fronts  had  become  strikingly  similar  following  the  First  and 
Second National Congresses (1975) of the ELF committing the movement not only to 
the liberation of the country but also to social transformation in order to overcome 
ethnic and religious differences. 
This also formed the core of the 1977 National Democratic Programme of the 
EPLF that emphasized ‘Eritrean citizens equality before the law without distinction as 
to nationality, tribe, region, sex, cultural level, occupation, position, wealth, faith, etc’, 
and also dedicated a special section to the respect of freedom of religion and faith. 
While religion was to be completely separated from the state and from politics, citizens’ 
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freedom of faith and belief were to be protected by the state.
45
 Despite the proclaimed 
goal of overcoming ethnic and religious differences, both Fronts had large 
constituencies on one side of the religious divide. While the EPLF was regarded as ‘an 
organization that ostensibly promoted the interests of Christian highlanders’, the ELF 
was regarded ‘as representing the interests of the Muslim lowlanders.’46 This decisively 
hampered the building of trust and the uniting of forces. Furthermore, the fact that 
Sabbe, officially the Head of the EPLF Foreign Mission, signed an agreement with the 
ELF on 9 September 1975 that would have merged the EPLF with the ELF without 
consulting or informing the EPLF leadership in the field further contributed to revive 
mistrust. Following the failure to push through the agreement, Sabbe left the EPLF and 
formed his own movement, the Eritrean Liberation Front – People’s Liberation Forces 
(ELF-PLF) in Khartoum in March 1976. However, this new Front was not recognized 
by either the ELF or the EPLF who were involved in an attempt to coordinate their 
forces.    
By mid-1976, the end of the civil war and the resulting coordination of 
campaigns strengthened the whole movement vis-à-vis the Ethiopians. Together the 
ELF and the EPLF even outnumbered Ethiopian troops in Eritrea at this time.
47
 Yet 
attempts at uniting proved to be rather difficult, mainly because the EPLF, by then 
already the stronger organisation, did not want a complete merger on equal terms but 
sought to maintain its own political autonomy. Nevertheless, negotiations were initiated 
by the socialist German Democratic Republic.
48
 An agreement outlining the principles 
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for a joint political leadership of a single national democratic front in Eritrea was finally 
signed in Khartoum on 20 October 1977. It was followed by a more detailed agreement 
on 15 March 1978, laying down the political principles of the political union and 
detailing the practical steps to be taken. The ‘Osman Sabbe clique’ was deliberately left 
out of the agreement which the EPLF described in its official organ as ‘the death 
warrant’ to his ELF-PLF, since its non-recognition as a ‘legitimate’ independence 
movement was made official.
49
 Yet it also demonstrated that the unity agreement was, 
in fact, not inclusive of all movements fighting for Eritrean independence and 
consequently rather diluted the establishment of a single, strong national movement. 
Furthermore, the fact that unity was not possible despite the strikingly similar 
programmes of the Fronts and that hegemonic claims were given precedence over 
national unity reflected the fact that a conflict based on grievances was still simmering.  
In fact, the ineffectiveness of the agreements became quickly apparent. The 
ongoing distrust between the two movements was too strong and undermined the 
relationship decisively. Connell asserts that ELF documents that would surface later on 
even suggest that the movement intended to subvert the agreement ‘from the moment it 
was signed.’50 By the end of what Iyob describes as a period of ‘uneasy coexistence’ 
from 1975 to 1977, the movement appeared as divided as ever.
51
 This has been 
interpreted by Erlich as being caused by the ‘rootlessness’ of Eritrean nationalism, 
asserting that Eritrea was lacking a ‘unifying nationalist tradition’ and that Eritrean 
nationalism was merely ‘the negation of Ethiopianism.’52
 
Yet it was mainly infighting 
over the leadership that prevented any genuine agreement on unity. In fact, the ELF 
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repeatedly stalled the implementation of the programme hoping for a weakening of its 
rival, the EPLF, in its fight against Ethiopia.
53
 
 
In any case, the lack of unity proved to 
be detrimental in 1977, since from a military point of view, the liberation was highly 
successful and the defeat of the Ethiopian forces seemed at hand. After having 
previously lost large parts of the countryside to the liberation movement, the Ethiopians 
started losing towns and garrisons from January 1977 onwards, to such an extent that 
‘[b]y the early summer the Derg controlled little more than Asmara and the ports of 
Massawa and Assab.’54 Yet, the liberation movements were unable to unite even in the 
face of imminent victory and subsequently increased military aid to the Ethiopians 
resulted in the Ethiopian army regaining a considerable amount of territory. 
 
In 1981 a 
stalemate was reached, yet any prospects of a negotiated peaceful Ethiopian-Eritrean 
settlement were out of reach. 
 
 
The return to civil war and the expulsion of the ELF  
The EPLF had reacted to the increased strength of the Ethiopian army through Soviet 
assistance with a strategic retreat whereas the ELF engaged in positional warfare which 
left it heavily decimated and defeated. As a result of its strategic retreat, the EPLF had 
not only conserved its forces but even improved them and gained more supporters.
55
 
Yohannes claims that this situation of weakness was considered by the EPLF as a 
‘propitious moment to establish a unipolar liberation order in Eritrea by permanently 
disabling the ELF’56 and, in fact, a second round of civil war was initiated by the EPLF 
in August 1980.  
The Sudanese government offered to mediate between the two warring liberation 
                                                          
53
 Dan Connell, ‚Eritrean Groups Turn On Each Other‘, 479. 
54
 Marina Ottaway (1982), p. 113. 
55
 On the strategic retreat see David Pool (2001), pp. 143-147. 
56
 Okbazghi Yohannes (1997), p. 183. Okbazghi also states that while there are differing reports, the 
most credible ones hint at the EPLF as the initiator of this second civil war between the ELF and the 
EPLF. The first one in the early 1970s had clearly been started by the ELF. 
213 
 
movements but the offer was rejected by the EPLF who seemed to prefer an ‘all-out 
showdown’.57 Connell reported that the ELF on the other hand even considered 
collaboration with Ethiopia and was ready to ‘accept compromise short of 
independence.’58 He suggests that there was no hard evidence for such collaboration; 
yet there were reports of simultaneous attacks by the ELF and Ethiopia against EPLF 
forces, and a meeting of ELF officials with Ethiopian and Soviet representatives in 
Damascus was said to be planned.
59
 This move has to be understood in the light of ELF 
alliances with Soviet-backed Arab countries and the newly established Soviet-Ethiopian 
relationship. An alliance with the ELF could have decisively weakened the Eritrean 
liberation struggle and perhaps contributed to the end of the conflict that had lasted 
almost twenty years, a costly business for Ethiopia and its allies. However, the fact that 
the ELF had been considerably weakened enabled the EPLF to push the majority of 
ELF units from Eritrean territory into Sudan between August and November 1980. 
Pressure from the Arab League on all Eritrean liberation movements resulted in 
the Tunis Agreement negotiated from 20 to 23 of March 1981. The EPLF, the ELF, the 
ELF-PLF, and the ELF-RC (Revolutionary Council) agreed to set up a working 
committee to coordinate the fight for independence among the forces. However, the 
agreement left many, mainly practical, questions unanswered. At the same time, ‘the 
EPLF’s substantial expansion into both the coastal and Barka lowlands [stroke] a 
powerful blow at efforts by the minor nationalist groups.’60 In fact, only few months 
after the negotiations the EPLF, with considerable support from the Tigrayan People’s 
Liberation Front (TPLF), drove the last remaining ELF units into Sudan and established 
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its supremacy over the field.
61
   
Despite more than thirty years of armed struggle, including internal strife and 
civil war, this particular period is crucial to understanding Eritrean national identity. 
Not just because, as Renan said, common suffering can help bind communities 
together,
62
 but because the EPLF, due to its large territorial success and integrative 
policies in the liberated areas, provided political structures and initiated a process of 
social and economic development that pulled all the various communities in the 
territory together. At the same time though, the internal struggle created political 
cleavages that endure beyond the struggle for independence and that, in absence of a 
democratic system and dialogue, put the cohesiveness of the Lebanese nation in 
question. 
 
LEBANON 
The descent into civil conflict  
Despite the fact that the Lebanon of the early 1970s had been described by scholars as 
witnessing an increasing tendency toward sectarian accommodation and moderation of 
communal attitudes,
63
 the country not only saw the outbreak of civil war in 1975 but the 
conflict extended over fifteen years, going through different phases. The first phase 
lasted from 1975 to 1976 and ended with Syrian intervention. The second phase, often 
described as the interwar period, lasted from 1977 to 1982, and the third, marked by the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the battles of Beirut, from 1982 to 1983. Finally the last 
phase, from 1984 to 1990, saw a worsening internal political crisis and was marked by 
inter-as well as intra-communal warfare as well as the ‘War of the Camps’ between the 
Shi
c
ite Amal and guerrillas in the Palestinian refugee camps, before the conflict finally 
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came to an end with the Ta’if Agreement.64 Regardless of phase, the conflict was 
inextricably connected to a number of regional conflicts that were fought on Lebanese 
territory and that often either dragged Lebanese communities into the conflict or stirred 
up inter-communal conflicts. As Hanf noted, ‘Lebanese shot at Lebanese in every year 
of the war’ and ‘there were always sufficient grounds for Lebanese strife within a wider 
war that was not pre-eminently Lebanese’.65 
While the outbreak of hostilities has generally been linked to dissent over the 
PLO presence on Lebanese territory and was specifically triggered by the 
c
Ain ar-
Rummaneh bus shooting on 13 April 1975, the underlying reasons were horizontal 
inequalities that had been building up over the past decades. Demographic changes were 
not reflected in the inflexible Lebanese sectarian system, and uneven development had 
resulted in a widening of the socio-economic gap. While the political system had 
provided the basis for peaceful coexistence in times of political and economic stability, 
the increasing instability resulted in many Lebanese returning their loyalty to their 
communal identity. This was reinforced by the fact that class and community structures 
largely overlapped. While the underlying reasons for the outbreak of the hostilities were 
predominantly of a domestic nature, divisions between communities and Lebanon’s 
geographic position made the country vulnerable to external interventions which 
contributed to the prolongation of the conflict.  
In fact, the first event that has to be considered as leading up to the civil war was 
one addressing socio-economic grievances: the Sidon disturbances of 27 February 1975. 
Clashes started when the fishermen of Sidon took to the streets to demonstrate against 
the Protein Company which was about to gain a monopoly control over the Lebanese 
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fishing industry thanks to authorisation granted by presidential decree.
66
 Despite 
ongoing negotiations with the company over the rights of the fishermen, the latter 
started protesting and were quickly joined by Palestinian guerrillas from the nearby 
camps which escalated into clashes with the Lebanese army. The PLO involvement did 
not sit well with Lebanese Christians who considered this an attempt to weaken the 
army and consequently the state. The events set in motion what El Khazen called ‘the 
built-in domino effect of Lebanese politics in the mid-1970s’ as the dispute aggravated 
tensions between the Lebanese communities and ‘was transformed into a complex 
political crisis having overlapping layers’.67
  
In this context, the presence of the PLO was enough of an issue to internally 
divide the Lebanese into two distinctive camps; it also added a military dimension to 
this division, for a large part because, as Hanf noted, the Palestinian issue ‘concerned in 
a very immediate way the Lebanese peoples’ understanding of themselves.’68 Those 
Lebanese who considered their country an Arab-Muslim one saw the support of the 
Palestinian cause as almost an obligation, while those who believed in a more distinct 
non-Arab Lebanon regarded the case of the PLO as more of a foreign issue. Once again, 
as with the crisis of 1958, a foreign policy issue – even though played out inside the 
country –  escalated existing internal tensions over the identity of the country. While 
Lebanon was facing numerous problems on many levels, the basic tension between the 
Christian and Muslim communities had never been properly resolved; this, in turn, left 
the state weak and disposed to slip into conflict in the face of uneven integration of 
communities. In the end, it was the overly-vague National Pact that prevented the 
country from having a rational national policy that was able to satisfy all members of 
Lebanese society on both social and economic, level. Consequently, with the outbreak 
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of hostilities in 1975, the National Pact collapsed as well. 
 
In his resignation statement of 15 May 1975, then Prime Minister Rashid al-Sulh 
claimed that the clear goal of the ‘massacre’ committed by the Phalange party in cAin 
ar-Rummaneh was not only to ‘destroy our national unity and strike at the Lebanese-
Palestinian brotherlines.’69
 
Rather, in a situation where the army could not interfere due 
to its precarious state, the party was trying to stir up unrest and exploit a sectarian 
system that was already severely out of balance since:  
 
The confessional distinctions which form the basis of the Lebanese political regime have been 
transformed by the changing conditions of Lebanon and its ties with its Arab environment, into 
an obstacle which not only prevents any kind of progress but also threatens to push backwards 
and destroy all that has been built up since independence.
70
 
 
 
Therefore, al-Sulh considered the only solution to the crisis involved reforms of the 
political system and a corresponding move towards secularized state institutions, as well 
as reform of the army that would place it under the formal control of the government 
and also ensure more equality within its ranks. After his resignation, and following a 
number of skirmishes, the country saw some halt to the violence over the summer when 
various Muslim and Christian organizations re-started the dialogue. Yet, the attempt at 
reconciliation through National Dialogue meetings in September and October 1975 
only seemed to highlight the divergent opinions, especially with regard to a reform of 
the constitution and the sectarian system. While most Muslims supported al-Sulh’s 
desire to abolish the sectarian system, the Maronite community believed that it was 
precisely this system that gave both sides enough ‘confidence’, and unless a new system 
was going to ‘supply this confidence in full’ it would only lead ‘to dissension and the 
destruction of the foundations of the nation.’71 Yet reform of the sectarian system as 
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envisaged by the Muslim community did not exclude the possibility of co-existence.
72
 A 
formula of co-existence was what the Muslims wanted; what they rejected was the 
system of political equilibrium since ‘[f]ormula means fusion and unification; 
equilibrium appropriation and division.’73 Such a formula had to be different from what 
was implied in the National Pact, since it should aim at real co-existence where the 
citizen’s ‘allegiance will be to his nation, not to his confessional community.’74 
Late 1975 and early 1976 was marked by sectarian violence and massacres and although 
Syria considered the events in Lebanon as threatening its own security, nevertheless the 
regime continued to supply the PLO and its Lebanese allies with weapons.
75
 In January 
1976, Syria intervened directly in the conflict for the first time ‘under the name of the 
PLA [Palestinian Liberation Army]’, following heavy fighting including the Karantina 
and Damour massacres, to save the National Movement and the PLO from defeat.
76
 
In February 1976, Syria initiated another attempt at national reconciliation, this 
time backed by the US. The so-called Constitutional Document, often also referred to as 
the Damascus Agreement, was basically a revised, and written, version of the 1943 
National Pact.
77
 While the sovereignty of the country was emphasized, it was also 
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clearly labelled as an Arab nation.
78
 The Syrian President Asad underscored the fact that 
no secular programme had been agreed upon due to the intransigence of the Lebanese 
Muslim communities (with exception of the Druze under Kamal Jumblatt) who 
considered a secular state to be against the principles of Islam.
79
 The document was 
supported by the majority of the Lebanese except for Jumblatt, who considered it 
‘ambiguous’ and prevented it from ever being enacted by the Lebanese Parliament.80 
Jumblatt’s attitude towards the Syrians also led to the weakening of the LNM because 
some members of the movement embraced the Syrian document. Moreover, it affected 
relations between the PLO and Syria, with Asad even accusing the Palestinians of 
turning into a tool of forces inside Lebanon and ‘fighting for the accomplishment of the 
objectives of others’ instead of focusing on the liberation of Palestine.81 
 
In reality, the 
PLO and their Lebanese supporters viewed the agreement with a sense of ‘being 
cheated of their success’, since it accepted the conditions of both the Cairo Agreement 
and the Melkart Protocol, which effectively limited the freedom the PLO.
82
 
 
In June 1976, Syria intervened again in the ongoing conflict, this time in support 
of the Christian communities, or rather to prevent a victory of the PLO that, together 
with the LNM and the newly formed Lebanese Arab Army (LAA),
83
 had started 
attacking Christian East Beirut and the presidential palace at Baabda. While the PLO 
was now also hostile towards Syria, attacking and detaining Syrian soldiers in Lebanon, 
Asad officially maintained that the purpose of the Syrian presence was to protect the 
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Palestinian refugee camps from possible Israeli attacks.
84
 
However, the invasion was 
rather guided by the aim of reinforcing Syria’s influence in the country and especially 
over both the LNM and the PLO, or as Weinberger put it, ‘to force them to stop 
contesting Syria’s will in Lebanon.’85 In June 1976, the Arab League decided in an 
emergency meeting to establish a 2000-man inter-Arab peace-keeping force and about 
four months later, it decided to transform this force into the 3000-man Arab Deterrence 
Force (ADF) under the command of the Lebanese President.
86 
No precise guidelines 
were given for the composition of this force and it soon became a purely Syrian force 
and basically served to legitimise Syrian military presence in the country and confirmed 
its predominance.  
 
From uneasy quiet to the Israeli invasions of Lebanon 
While support of the PLO had been the issue of disagreement that triggered the conflict 
and divided the two sides during the early stages, the issue had already moved to the 
background by the end of the 1970s. In fact, there was increasing agreement amongst all 
the different groups and parties regarding their lack of support for any sort of foreign 
military forces on Lebanese soil, in the wake of a possible Israeli invasion and the 
presence of Syrian military personnel since 1976. While it was Syrian intervention that 
ultimately ended the first phase of the war, Israel had also quite decisively intervened in 
the conflict by supporting the Maronite militias with financial and military aid during 
the ‘battles of Beirut’ that saw the LF embroiled in battles with the ADF over control of 
Christian East Beirut. However, it was only in 1978 that Lebanon witnessed the first 
direct military intervention by Israel on Lebanese territory. This first intervention was 
followed four years later by the invasion of South Lebanon up to Beirut by the Israeli 
                                                          
84
 Speech by Hafiz al-Asad, 20.07.1976, p. 226/227. 
85
 Naomi J. Weinberger, Syrian Intervention in Lebanon: The 1975-76 Civil War, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), p. 213. 
86
 Ibid., p. 229. 
221 
 
Defence Forces (IDF), named ‘Operation Peace for Galilee’, unprevented by the 
presence of a UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon; the United Nations Interim Force in 
Lebanon (UNIFIL) had been stationed following the 1978 attacks by Israel and as a 
result of UN Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426. Yet the mandate of the UNIFIL 
did not include active involvement in possible attacks but was rather aimed at restoring 
peace and security by its mere presence, and in assisting the Lebanese government to 
regain effective authority in Southern Lebanon.
87
 
The 1982 invasion would have decisive repercussions for the future political 
landscape in Lebanon. It took place after a ceasefire with the PLO had been in place for 
almost a year and the National Salvation Committee, established by then Lebanese 
President Elias Sarki, had brought together various militia leaders to foster dialogue. 
The Israelis used the attempted assassination of their ambassador in the UK as a pretext 
to start the invasion even though the group responsible was led by Abu Nidal, an arch 
enemy of Arafat and the PLO. The invasion not only aspired to end the PLO presence in 
Lebanon, considered a pre-requisite for creating a solution to the West Bank, but was 
also meant to realize old plans to establish a pro-Israeli government in Lebanon. The 
plan was to bring a government under Bashir Gemayel to power, and thereby create an 
environment favourable to a possible peace agreement with neighbouring Israel. 
However, as Schulze analysed, despite Israeli intelligence based on covert relations with 
the Phalanges, the invasion plan was flawed because it was based on a false perception 
of the Maronites as a ‘junior ally’ and a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
communal balances in Lebanon.
88
 In addition, cooperation between the Phalange and 
the Israelis did not go unnoticed and certainly contributed to revive or even deepen 
sectarian resentments. In their opening letter of 1985, Hizb’allah dedicated an entire 
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chapter to the discussion of Zionist-Phalange relations and accused the Phalange of 
having invited the Israeli invasion in order for Gemayel to attain the presidency by 
walking over an ‘American-Israeli bridge’89.  
In fact, the deteriorating situation in the country, and the entanglement of 
external forces in the conflict which had resulted increasingly in internal chaos, fuelled 
American fears of the conflict igniting a wider regional conflict. In reaction to the 
invasion, the Americans participated in a Multi-National Force (MNF)
90
 
in the territory 
which aimed to serve as a buffer between the Israeli and the Syrian forces, who were 
both present on Lebanese territory, in order to find a solution to the Palestinian issue 
without further bloodshed. After the deployment of the first MNF succeeded in 
removing the PLO from Lebanon to exile in Tunis, Washington dedicated itself to 
supporting an agreement between the warring parties, mainly to secure Israel’s interests 
and its northern border. The MNF was withdrawn from Lebanon only to be redeployed 
less than two weeks later following the assassination of President Bashir Gemayel on 14 
September 1982, and the Sabra and Shatila massacres on 17 and 18 September.
91
 
Amin Gemayel, who was elected as successor to his brother Bashir, hoped that 
with the help of the American administration, the Lebanese Government would be able 
to get the most out of the stalemate between Israel and Syria. In his speeches, Gemayel 
regularly reaffirmed the importance of maintaining the unity of Lebanese territory as 
                                                          
89
 UMAM, Naṣ al-risāla al-maftūḥa allatī waǧahahā Ḥizb ‘allah ‘Ilā al-mustaḍ
c
afīn fī lubnān wa al-
c
ālam, p. 
13. 
90
 The Multi-National Force consisted of American, French and Italian soldiers, and from January 1983 
some British observers joined the second MNF in Lebanon. 
91
 This massacre in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon was initiated by Israeli commanders who 
wanted to make sure every PLO military presence in Lebanon was completely eradicated. They 
suspected some guerillas of having remained in Lebanon and hiding in the camps, but did not want their 
own soldiers to go into the camps. They found Christian militiamen from the Lebanese Forces that went 
in for them, committing a cold-blooded massacre. Estimates of the number of people killed during the 
massacre, mainly Palestinians but also Lebanese Shi’ites, range from 750 to 3,500. For a detailed 
account see Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War, 3rd edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), p. 359-400. 
223 
 
well as its sovereignty and independence.
92
 US mediation efforts finally led to the 
signing of the 17 May Agreement in 1983. Proving his seriousness concerning the unity 
of the country, Gemayel made sure that representatives of the Sunni and the Shi
c
a 
communities were included in the negotiations for the agreement. However, the 
agreement was aimed solely at ending the war between Israel and Lebanon on Lebanese 
soil to Israel’s advantage, while completely ignoring Syria. The existence of an Israeli 
‘side letter’ which was accepted by Secretary of State Shultz but probably not disclosed 
to Gemayel, further jeopardized the success of the agreement.
93
 
 
During this stalemate, 
the MNF was essentially without a mission and it became the target of attacks by 
Lebanese militia forces, mainly the National Salvation Front that had been organized by 
Syria in opposition to the Lebanese-Israeli agreement.
94
 
 
The worst of these attacks took 
place on 23 October 1983 and resulted in the deaths of 241 American servicemen. It 
took another four months until the failure of the 17 May Agreement and the mission of 
the MNF were both finally recognised and the MNF withdrawn from Lebanon. At the 
same time as these international forces left, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) 
collapsed due to ongoing confrontations with Muslim militias, reflecting the conflict 
between supporters of the government and the agreement, and those vehemently 
opposing it.
95
 
 
Two years later another attempt to reach an agreement was made, again initiated 
by Syria but this time supported by Saudi Arabia. The aim of this new attempt was to 
bring together the three main militia leaders – Elie Hobeika of the LF, Walid Jumblatt 
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of the PSP and Nabih Berri of the ‘Amal – in order to reach an agreement between them. 
The Lebanese government was deliberately left out, as was the Sunni community as it 
lacked sufficient militia power.
96
 
In addition, the rise of the Shi
c
a community and its 
movements had decisively shifted political influence away from the Sunni community. 
While the new agreement seemed to meet more demands of most of the militias since it 
embraced a certain level of ‘deconfessionalisation’, it was only signed by the leaders on 
28 December 1985 because ‘no one was challenging Syria in Lebanon at that time and it 
controlled the balance of forces in the war.’97 
 
Hence, it was an agreement enforced by 
Syria in order to strengthen the distinctive relationship between the two countries, 
granting Syria more than mere influence. The agreement seemed to force Lebanon into 
adopting the same foreign policy as Syria and it would have placed the LAF under 
Syrian supreme command which would have seriously put the sovereignty of Lebanon 
in question.
98
 However, the agreement did not have any national legitimisation since it 
bypassed the Lebanese government completely and lacked international support. In 
addition, ‘militiamen, militia commanders and militant politicians had an interest in 
maintaining at least some tension between the conflicting parties’99, since each only had 
the support of a minority in their respective community. As a result, a peaceful 
settlement of the conflict would have also seen their influence diminish. All these 
factors ultimately led to the failure of yet another initiative to end the fighting.  
 
The experience of violence and grassroots movements  
Aside from the political impact of shifting alliances, inter-sectarian conflicts and elite 
attempts at reconciliation, the sheer level of violence experienced also affected the 
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whole of the Lebanese population, regardless of religious affiliation, on a psychological 
level and profoundly influenced people’s perception of unity and identity. The 
increasingly inter-communal violence began to impact on the demographic distribution 
of the Lebanese population. Not only did Beirut become divided into a Christian-
dominated East and a Muslim-dominated West, confessionally mixed areas, especially 
in the capital, increasingly vanished. Many people relocated several times in the course 
of the conflict, often moving into areas occupied solely by members of their own 
sectarian community. As a Sunni woman reported during the siege of Beirut in 1982:  
 
Our neighbourhood is a mixture of Sunnis and Shiites. It contains some people who are very 
poor and some who are very rich. A fortnight ago, all the Shiites moved out – all of them. 
Newspaper vendors, dustmen, labourers, porters, domestics, etc. all loaded supplies into their 
cars and set off at 4 a.m. for occupied south Lebanon. Not a single one stayed behind. Partly they 
went to escape the bombardments, but partly they felt that their homeland in the south was 
slipping through their fingers. They preferred to be down there.
100
 
 
 
 
However, neighbourhoods such as Ras Beirut, which had always been a place of ‘real 
coexistence’ remained open to all communities even during the prolonged civil war. It 
was also largely because of its multi-communal nature that it was spared the experience 
of serious wrangles or even massacres endured by other neighbourhoods.
101
 Such 
massacres in neighbourhoods were often answered by retaliatory massacres in 
neighbourhoods inhabited by the rival community, and were, in fact, often based on old 
rivalries rather than related to the issue that had pushed the country into civil war in the 
first place. The earliest massacre took place on 18 January 1976 in the Karantina district 
of Beirut which was mainly inhabited by Palestinians, Syrians and Kurds and under the 
control of the PLO. It was overrun by Christian militias resulting in the death of 1000-
1500 people. In response, the PLO entered the Christian town of Damour, a Phalange 
militia base, two days later and killed an estimated 600 people.
102
 Yet this type of 
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excessive violence did not remain confined to the inter-communal level and, as 
Tersakian noted, ‘some of the most despicable, unpredictable and yet highly significant 
violence in Lebanon occurred within the “Christian” camp.’103 Specifically, the brutal 
killing of the son of ex-president Suleiman Franjieh, Tony, together with his wife, two-
year old daughter, other family members and staff in Ehden on 13 June 1978 shocked 
the Maronite community and was widely condemned.
104
 The massacre had been carried 
out by the Phalange under the command of Bashir Gemayel who also ordered the 
slaughter of the ‘Tiger’ militia, by then under the command of Camille Sham’un’s son, 
Dany. This had been preceded by a ‘mutual hate campaign between the two militias’, 
and the killing of Bashir Gemayel’s baby daughter by a car bomb on 23 February 
1980.
105
 The elimination of the ‘Tiger’ militia has been linked to the killing of 
Gemayel’s daughter, as well as to the fact that Gemayel was said to be have become 
tired of sharing power with Sham’un since both militias had been operating under the 
umbrella of the LF. The Ehden massacre, in contrast, ‘had its roots in […] a century-old 
blood-feud’ between the town of Ehden and the hometown of one of the leaders of the 
Phalange forces, Samir Geagea.
106
  
Despite the high level of violence and cruelty experienced during the civil war, 
the majority of the population appeared to be able to view this as a experience shared 
with its co-nationalists, and as something that brought the communities closer together 
instead of tearing them apart. As an Orthodox Christian woman recounted in June 1982:  
 
Five days ago we decided to leave for East Beirut. We took our Shiite neighbours with us. At the 
Phalangist barricade, just past the Museum, they told us that they were willing to let us through, 
but that our Shiite neighbours would have to turn back. I said that either we all went through, or 
nobody would go. They gave in. [...] Here, this is our neighbourhood, this is where we grew up. 
Our neighbours are closer to us than our relations. The war itself has bound us together. Here 
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people understand each other.
107
 
 
 
In fact, such accounts of inter-communal bonds and relationships described as ‘closer 
[...] than the closest of family’108 did not represent isolated emotions but were part of a 
much larger sentiment amongst the Lebanese population. Hanf’s comprehensive 
surveys conducted during the civil war revealed that ‘the majority of Lebanese have 
little difficulty in reconciling communal identity and national identity. […] Lebanese do 
have a strong sense of communal affiliation. But only a small minority feel that this is 
more important than their Lebanese nationality. […] all want to live in peace with each 
other in the same country.
109
 Hanf’s findings confirmed Salibi’s earlier assertion that 
there was a ‘consensus among all but the more committed extremists today that they are 
Lebanese, sharing the same national identity, regardless of other, secondary, group 
affiliations and loyalties.’110  
The desire for peace was also openly expressed through demonstrations staged 
throughout the war. The first one which took place in November 1975 saw tens of 
thousands Lebanese from both East and West Beirut taking to the streets. It managed, 
for a moment, to interrupt the fighting but the ‘fighters prevented further demonstrations 
by staging heavy artillery duels hours before the announced time of any 
demonstration’.111 Yet organized protests continued, including peace movements such 
as ‘Women Against War’ and professional associations and societies. An important role 
was also played by the Confédération Générale des Travailleurs Libanais (CGTL), the 
umbrella organization of the Lebanese trade unions, which had adopted a non-
confessional position and preserved it throughout the war.
112
 After the first strike called 
                                                          
107
 Selim Nassib, ‘Cross-section of the war – five stories of a Beirut apartment block’, 21.06.1982, 
published in: Selim Nassib with Caroline Tisdall (1983), p. 60. 
108
 Selim Nassib, ‘In the Palestinian camps the day after the bombing, 29.07.1982, published in: Selim 
Nassib with Caroline Tisdall (1983), p. 98. 
109
 Theodor Hanf (1993), p. 641. 
110
 Kamal Salibi (1988), p. 3. 
111
 Ibid., p. 638. 
112
 Ibid., p. 639. 
228 
 
by the CGTL, the union managed to mobilize people outside of their membership and 
organized a number of mass political demonstrations. Non-violent activities protesting 
the ongoing violence also included sit-ins, placing flowers in the muzzle of guns and the 
prevention of kidnappings; these actions were performed by members of all Lebanese 
communities.
113
   
However, as Salibi rightfully cautioned, the will to live together peacefully and 
the emerging consciousness of common identity that he detected among the Lebanese 
population had to be ‘translated into a new national order’.114 This would necessitate 
overcoming the struggle between the Lebanese elites, especially the leaders of the 
various militias, since it was up to them to translate this sentiment into an agreement 
and into support for a political system of coexistence that would not be conducive to 
communal affiliations taking predominance once again.  
 
From two governments to agreement  
The prolonged Lebanese civil war finally came to an end through an agreement 
negotiated in 1989. Preceding this, Asad was still trying to establish Syrian hegemony 
in Lebanon and intended to use the presidential elections of 1988 for that purpose.  
After many attempts at electing a new president remained unsuccessful, largely 
because of a lack of Syrian support, the American and the Syrian governments jointly 
nominated a candidate.
115
 However, disagreement over the nomination led to a split 
between those supporting the US-Syrian proposal and those opposing it, and eventually 
resulted in the existence of two governments. Both the cabinet of General Michel Aoun 
and that of Salim Hoss claimed to be the legitimate one. The split also extended to the 
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administration and institutions such as the armed forces.
116
 Aoun had actually been 
embroiled in a struggle over power in the Christian community with Samir Geagea, 
despite ideologically following very similar lines. Moreover, Aoun was trying to restore 
the authority of the state which was constantly undermined by the existence of militia 
forces, mainly the LF under the leadership of Geagea. After heavy fighting between the 
LF and the LAF, a ceasefire was agreed, a decisive victory for Aoun. Following this 
success, Aoun started challenging other militias in areas where his government was not 
actually recognized. This provoked the Syrians to intervene militarily once again. 
Heavy bombardments and fighting broke out between Syria and the supporters of Aoun. 
The latter had hoped for foreign support in what he considered was a war to liberate 
Lebanon from Syrian dominance, but such support never came.
117
 Finally, the Arab 
League called for a ceasefire and during the Arab summit conference on 23 May 1989 
they set up a troika to restore Lebanon’s sovereignty and elaborate on reforms of the 
political system. It would take two more attempts until a breakthrough could be reached 
and the Syrians acceded to international pressure to agree to the proposal of 13 
September 1989.  
The warring parties finally came together for negotiations due to a variety of 
causes, internal as well as external. Just as the war itself was marked by external 
influences, so was its settlement. To reach an accord, not only the agreement of the 
internal forces was needed but also a regional environment conducive to peace. What 
certainly contributed to an agreement being more likely was the fact that one of the 
issues that had created the most dissent at the outbreak of the conflict was now lacking, 
namely the Palestinian issue. The key issue remaining was the issue of internal political 
reforms.  
Yet, the Ta’if Agreement that marked the end of the civil war would not resolve 
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one core problem: the system of institutionalised sectarianism. In fact, the situation in 
1989 seemed to have been conducive to the introduction of a new system due to the 
positive attitude within the Lebanese population of all denominations, as described by 
both Hanf and Salibi. However, while co-existence was indeed desired by the majority 
of the Lebanese by the end of the civil war, and a large number of Lebanese politicians 
believed that it was the only way for Lebanon to survive, there remained the continuing 
desire of the traditional elites to keep their positions of power.  
As Maila noted, the Ta’if Agreement ‘determines the nature of Lebanese society 
as a society of communities welded by their desire to live together.’118 In terms of the 
system for living together, the accord basically reorganized the elements of the National 
Pact of 1943, which meant a return to the confessional formula with very few 
alterations. Yet, the Accord also reemphasized the temporality of the system by stating 
that equal and proportional distribution should be the basis for the distribution of 
parliamentary seats ‘[u]ntil the Chamber of Deputies passes an election law free of 
sectarian restriction’.119 The document includes a phased plan for the abolition of the 
sectarian system, but no precise time frame, and even declares it ‘a fundamental 
national objective’.120 Thus, all the Ta’if Accord did in this respect was to postpone the 
modification of a sectarian system that, when integrated into the constitution after the 
unwritten National Pact of 1943, was already considered ‘a provisional measure’.121 
 
CONCLUSION  
As this chapter has shown, in both Eritrea and Lebanon the underlying reasons for the 
descent into civil war were linked to divisions along religious lines and the correlating 
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different nationalist aspirations and perceptions of the identity of the countries. Yet, 
while these cleavages were the underlying factors for civil conflict, the impetus for the 
outbreak came from structural changes that aggravated grievances and resulted in 
horizontal inequalities. In Lebanon, demographic changes accompanied by the widening 
socio-economic gap exacerbated sectarian divisions and dissatisfaction with the 
institutionalized sectarian system, while in Eritrea the organizational structure applied 
by the ELF accounts for the emergence of horizontal inequalities. In both cases, these 
inequalities exacerbated the major-cleavage and, therefore, the outbreak of hostilities 
was to a large part also motivated by the question of the identity of the country and the 
independence movement respectively. However, this issue moved into the background 
as the fighting prolonged and rather disagreement and struggle over the distribution of 
power became the predominant bone of contention.  
In fact, in Lebanon internal problems became intertwined with regional conflicts 
and international interests. This made the conflict much more complex and complicated 
than was the case in Eritrea. Consequently, it also made formation or preservation of 
national unity and identity much more complicated, almost impossible. The fact that 
external forces were able to extort internal divisions and play communities off against 
each other certainly contributed to the length of the conflict. Yet, since in the later 
stages it was mainly a fight over dominance and political power, the civil war did, in 
fact, instil in the Lebanese population some sense of common suffering that would bind 
them together as a nation. However, the Ta’if Agreement simply reaffirmed the old 
sectarian system and left the impression that the desire to co-exist peacefully on an 
equal basis existed mainly on a grassroots level. For the elites, keeping a system that 
left, again, the question of national identity in limbo to a certain degree, appeared to 
leave enough space for the interests of all community leaders.  
The same dynamic was at work in the case of Eritrea, although here it was much 
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stronger since the liberation movements did not experience the massive interference and 
attempts at being played off against each other as was the case in Lebanon. The 
experience of civil conflict was rather limited and predominantly stimulated by power 
interests and disagreements over strategic issues. The common suffering under the 
Ethiopians helped to bind the Eritreans together from the very beginning of the 
independence struggle. The civilian intervention in the first war between the ELF and 
the EPLF, when grassroots pressure was strong enough to push the warring liberation 
movements to a ceasefire, was proof of the existence and the strength of a common 
bond based on the shared experience of atrocities and suppression. The people were not 
willing to endure more suffering because of disagreements over military strategies and 
leadership. 
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Chapter 6 – A nation in a world of nations?: External influences  
While the process of national identity formation is often considered an internal process, 
taking place between the members of a population imagining each other as belonging to 
the same nation, it has also been widely recognised that an ‘outward- looking element’ 
is part of nationalism and, therefore, plays an important role in the formation of national 
identity.
1
 As Prizel notes, this is due to the fact that ‘national identity serves not only as 
the primary link between the individual and society, but between a society and the 
world’.2 Therefore, international relations and national identity have to be considered as 
intertwined phenomena with the ability to mutually influence each other. Of special 
relevance in this context appears the aspect of recognition, the legitimacy of a nation 
being recognized by another based on ‘[t]he assumption of sovereign nation-states 
existing in mutual recognition.’3   
This chapter will look at external influences on the formation and formulation of 
national identity in Eritrea and Lebanon after the departure of the respective 
colonial/mandate power. Due to their geostrategic positions, both countries were of 
interest not only to regional but also international actors, yet the fact that they did not 
receive the same international recognition as self-determining nation-states led to these 
external actors and conflicts shaping their national identity in different ways. This 
chapter focuses on the two broader conflicts which influenced both countries, the Cold 
War and the Arab-Israeli conflict, and argues that in both cases the policies of other 
countries towards the state or its communities played a certain role in the development 
of national identity. In the case of Eritrea, the absence of international recognition of its 
right to self-determination and the active support of Ethiopia by the majority of the 
international community contributed positively to the development of a cohesive 
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national identity. Lebanon, in contrast, had been recognised as a sovereign nation state, 
yet the lack of a coherent foreign policy grounded in a commonly accepted national 
identity resulted in the country being dogged by regional conflicts. This, in turn, had a 
negative impact on the development of a cohesive national identity.  
 
ERITREA 
The geostrategic position of Eritrea  
Eritrea’s strategic position at the ‘crossroads’ between continents brought about not 
only numerous waves of immigration but also turned it into ‘the object of a long series 
of foreign invasions’4 long before it became an actual territorial entity. Immigration and 
invasions resulted in the population of the territory ethnically mirroring ‘a crossroads 
between the Middle East and Africa’,5 and its geostrategic position rendered it an object 
of constant interest to external actors on a regional as well as on an international level.  
While the Italians considered their first-born colony mainly a springboard to 
gaining control over the Ethiopian hinterland, Eritrea’s wider strategic importance was 
confirmed after the British occupation of the territory and the beginning of the BMA. 
After occupying the Italian colony in 1941, the British authorities and their American 
allies quickly started using the territory for important war projects.
6
 American interest in 
the territory remained strong after the Second World War because of the strategic value 
of the coastline for America’s main ally Ethiopia on the one hand, and for their own 
interest in the Middle East, North Africa, and the region of the Indian Ocean, on the 
other. The Eritrean ports of Massawa and Assab provide the closest and most accessible 
links for trade with Ethiopia while the Red Sea, in general, is an important gateway to 
the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean in the north as well as the Gulf of Aden and the 
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Indian Ocean in the south. Therefore, as Haile pointed out, the importance of Eritrea for 
international powers stems from its position ‘on the crossroads between indispensable 
Middle East oil and the economies of the industrialized countries.’7
 
 
 
The Eritrean ‘non-relationship’ with the superpowers  
The relationship of Eritrea with both the USA and the USSR was always intrinsically 
linked to the relationship of the two superpowers with Ethiopia as well as to the 
Ethiopian-Israeli relationship. The latter was of special relevance due to the strong 
Israeli-American partnership in the region, and the fact that American policy in the 
Horn of Africa was always oriented toward the protection of Israeli interests. American 
and Russian interests in the Horn have to be understood within the Cold War context 
and seen as competing attempts to acquire a foothold in this strategically important 
region. Consequently, Ethiopia’s relationship with both the US and the USSR, as well 
as with Israel, must be considered in order to fully appreciate superpower interests and 
politics with regard to Eritrea.  
For the US, the Eritrean territory was deemed essential to creating effective 
defence perimeters in the region and Yohannes claimed that it would be ‘an 
understatement to argue that Eritrea constituted the touchstone in the beginnings of 
U.S.-Ethiopian relations in the 1940s and retained a key role in future dealings.’8 In 
fact, the Americans had started to build up facilities in the strategically important 
highlands and ports of Eritrea during the BMA, and the maintenance of these 
established facilities was the major concern of the US when it came to decide on the 
future of the former Italian colonies. The communications base in Asmara was of 
special importance due to its specific location that left the facility practically unaffected 
by electrical and magnetic disturbances and, therefore, made it an important 
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communications component of the US network, especially the NATO area in Western 
Europe. This explains the initial American support of a British trusteeship, specifically 
over the important areas of Asmara and the ports, in order to best protect US interests at 
the established facilities. However, when it became clear by mid-1948 that the British 
were to relinquish all control over the territory, the American attitude quickly changed. 
 
Ethiopian control of the territory was now considered to best serve US interests 
in keeping its communications facilities. Furthermore, American support for Ethiopia 
also reflected the concern that the Soviet Union might exploit Ethiopia for its own 
strategic purposes. A concern not unfounded, as Spencer noted, because by the end of 
1947, ‘the Soviet Union had already embarked on a programme of assistance to 
Ethiopia.’9 Therefore, the US position with regard to the future of Eritrea also has to be 
considered linked to Cold War considerations. Speaking before the UN Security 
Council in 1952, John Foster Dulles made it clear that   
 
[f]rom the point of view of justice, the opinions of the Eritrean people must receive 
consideration. Nevertheless the strategic interests of the United States in the Red Sea basin and 
considerations of security and world peace make it necessary that the country has to be linked 
with our ally, Ethiopia.
10
 
 
 
In fact, the US sought a whole package of diplomatic privileges from Ethiopia in 
exchange for pushing through the UN resolution on federation. A number of 
declassified documents published by the Journal of Eritrean Studies in 1987 and 1988 
showed how guarantees for the use of strategic facilities were traded against securing 
access to the sea.
11
 
It was only in 1955 that the US communications base at Radio Marina was re-
established outside Asmara and renamed Kagnew. Additionally, the US was granted use 
of the naval facilities at Massawa as well as extensive over-flight privileges throughout 
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the whole of Ethiopia. Following a strategy of quid pro quo the Ethiopians only entered 
the agreement in exchange for military assistance and became the main recipient of US 
military and economic aid in Africa for the next two decades; Ethiopia quickly 
assembled the strongest military on the African continent. This very special relationship 
contributed decisively to the UN decision to make Eritrea a unit of a federation within 
Ethiopia and also the silence of the international community ‘over the undermining of 
Eritrea’s autonomy.’12 There was essentially no international reaction when Ethiopia, 
step by step, reduced Eritrea’s autonomy and ultimately annexed the territory. The 
Eritrean issue was considered an internal Ethiopian affair and Spencer noted that 
America did not want to become engaged in ‘any political or military involvement in 
Ethiopia beyond what was required to assure continued use of that facility [Kagnew]. ’13  
With the US-Ethiopian relationship developing, the Soviet Union emerged as an 
advocate of Eritrean independence in 1950, supporting the self-determination of the 
former colony in line with the Soviet Marxist state doctrine. During the deliberations on 
the future of Eritrea at the UN, the Soviet representative claimed that ‘[t]he USSR has 
consistently supported the proposal that Eritrea should be granted independence’ and 
that ‘[t]he USSR delegation cannot […] support the proposal for federation, which is 
the outcome of the struggle among the colonial powers for a new partition of the former 
Italian colonies’.14 In fact, that this support was guided by Soviet strategic interests 
rather than concern for ‘the longing of the Eritrean people for independence and 
freedom from national oppression’15 had already been revealed at the beginning of the 
debate at the UN in April 1949 when the Soviet envoy claimed that the French and 
British were collaborating with the US in order to present a ‘united front’ to the General 
Assembly of the UN as ‘[t]he three western Powers sought to maintain their hold on the 
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former Italian colonies at any cost in order that they might be utilized as strategic bases 
for any possible military action against the Soviet Union and People’s democracies.’16
 After the decision on federation, the USSR was keen to procure a foothold in the 
strategically important region and the US-Ethiopian agreements on military aid only 
intensified Soviet interests. While Ethiopia tried to prevent any sort of infiltration by the 
Soviet Union, the latter considered Ethiopia an ideal location from which to penetrate 
into the rest of Africa, and accordingly the USSR steadily increased its activities in the 
Horn. Somalia was used as a base for military build-up and ‘the Soviet Union was 
utilizing Eritrea as the northern half of a clamp being constructed to close on Ethiopia 
against the southern half in the Ogaden: the Soviets supported Syria and Iraq with 
money and arms destined for the so-called liberation movement in Eritrea.’17 While the 
Soviet Union consistently refused to give any direct or official support to the developing 
nationalist movement in Eritrea, weapons were supplied indirectly through Soviet allies 
such as Sudan, Somalia and Syria, and ELF fighters were trained in socialist countries 
with strong links to the Soviet Union such as Cuba, China and Algeria; Mordechai 
asserts that by 1970 the military aid channelled to Ethiopia’s neighbours ‘had 
completely changed the balance of power in the area.’18  
For Ethiopia, US military assistance was vital in maintaining the struggle against 
the liberation movement in Eritrea (and the Ogaden) and hence relations with the US 
were considered the ‘antibiotic for the infections of regionalism’.19 However, a number 
of developments were to bring about a shifting of alliances in the region in the mid-
1970s. While Ethiopia had received 73 billion USD in military assistance from the US 
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by 1963
20
, Spencer suggests that US-Ethiopian relations were beginning to cool as early 
as 1959.
21
 He linked this to American policy on the Suez Canal, as well as the Greater 
Somaliland issue, and asserted that pressure from the non-aligned camp on Ethiopia 
resulted in a drift towards the Soviet Union. This put Ethiopia in a position where it 
could play off the two superpowers against each other; American awareness of the 
possibility of losing their ally to its Cold War rival led to the US acquiescing to growing 
Ethiopian demands for military assistance, mainly to finance the fight against the 
Eritrean liberation movement in the north.
22
 Lefebvre argues that the US also 
considered the Eritrean struggle an ideal testing field for the counterinsurgency doctrine 
introduced by the Kennedy administration,
23
 especially as the Eritrean liberation 
movement was perceived as being extremely vulnerable due to its internal divisions and 
consequently easy to overcome. Operations such as ‘Plan Delta’, which involved 
sending an advisory team of 164 men in 1966 to increase the skills of the Ethiopian 
army, and other training measures were all part of the American counterinsurgency 
plan. Yet, this policy also placed American nationals in danger as the US involvement 
did not go unnoticed by the Liberation Front and was answered with kidnappings such 
as that of the American Consul General in Asmara, Murrey Jackson, in1969.
24
 In an 
attempt to avoid any visible US interference, most of the operational responsibility lay 
with America’s ally Israel; in turn Israel ‘was assigned to recruit mostly from among 
Eritrean and Ethiopian Christians, most likely intended to aggravate the vertical 
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divisions of Eritrean society.’25 However, America’s political and military support for 
Ethiopia as well as its complete disregard of Eritrea’s right to self-determination 
provided grounds for agreement between the different communities as well as between 
the liberation Fronts. The ELF’s depiction of the US as Ethiopia’s ‘imperialist 
master(s)’, and the independence struggle as a fight against ‘the imperialist forces’,26 
was also followed by the breakaway groups and by the EPLF.
27
 
A combination of factors such as American economic problems, the détente 
policy introduced by the Nixon administration and the decision to move American 
military facilities from Eritrea to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean contributed directly 
to the erosion of relations between the US and Ethiopian.
28
 There was no American 
support for Haile Selassie on the ground in Ethiopia during the mounting crisis and then 
revolution of 1974. Initially, the US continued its economic and military assistance to 
the new regime, the Dergue, until mass executions carried out by the latter caused 
immense public relations problems. The US announced that ‘its future economic and 
military aid to Addis Ababa would be subject to review’29 as it tried to preserve the 
traditional relationship between the two countries. In Ethiopia, following the 
introduction of ‘Ethiopian socialism’ and the continuous repression of moderate 
elements ‘by the summer of 1976, state propaganda apparati had become overtly anti-
American and pro-Soviet’.30 From early 1975 onwards, published reports about 
Ethiopian atrocities became more widespread in the international media, as did 
numerous eyewitness reports by the large number of Eritrean refugees, some of whom 
had fled to Western countries. The political establishment in the US began to examine 
the issue more closely and realized that the US and its international reputation were 
                                                          
25
 Okbazghi Yohannes (1997), p. 165. 
26
 TNA, FO1043/78, Eritrean Liberation Front, ‘The struggle for Eritrean National Liberation’, no date 
(probably 1967). 
27
 See, e.g., ‘Our struggle and its goals‘. 
28
 See Okbazghi Yohannes (1997), p.68/69. 
29
 Ibid., p. 71. 
30
 Ibid., p. 76 
241 
 
becoming too embroiled in the conflict.
31
 Continuing support for the Ethiopian regime 
and its cruelties was difficult to justify to the American public, especially after the 
recent disaster in Vietnam. After Mengistu took over control of the Dergue in February 
1977, the US finally ended its assistance; the last American troops left the bases in 
Asmara, the American ambassador departed from Addis in 1981, and ‘during the 
Reagan administration Ethiopia […] remained on the list of pariah Marxist states 
publicly condemned by the president and other senior officials.’32 
In contrast, the Soviet Union began its direct involvement with Ethiopia at the 
end of 1976 by signing an arms deal worth 200 million USD.
33
 Two points make this 
change in allies especially important: first, once the Soviet Union created an alliance 
with Ethiopia, the rest of the Socialist block followed, despite the fact that the EPLF had 
itself taken up a programme of social revolution combined with a revolutionary 
movement for national independence by the late 1970s.
34
 Second, Eritrea would become 
the only nation that, throughout its ongoing struggle for independence, was indirectly 
yet successfully fighting against both superpowers, a point often stressed by Eritreans. 
The Second National Congress of the EPLF actually claimed that ‘US economic and 
diplomatic support aimed at winning over the Dergue has supplemented Soviet military 
aid and enabled the regime to continue its military adventures’ and, therefore, ‘both 
superpowers have created complications and obstructed a just peaceful resolution of the 
Eritrean case’.35 The lack of international support for the Eritrean cause and the fact that 
all appeals to the US and the Soviet Union were ignored left the Eritrean population 
with the strongly held perception of being abandoned by the entire world. This was, and 
                                                          
31
 ELF-PLF, Foreign Mission, Congressional Document: American Military Aid to Ethiopia, from U.S. 
Congress Minutes of July 19, 1976. 
32
 Herman J. Cohen, Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent 
(Basingstoke Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000), p.6. 
33
 Marina Ottaway (1982), p. 103. 
34
 Most notable are here probably Cuba and Eastern Germany, that both sent a considerable number of 
soldiers and military advisors to Ethiopia as well. 
35
 RDC, E.P.L.F./Arm/Str/147 03255, Concluding declaration of the 2
nd
 orgganzational [sic] congress of 
the E.P.L.F., 19.03.1987, 
242 
 
still is, often used as an argument for a policy of austerity and self-reliance and became 
an important part of Eritrean national identity during the struggle for independence and 
beyond. It was, furthermore, considered a continuation of Western disrespect for the 
wishes of the Eritrean population and fostered the strengthening of a cohesive identity 
by adding another ‘them’ layer to the already existing one represented by the Ethiopian 
State.  
A change in American and Soviet policy towards Eritrea only occurred under the 
Bush administration (1989-1993) and was strongly related to the end of the Cold War 
and American attempts to achieve closer cooperation with the new Soviet regime under 
Gorbachev. Furthermore, the humanitarian situation in Ethiopia (and Eritrea) as well as 
the issue of the Ethiopian Jewry constituted hot topics that required the US to engage 
with the regime in Addis Ababa. From the Soviet perspective, cooperation with 
America was welcomed from a very practical point of view. After supporting both 
Ethiopia and Angola for years, ‘the Soviets could no longer afford these costly burdens 
in Africa and did not believe either conflict could be resolved through military means.’36 
Due to the prolonged conflict with Eritrean guerrilla forces, morale amongst the 
Ethiopians was low, especially as the country was in the midst of a famine more 
devastating than any previous; it had become impossible to explain to the public why 
more than half of the national budget was spent on weaponry. It was also embarrassing 
for the Soviets, who supplied Ethiopia with weapons and other military support, that all 
of the considerable international humanitarian relief effort was coming from Western 
aid.
37
 Hence, the Soviet Union was trying to phase out assistance to Ethiopia without 
losing face by decisively reducing its military presence and supply. Ethiopia then had to 
look for support elsewhere which worked in favour of the US. The American 
government’s former Senior Advisor on Africa (1987-89) and Assistant Secretary of 
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State for African Affairs (1989-1993), Herman Cohen, noted that due to Ethiopian 
attempts to replace Soviet military support with Israeli arms and technical assistance 
through the US, the latter was ‘able to take advantage of this scenario to exercise 
considerable influence on the protagonists.’38
 
While Ethiopia attempted to use the Falasha Jews as a bargaining chip, linking 
their emigration to Israel to military assistance,
39
 the US actually tried to use its 
influence as mediator to work towards ending the war between Ethiopia and Eritrean 
nationalists. American policy makers generally considered Eritrea an integral part of 
Ethiopia and supported territorial integrity. Consequently, the ‘secessionist’ Eritreans 
fighting for independence could not be assisted even though EPLF awareness 
campaigns started to reach even high-profile officials like Cohen, as his speaking 
engagements were protested by Eritrean-Americans who ‘were relentless picketers.’40 
Interestingly, Cohen displayed a much more understanding attitude towards the TPLF 
and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF); the former was simply branded ‘Marxist-
Leninist Albanians’ while the latter were actually deemed to have objectives that were 
‘understandable’,41 despite the fact that both, unlike Eritrea, had never existed as 
separate territorial entities.  
Cohen’s August 1989 visit was the first by an American Assistant Secretary of 
State to Ethiopia for fifteen years. Prepared with a checklist of demands, he was 
surprised to find Mengistu ‘swallow his pride and act like a pussycat’;42 Mengistu’s 
attitude can be explained by the fact that he was worried about losing Soviet military 
support and desperate to find new allies, especially new military suppliers. In fact, the 
regime proved quick to meet the demands made by the US administration; with regard 
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to the conflict with the EPLF this meant a first round of peace talks presided over by 
former US president Jimmy Carter in Atlanta, Georgia, that took place from 9-19 
September 1989. These failed due to the Ethiopian refusal to allow UN observers to 
participate. While the US remained the accepted negotiator between the EPLF and the 
Ethiopian government, further peace talks were marked by American support for 
Ethiopia’s territorial integrity, with a return to federation being the preferred solution. 
However, the Eritrean fighters, with military victory in reach, refused to consider this as 
an option. By the end of 1990 very little had been achieved as ‘[t]he EPLF wanted to 
talk only about self-determination, while the GPDRE wanted to talk only about 
federalism.’43 
Eventually, it was the military victory of the TPLF and the EPLF that ended the 
conflict, not negotiations.
44
 Winning what an ex-fighter called ‘the forgotten war’ in 
which ‘everyone was against us’ became an important part of Eritrean national identity 
since ’[w]inning that war meant we came to exist as a nation’.45 In the 1993 referendum, 
the Eritrean population clearly opted for independence, not least because the long 
struggle for independence against Ethiopia and its allies had cemented Eritrean national 
identity as distinct from Ethiopia.  
 
Eritrean-Arab partnership vs. Ethiopian-Israeli alliance  
Despite the fact that the Eritrean liberation movement has often been depicted as 
‘largely foreign inspired and financed’
 
by Arab countries,
46
 especially during the early 
stages of the independence struggle, such claims were highly exaggerated and used to 
construct a picture of a liberation front directed from outside. While Arab support for 
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and influence on the Eritrean nationalist movement existed, most Arab countries were 
inconsistent in their attitude towards the Eritrean cause, with the notable exception of 
Syria and Iraq.
47
 By the late 1960s, ELF offices existed in virtually all Arab countries; 
yet the majority of Arab states constantly changed their position according to their 
wider international and regional interests which were largely linked to superpower 
politics as well as to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In general it is fair to say, as Pool noted, 
that ‘Arab support has not been as strong as western journalists have imagined.’48  
Egypt was one of the Arab countries with a particular interest in the territory as 
it had formerly possessed parts of it, namely the coastal area of Massawa. When the 
Four Powers decided on the future of Eritrea, Egypt was one of the powers claiming 
rights over its former possession, tracing the entitlement back to pre-Ottoman times. 
Referring back to assurances by the Italians that the dispatch of Italian troops to 
Massawa in 1885 was not to be seen as an act of seizure, Egypt was hoping that ‘she 
will be granted her request and that her historic rights to Massawah will be conceded.’49 
However, Egyptian claims did not play a substantial role in the negotiations over the 
disposal of Eritrea. Of greater importance to Eritrea in the negotiations over its future 
was neighbouring Sudan; proposals that the Western provinces of Eritrea should 
become part of the Sudan were suggested by the British and reflected their interests 
more than those of Sudan which had a traditionally close relationship with Ethiopia, the 
source of 80 per cent of its water.
50
 Furthermore, neither Egyptian claims over Eritrean 
territory nor the proposal to join the Western provinces with Sudan were ever endorsed 
by the Eritrean Muslim community as they did not reflect its nationalist aspirations.     
The Muslim states, together with the Latin American-French bloc, were the only 
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governments who strongly opposed Eritrean-Ethiopian federation during negotiations at 
the UN. Trevaski pointed out the possibility that discontented Eritrean Muslims might 
turn to their religious brothers in the Arab countries to gain support for their cause.
51
 In 
fact, numerous Eritrean nationalist leaders went into Arab exile, predominantly in Egypt 
and Sudan, where they received educational and military training. Yet, many chose 
exile in these countries largely because of the proximity to Eritrea independent of their 
own religious affiliation. The most prominent example was the Protestant Woldeab 
Woldemariam who affirmed that his choice to stay in Egypt, despite having the 
possibility of moving to Europe or the US, was predicated on the closeness of the 
country to Eritrea.
52
 However, the fact that most Muslim Eritreans also spoke Arabic 
certainly predisposed their choice of exile. Although Arabism may have been a binding 
force, it is questionable to what extent it actually influenced the identity of Eritrean 
Muslims. Wai ascribed the noticeable differences in the value systems of Africans and 
Arabs ‘as products of the social structures and environments’ and claimed that ‘the 
impact of European culture on Africans is considerably greater than the impact of Arab 
culture.’53 
The proximity of the exiles certainly facilitated the launch of the Eritrean 
liberation movements, and the newly-established ELF quickly adapted Pan-Arab 
rhetoric for their own use. In an attempt to weaken the growing nationalist movement in 
Egypt and to prevent decisive support from countries hosting Eritrean exiles, Haile 
Selassie went on an official state visit to Cairo in 1959. Yohannes claims that Nasser 
did not really care about Eritrean independence but rather saw his influence on the 
movement as some sort of bargaining tool for any dealings with Ethiopia.
54
 In fact, 
radio broadcasts into Eritrea by the nationalists were soon terminated and, although the 
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multi-communal Political Committee of the Eritrean People’s Legal Representatives 
Abroad was still financed privately by Egypt until 1963,
55
 the headquarters of the 
movement had to relocate to Syria after 1963. The change in Egypt’s official policy 
towards the Eritrean nationalists was linked to Nasser’s involvement in the OAU, which 
made him adhere to the principle of respecting colonial borders as interpreted by the 
organization. Other visits scheduled by Haile Selassie throughout the Middle East with 
the same aim turned out to be less successful.
56
 However, this has to be largely seen in 
the context of the strong Ethiopian link with Israel as well as the American presence and 
military installations in Eritrea.  
Spencer claims that the annexation of the Eritrean territory by Ethiopia in 1962 
resulted in ‘a redoubling of efforts by the Arab states, through propaganda, money and 
arms, to undermine that union’, which in turn accelerated accusations of the movement 
being instigated from abroad.
57
 However, it was rather the fact that support for the 
Eritrean cause could be garnered neither from the Western world nor from African 
countries that resulted in the Eritrean Muslim community turning towards the Arab 
countries. The fact that the ELF was initially dominated by a Muslim membership 
certainly facilitated the inscription of the Eritrean struggle within the pan-Arabist 
framework and the ELF leadership attempted to prove that historically ‘Eritrea was part 
of the Arab world’.58 However, this link was probably only sought to strengthen Arab 
support and, as one ex-fighter noted in an interview, ‘the Arab countries probably 
thought that Eritrea is an Arab country and for this reason they supported the 
independence struggle.’59 Pan-Arab support was also engendered by rhetorically 
equating the Eritrean uprising with the Palestinian struggle for independence and 
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linking   the   fight   against   Zionist   imperialism   to   the   fight   against   Ethiopian 
imperialism.
60 
Yet, the equation of the Eritrean with the Palestinian struggle was not 
based on religious or ‘Arab’ values; both struggles were rather viewed in the wider 
context of the struggle of suppressed peoples for the right to self-determination. Both 
Muslim and Christian Eritrean fighters were trained by Syrians and Iraqis in the field 
and abroad,
61  
yet the actual influence on the fighters in the field appears to have been 
‘very, very limited.’62 However, the interpretation of the liberation struggle as a Muslim 
 
and Arab movement was strongly opposed by the growing numbers of Christian recruits 
in the ELF and this contributed to a large part to the crisis of the organisation and the 
emergence of break-away groups in 1969/1970. Consequently, the ELF later moved to 
describe its relationship with the Arab nations in rather general terms as a ‘militant, 
organic, historical, and cultural one based on bonds of the joint destiny, mutual and 
common  interests,  and  solidarity  in  face  of  menace  and  aggression  of  Zionism, 
colonialism and imperialism and the agent forces.’
63
 
 
The Ethiopian-Israeli relationship was largely initiated by Ben-Gurion’s ‘Policy 
of the Periphery’ which aimed to form special relations with states on the edge of the 
Middle East.
64  
Yet it was also based on a similar perception of the two countries’ 
position in the region, thus seeing them as ‘natural allies’. Ethiopia considered itself ‘a 
Christian  society  surrounded  by  Muslim  Arab  nations’,  which  may  be  seen  as 
comparable  to  the  Israeli  position  as  only non-Arab  country in  the Middle East.
65
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Moreover, the two countries also felt linked to each other historically as ‘an ancient 
colony of Ethiopian Jews [had existed] dating back to biblical times’, and the 
Ethiopians traced their history back to ‘the love affair between their Queen of Sheba and 
the Hebrew’s King Solomon, producing Ethiopia’s first monarch, Menelik I.’66 The 
establishment of an independent Eritrea was opposed by Israel not only for reasons of 
solidarity, but also for fear that a pro-Arab Eritrea might blockade the Bab al-Mandeb 
strait which would greatly harm Israel’s economy. This worry was not unfounded since 
the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), which had close ties to Marxist 
Palestinian guerrillas, ‘had declared its intention of closing the Bab el-Mandab to Israeli 
navigation already in 1967.’67 After the Six-Day War, the Red Sea was used more 
extensively by Israeli shipping and this only increased the Arab desire to maintain its 
influence over the Eritrean coast. Moreover, Ethiopia’s close relationship with Israel 
and the presence of Israeli military advisors in Addis Ababa actually contributed to the 
ELF securing Arab support since it came to be seen as a liberation movement fighting a 
pro-Israeli regime and Israeli attempts to use Eritrea as a base for its war against the 
Arab world.
68
 Arab aid, especially from the Syrian Ba’ath regime, increased at the 
beginning of 1968 ‘and Damascus radio broadcast daily ELF propaganda.’69  
With the shift of superpower allies after the 1974 revolution, the Israeli-
Ethiopian relationship changed decisively, yet Israel continued to try to reforge an 
alliance mainly because of its connection to Ethiopian Jewry. The regime change in 
Ethiopia also altered relations with a number of Arab countries and directly influenced 
the nature of Arab support for the Eritrean nationalists. Throughout its early years, the 
ELF had been supported by Sudan which ‘provided the ELF with essential facilities 
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such as staging bases, supply depots for smuggled arms and shelter from the Ethiopian 
army.’70 Yet this support was inconsistent since it strongly depended on Sudan’s own 
internal political developments. Sudan feared that Ethiopia might use the rebels in South 
Sudan for retaliation and that the Eritrean struggle might serve as a precedent for these 
rebels: as a result, Sudan was cautious about its level of direct support for the Eritrean 
nationalists.
71
 After Nimery seized power in 1969, the new regime in Sudan tried to 
establish a friendlier relationship with Ethiopia, and the first civil war in Sudan was 
brought to an end with the signing of an agreement by the two warring parties in Addis 
Ababa; ‘but the regimes in Addis Ababa and Khartoum remained alert to opportunities 
to undermine one another.’72 The short détente between the two countries was finally 
crushed by the Dergue’s collaboration with Libya that had previously supported the 
Eritrean liberation movement but was willing to trade support in exchange for 
permission to use Ethiopian territory to stage the overthrow of the Sudanese President 
Jafaar Nimery in July 1976.
73
 The failure of the Libyan attempt and the Ethiopian 
involvement led to Nimery reconsidering his neutrality concerning the Eritrean 
independence struggle and his offering of full support to the liberation movement. 
While the relationship of the ELF with Arab countries had initially been largely 
based on the emphasis of common religion and ‘Arab-ness’, it was decisively different 
with the emerging break-away groups that were to develop into the EPLF. The new 
coalition was still benefitting from Arab support through its collaboration with Osman 
Saleh Sabbe, yet it dismissed viewing the Eritrean liberation struggle in a Pan-Arab 
context from the beginning. It rather stressed that the alignment with the Middle East 
anti-imperialistic front only came about due to the physical proximity to the Arab world 
and the understanding of the liberation struggle as part of the world-wide anti-
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imperialist struggle. It emphasized that ‘when we line up in the struggle together with 
our Arab comrades, it is only because of our revolutionary conviction and the dictate of 
our strategic relationship, and not because we are Arabs or Moslems.
74
 Accordingly, 
‘smashing’ Israeli Zionism was one of the objectives of the EPLF along with combating 
the global imperialism of the United States.
75
 This anti-Western position changed after 
the second EPLF congress in 1987 due to the conviction that a diplomatic offensive 
towards the West would be more useful to the Eritrean cause.  
Overall, while Arab support was at least partly based on the belief in a religious 
bond and a common Arab identity, for the Eritreans this collaboration had 
predominantly practical reasons. Arab financial and political support was vital for the 
independence struggle but it did not have any substantive impact on the formation of 
Eritrean national identity; one reason for this may have been the continually shifting 
alliances of most Arab countries. Muslim and Arab elements had existed in Eritrea for 
centuries and remained an important part of the country’s identity yet these ethnic and 
religious markers never became primary bases of Eritrean national identity.   
 
LEBANON 
The geostrategic position of Lebanon  
Discourse on Lebanese identity has always seen a lively discussion surrounding the fact 
that Lebanon is located at the crossroads of East and West. Bustani asserted that this 
‘unique status as a bridgehead’ between the Arab states and the West had been 
recognized and appreciated by the Arabs as it helped them to maintain good relations 
with Western nations.
76
 In Lebanon itself, this expression was used predominantly to 
emphasise the unique identity and ideology of the country yet it also hinted at the 
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geostrategic importance of the location of the territory. This strategic importance of the 
Levant states (Lebanon and Syria) had been highlighted towards the end of the Second 
World War by Sir Edward Spears who called the Levant ‘the most important theatre in 
the world’ apart from Britain.77 This view was largely based on the potential threat to 
British control over the Suez Canal and Egypt since the British military stationed in 
Alexandria ‘could not […] [have] held out […] under air attack from the Levant.’78
 
The military importance of the territory was recognized by the US for exactly 
this reason, Lebanon’s shoreline potential for air bases. Due to already existing lines of 
communications and bases, the country was considered important for ‘a forward defense 
in the Middle East’.79 In addition, its geographical location endowed Lebanon with a 
certain economic importance since the majority of oil pipelines from the Persian Gulf 
area and Iraq terminated at the Lebanese ports of Beirut and Tripoli.  
The territory thus was of great interest to a number of external actors, yet the 
governments of independent Lebanon displayed a relative inability to formulate a clear 
and independent foreign policy. This inability can be traced back to the lack of a 
cohesive national identity that would allow for a uniform policy in general. As Salame 
formulated:  
 
Sects and political parties have different foreign policies: they use their relations with foreign 
powers to strengthen their positions on the local scene, creating a fertile ground for foreign 
interference and ignoring that in this way they may destroy their country’s independence and 
jeopardize its national unity.
80
 
 
 
In fact, Lebanon never had a central government strong enough to develop and 
implement an unequivocal foreign policy. The National Pact of 1943 did not provide 
clear definition on the orientation of foreign policy; on the contrary, it left a lot of room 
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for interpretation which resulted in relations with the West and solidarity with the Arab 
world remaining highly controversial issues from 1943 onwards. Furthermore, the 
Lebanese political system left the country highly susceptible to external influences. To 
solve this dilemma, successive Lebanese governments officially proclaimed a policy of 
neutrality and non-alignment and, especially after the 1958 crisis, ‘extreme restraint was 
the keynote of Lebanese foreign policy.’81 Speaking at the seventh non-alignment 
summit in 1983, Amine Gemayel described Lebanon’s non-alignment policy as ‘the 
cornerstone of the Lebanese State, and indeed […] one of the reasons for its 
existence.’82 Furthermore, non-alignment was considered essential to ‘ensure[s] her 
security and promote[s] her internal unity.’83
 
Although this policy of non-alignment was presented as part of the Lebanese 
identity, it was tested numerous times throughout Lebanon’s independence history, 
especially in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict.  
 
Lebanon and superpower interests in the Middle East  
Despite Lebanon’s internationally important strategic position, the country was mainly 
influenced by regional events and actors until the mid-1950s; it was a regional 
development - the run-up to the Suez crisis - that not only exposed the internal dispute 
over foreign policy matters but also saw the US become directly involved in the 
conflict. In Lebanon, the ongoing power struggle between a pro-Western government 
and the pro-Arab opposition exacerbated the impact of regional and international 
developments which, in turn, contributed directly to further deepening the already 
existing conflict inside the country. The highly polarized international system during the 
Cold War only intensified the Lebanese situation, and all actions by the US and the 
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Soviet Union have to be examined within this context. Nasser’s rise to power and the 
expansion of his influence in the region developed into a major concern for the US since 
‘Arab nationalism was seen as the enemy and its policy of non-alignment as a tacit 
alliance with the Soviet camp.’84 To counter this development, the strengthening of 
Lebanese authorities became part of the US strategy in the region that due to its 
geostrategic location could serve as a ‘bridgehead’ for a potential military intervention 
in the region.
85
 
The American position agreed with the Lebanese government under Sham’un 
who also considered Arab nationalism a threat to regional order. The growing influence 
of Arab nationalism and the run-up to the Suez crisis required taking a stand and on 15 
January 1951, the Lebanese cabinet ‘unanimously decided henceforward to align their 
policy with that of the Western democracies.’86 This would also include making 
facilities such as ports and aerodromes available to Western democracies in exchange 
for defence agreements.
87
 Sham’un tried not only to manipulate Cold War rivalries to 
gain economically and politically but also to keep domestic opposition in check. 
Furthermore, ‘he saw in the Cold War a golden opportunity to put Lebanon on the map 
and avoid marginalization’.88 The Soviet Union also tried to make use of the turbulent 
situation in the region throughout the 1950s, and to gain influence amongst the pan-
Arab camp. As Bustani noted:  
 
Her emissaries and propagandists sought everywhere in the Arab world to peddle Communism 
under the guise of Arab nationalism; to worsen the already disturbed relations between the Arab 
countries and the West, and to assist any potential saboteur of stability who might, even 
unwittingly, advance the Communist cause of world subjugation to Moscow. She posed as a 
lifelong friend of the Arab peoples, carefully omitting to recall the important part she had played 
in the creation of Israel, and succeeded in making the Middle East the foremost arena in the cold 
war.
89
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The pro-Western attitude of the Lebanese government alienated not only pan-Arab 
states such as Egypt and Syria, but also the Muslim pan-Arab opposition in Lebanon. 
Since the Arab nationalist cause was aligned with Communism, this brought the Cold 
War directly into the Lebanese equation. In Lebanon itself, Communism did not play a 
decisive role; people adhered to Nasser’s Arab nationalism on a cultural and religious 
basis rather than on an ideological one inspired by Communism. Furthermore, the 
Soviet Union was not really interested in Lebanon itself but rather concentrated its 
influence on Egypt and Syria.
90
 However, the different alignment of the Lebanese 
communities with either side of the conflict reinforced opposed nationalist aspirations 
and decisively shattered any form of cohesive national identity. 
Supporting Lebanon openly posed a dilemma to the US since it could never go 
as far as to confront Syria and Egypt directly and thereby risk provoking a much wider 
confrontation with the USSR. Yet the US decisively supported Sham’un financially 
through the CIA in the 1957 elections, to such an extent that the CIA station chief in 
Beirut at the time, Wilbur Crane Eveland, in his autobiography claimed that the US 
effectively ‘bought’ Sham’un a parliament.91 Despite not wanting to risk a confrontation 
with the Soviet Union in the region, backing Sham’un was considered important since 
‘Western failure to support him will have repercussions among all the most moderate 
and responsible friends and allies of the West in the Middle East Area. Chamoun has 
come to symbolize to them the forces of resistance to Nasser.’92 The funding of his 
elections had thus been authorized by the US authorities because there was ‘increasing 
evidence of massive Syrian and Egyptian aid to the armed bands now endeavouring to 
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take control of the country.’93 
While Bustani asserted that ‘Lebanon is not, and has never been, a neutral in the 
cold war’ since it ‘has stronger reasons than any other Arab country to remain on good 
terms with the so called “imperialists”’,94 the Lebanese government’s strategy in 1957 
was clearly aimed at internationalising the internal dispute and at achieving American 
involvement through the transformation of ‘purely local feuds [...] into international 
crisis.’95
 
Sham’un tried to manipulate the US to consolidate its own power. Yet this 
manipulation appeared mutual to some extent since when the US finally intervened 
militarily in the conflict it was not primarily to support the Lebanese government. 
Rather the reasoning behind the intervention was specifically a reaction to the coup 
d’état in Baghdad in July 1958. By intervening in Lebanon the US ‘wanted to signal to 
their adversaries their readiness to use force, if necessary, to arrest the further crumbling 
of the Arab conservative order.’96 At the same time, Lebanon’s importance in terms of 
Cold War politics had diminished greatly by the late 1950s, especially because the 
Soviet Union did not have an interest in Lebanon per se. In that respect, both 
superpowers agreed that Lebanon itself was not important enough to justify a wider 
confrontation in the region.  
For Lebanon though, adherence to the Eisenhower doctrine in 1958 meant that 
the country linked itself solely to the support of the US and the country turned into ‘the 
center of America’s presence in the Arab East’ before its descent into civil war in 
1975.
97
 Internally, alliance with the US only worsened the divide between the opposing 
camps which now expressed ever more different understandings of Lebanese national 
identity. Lebanese Muslims felt that the ‘Arab face’ of the country, as agreed upon in 
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the National Pact, had been betrayed by the Lebanese government and American 
intervention in the country. This was considered an attack against their very identity by 
their own government that clearly adhered more to a Maronite understanding of 
Lebanese identity by putting alliance with the West first. Enraged Muslim 
demonstrators even ‘trampled the Lebanese flag in the streets of Tyre’.98 
Lebanon’s importance to the superpowers changed after the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
war. The US became Israel’s main strategic partner and Hudson argues that henceforth 
Lebanon’s importance to American interests was largely linked to the fact that it shared 
a border with Israel; consequently ‘Lebanon could hardly be of less than vital political 
if not strategic interest for any American government.’99 Soviet interest also increased 
when PLO fighters started their war of resistance against Israel from Lebanese territory. 
The fighters looked to the Soviets for arms and military training, partly through Soviet-
backed Syria. The fact that the PLO was fighting Israel from Lebanese territory also had 
repercussions for the pro-Western elements in Lebanon and their relationship with the 
US. Since the latter was one of Israel’s staunchest supporters, it urged the pro-Western 
governments under Helou and Franjieh to contain the guerrilla activities on its territory. 
All superpower attitudes towards Lebanon, especially during the early stages of the civil 
war, were based on the basic premise of not letting the conflict spread to other countries 
in the region.
100
 This approach would change after the end of Cold War détente and the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.  
The deteriorating situation in the country during the early stages of the civil war 
and the entanglement of external forces in the conflict turned the situation increasingly 
chaotic and strengthened the American perception that ‘in many ways Lebanon is not 
really a country’ and that ‘virtually all the elements of instability are contained in that 
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small, narrow and unhappy land.’101 The American administration of 1981 was aware 
that an intervention would probably be needed to end the conflict, yet the situation was 
much more complicated than in 1958 when US military intervention in support of the 
Lebanese government helped to resolve the crisis. It was feared that the war in Lebanon 
could ignite another Arab-Israeli conflict which would have decisively harmed Western 
interests in the entire region. This perception was not farfetched and was based on the 
fact that the civil war was fuelled by both Syria and Israel who considered Lebanon a 
base for either attacking or being attacked by the other.
102
 The US agreement to 
contribute to the multinational peacekeeping force in 1982
 
has to be understood as a 
means of damage control which the US only agreed to because it was both multinational 
and a peacekeeping mission, and bore no similarity to the American involvement in 
Lebanon in 1958. US mediation efforts also led to the signing of the short-lived 17 May 
agreement in 1983 which was considered rather ‘curious’ and ‘nullified from the start’ 
by American officials and quickly faltered.
103
 However, renewed American 
involvement in Lebanon fuelled the Lebanese Maronite elite’s perception of their 
country’s vital importance to the US. Amine Gemayel asserted that, after the 
redeployment of the MNF to Lebanon, the country was ‘one of their priorities in foreign 
policy with all that this implies in terms of exceptional means’.104 Additionally, the idea 
of Lebanon being a ‘key in the region’, meaning that ‘if she is stable, so will the region 
be stable’, was also propagated by the Lebanese government in order to maintain 
international support.
105
 
The stand-off between Soviet-supported Syria and US-backed Israel on 
Lebanese territory directly located the Cold War frontline in Lebanon. The fact that both 
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Israel and Syria, and both superpowers, wanted to avoid escalation and direct 
confrontation on Lebanese territory had resulted in the so-called ‘red line agreement’ of 
1976; this agreement also remained intact after the Israeli invasion in 1982.
106
 Gemayel 
recognized the fundamental role of both superpowers in the region; he considered the 
Soviet Union an important actor in bringing about a possible peace conference for the 
entire region, noting that ‘the attitude of Moscow was often found to be paradoxically 
favorable to the Lebanese position, and the Soviet ambassador did not fail to let us 
know this.’107
 
Consequently Gemayel tried to maintain contact with the Soviet Union 
but at a much lower level than with the US.  
Superpower interests in Lebanon were predominantly related to the wider Cold 
War context and to the fact that the country constituted a sort of ‘buffer-zone’ between 
the main allies of the superpowers in the region. Yet, since the opposing politics of the 
superpowers, as well as their allies, were intrinsically linked to existing divisions within 
Lebanese society, they negatively impacted any possible formation of a cohesive 
national identity.  
 
The Arab states, Israel and the Palestinian factor in Lebanon  
Apart from the special relationship with its neighbour Syria, Lebanon’s relationships 
with other Arab countries were often problematic, due in large part to the plurality of 
identities and their respective interests within Lebanon; this resulted in the absence of a 
unified foreign policy that would have facilitated engagement with Lebanon as a nation. 
Lebanon’s adopted policy of non-alignment and neutrality created major problems when 
dealing with other Arab states, as well as with pro-Arab elements within the country. 
This was also reflected in diverging views on the function of organizations of Arab 
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cooperation such as the Arab League. Although Lebanon was one of the founding 
members of the Arab League on 22 March 1945, for the Lebanese Christian population 
this was purely a matter of cooperation with other states; support for the League 
amongst non-pro-Arab elements in Lebanon was facilitated by the fact that the purpose 
of the Arab League was for member states ‘to safeguard their independence and 
sovereignty’.108 In fact, member states of the League voiced heavy criticism of French 
actions in both Lebanon and Syria in 1945, considering them attempts by the French to 
preserve ‘dictatorship’ in these countries.109 Yet, Hanf asserts that the Lebanese Muslim 
community considered membership in the League ‘a step towards integration’, at least 
by those parts of the Muslim population that still hoped for a re-integration into a 
Greater Syria.
110
 In fact, because they saw their identity as intrinsically linked to the 
Arab world, cooperation with other Arab states constituted a logical extension of their 
definition of Lebanese national identity.   
Official Lebanese policy towards Arab states was based on neutrality, yet the 
politics of the various communities varied depending on their understanding of 
Lebanese identity. Consequently, those communities who saw themselves as Arabs 
strove for an active pro-Arab policy. The position of the Arab states towards Lebanon 
was heavily influenced by the Palestinian cause, especially after the PLO moved its 
headquarters into Lebanese territory. Initially, all Lebanese communities’ attitude 
towards the Palestinian cause was quite supportive, especially before 1948. As Longrigg 
notes, the frequent outbreaks of violent resistance by the local Palestinian population to 
increased settlement policies by the Zionist movement in Palestine evoked sympathy 
within the Lebanese population and found expression not only in demonstrations and 
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public donations, but sometimes even saw volunteers from Lebanon joining the 
resistance movement in Palestine. While the French authorities were attempting to 
prevent all such activities during the mandate period, ‘the Syrian and Lebanese 
authorities, at every level, gave all support within their power to Arab brothers.’111 
However, the situation quickly changed after the founding of Israel and the first Arab-
Israeli war in 1948. The Arab-Israeli conflict, and the plight of the Palestinian refugees 
had a divisive impact on Lebanon, even though, or probably especially because, the 
Lebanese government tried to avoid direct involvement in the conflict after the 
Lebanese-Israeli armistice of 1949.
112
 This policy was based on the fact that Lebanon, 
as a small, young independent state was still struggling with its own institutions and 
question of national identity. However, this was a rather short-sighted policy given 
Lebanon’s proximity to Israel which made neutrality in the conflict difficult to maintain. 
Of course, the problem was aggravated by the fact that a large number of Palestinian 
refugees came to Lebanon as a result of the 1948 and the 1967 wars. On the regional 
level, the presence of the Palestinian guerrilla forces in Lebanese territory also 
heightened Arab interest in Lebanon. Since the Palestinian struggle was considered an 
Arab cause, attempts by the Lebanese army to crack down on the guerrilla groups 
operating from Lebanese territory led to retaliations by Arab guerrillas operating from 
Syria into Lebanon. These attacks resulted in a number of casualties in the Lebanese 
army and were declared to be understood as a warning by Palestinian guerrilla forces 
and their Arab supporters. So, instead of Israeli retaliations, which the Lebanese 
authorities wanted to prevent by not allowing guerrilla operations from their territory, 
they had to deal with retaliatory attacks from Arab guerrillas. The fact that the attacks 
came from Syrian territory also played an important role since it ‘underscored Syria’s 
role as key foe of Lebanon’s attempt to steer a militarily neutral course in the Arab-
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Israeli conflict.’113
 
Furthermore, the policy was partially supported by pro-Arab 
Lebanese who considered loyalty to Lebanon and the Palestinian and Arab causes as 
intrinsically linked to each other as expressed by a Lebanese guerrilla leader: ‘We are 
protecting our honor – the honor of the Lebanese, the Palestinians and all Arabs [...] We 
carry the Lebanese flag as well as the Palestinian flag.’114  
Expectations of a pro-Arab Lebanese foreign policy also destroyed Lebanon’s 
relationship with a number of Arab states in the wake of the 1958 crisis. The UAR was 
disappointed with Sham’un’s pro-Western policy and ‘the authorities in Damascus 
exploited the situation and made it more violent than it need have been’.115 The massive 
UAR interference in Lebanon helped the country gain some support amongst a number 
of moderate Arab states, especially Jordan whose King Hussein publicly avowed his 
support for the Sham’un government, which he considered represented the ‘right cause’ 
and ‘democracy’.116 Sympathy and support for Sham’un’s government was also voiced 
by other countries belonging to the Baghdad Pact such as Iraq, Iran and Turkey.
117
 
Bustani argued though, that the 1958 crisis and the American intervention in Lebanon 
‘put the clock of Lebanese progress towards Arab Federation back by several 
decades.’118 In fact, the influence of Cold War politics in the region also contributed to 
the decline of Lebanon’s relationship with Arab nationalist countries. The Lebanese 
government was keen to maintain its traditionally good relationship with Western 
countries, mainly the US, whereas most Arab nationalist countries turned to the Soviet 
Union for support to counter the strength of the Israeli-American relationship.  
As Kirsten Schulze revealed in her study on Israeli covert diplomacy in 
Lebanon, there also existed an important, yet secret, link between members of the 
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Maronite community and Israel. Even before 1948, the Maronites were considered a 
possible ally by Israel as they represented another large religious minority in the 
predominantly Muslim area; there was a similar perception amongst the Maronite 
clergy, some of whom actually proposed an Israeli-Maronite minority-alliance.
119
  
As early as 1953, the Muslims of Lebanon voiced their concern over Maronite-
Israeli relations and requested ‘to stop absolutely all secret trade with the Zionist forces 
in Palestine’120 This demand was based on ongoing rumours of Maronite-Israeli 
cooperation which exacerbated religious tensions in the country:  
 
The former Maronite Archbishop of Beirut, Monsignor Ignatius Mubarak, has always been noted 
for his favouring the Israelis against the Arabs and for his statements which are sometimes so 
indiscreet as to embarrass even the Maronite clique, which is not yet ready to defy the Arab 
world openly. He has made statements which indicated to the UN committee of enquiry on 
Palestine that he favors the founding of the political Zionist state of Israel as an additional 
protection to the Christian minorities of the Middle East against the Moslems.
121
 
 
In order not to upset the Muslim communities of the country, any relationship had to 
remain covert; yet the Lebanese Muslim communities were aware of the collaboration 
and, because of their pro-Arab stance, this contributed to heightening the mistrust 
between the communities even further. 
 
 In fact, Lebanon’s descent into civil war resulted in the positions of the Arab 
states and Lebanese actors becoming even more rigid. During the civil war, perceptions 
of Israel as a ‘natural ally’ in a ‘Muslim sea’ were openly propagated in pamphlets by 
some of the extremist Maronite nationalists groups and parties, such as the Guardians of 
the Cedar (Hizb Huruz al-Arz).
122
 The fact that the 1982 invasion was preceded by 
Israel’s covert relations with the Phalange, designed to bring a government under 
Bashir Gemayel to power, contributed to deepen sectarian resentments. Jumblatt noted 
that the ‘Phalange and its allies are setting up a Maronite Haganah; their ambition is to 
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carve up Lebanon and establish a Christian state on the lines of the Zionist entity.’123 In 
fact, the diaries of David Ben Gurion and Moshe Sharett, Israel’s first and second Prime 
Ministers, have revealed long-held plans to overthrow the multi-religious state of 
Lebanon and ‘create a Christian regime that will ally itself with Israel.’124 The ongoing 
civil war in Lebanon and the long covert cultivation of the Phalange appeared to 
provide circumstances conducive to the final realisation of this plan while, at the same 
time, ensuring the expulsion of the PLO from its border areas.   
Israeli relations with the Lebanese Maronite elites and the Phalange party were 
largely facilitated by the fact that many of them still considered their identity linked to 
their religious and communal affiliations rather than the concept of a multi-communal 
Lebanon. Furthermore, Arab governments were accused of sponsoring the PLO and 
thereby undermining Lebanese sovereignty and letting the country slide into civil war 
despite the Council of Arab Foreign Ministers’ 1975 declaration of ‘the concern of all 
the Arab countries for the sovereignty of Lebanon and the unity of her territory and 
people’ and the request that each Arab country ‘do all in its power to consolidate 
Lebanon's stability and national unity.
125
 However, considering the Palestinian factor in 
the outbreak of the hostilities and the scope of Arab support for the PLO, the civil war 
actually came to be viewed by many Lebanese as a basically regional and Arab conflict 
that was fought on Lebanese territory.
126
 The Arab world was considered collectively 
responsible for the outbreak of violence and the fact that there was no loud outcry from 
the Arab states in the face of the occupation of an Arab capital, Beirut, by Israeli forces 
in 1982 further contributed to this perception.
127
 At the same time, the search for 
supporting external allies by various communities in Lebanon coupled with the strategic 
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importance of the country all advanced the use of the Lebanese arena for proxy wars. 
This was proven by the fact that of twenty-six distinct confrontations only nine were 
primarily inter-Lebanese, and six did not involve any Lebanese parties.
128
 While the 
Lebanese political system and the unresolved issue over the identity of the country 
together with the lack of a coherent foreign policy had made these external interventions 
possible in the first place, they also reinforced sectarian divisions.
 
 
CONCLUSION  
This chapter has shown that both Eritrea and Lebanon were of interest to regional and 
international powers due to their strategic importance. While their respective 
geostrategic positions – on the Red Sea and on the Mediterranean - influenced nascent 
national identity formation in both countries, regional and international interests after 
the departure of the colonial/mandate powers contributed to the consolidation of 
specific national identities, but in very different ways.  
In the case of Eritrea, it was largely the absence of support and non-recognition 
of the right to self-determination that impacted the formation of national identity. 
Superpower interests in the Horn of Africa were almost exclusively satisfied through 
alliances with Ethiopia because both the US and the USSR were convinced that Eritrea 
was part of Ethiopia and did not constitute a nation in itself. Furthermore, the Soviet 
Union saw its interests in the region secured through its alliance with Somalia to 
counter the US-Ethiopian relationship. Even though the Soviet Union provided some 
indirect support at times, it never exceeded a level that would jeopardize any possibility 
of a later Soviet-Ethiopian alliance. In fact, when such an alliance materialized under 
the new Ethiopian regime in the mid-1970s, Eritrean nationalists simply saw American 
military support for Ethiopia replaced by Russian support. This enhanced Eritrean 
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perceptions of international disregard for their cause and strengthened their belief that 
only through national unity, based on a cohesive identity, could they emerge from the 
struggle successfully. Eritrean liberation movements’ relations with various Arab states 
were also intrinsically linked to existing alliances between Ethiopia, the US and Israel. 
Although a religious and linguistic bond existed between the Arab states and the 
initially Muslim-dominated Eritrean nationalist movement, Arab support was not 
consistent and always depended on their wider regional interests while the Eritrean 
movements regarded their relationship with the Arab states as a means to the end of 
their larger strategic interests. Consequently, these relationships with Arab states did not 
have a decisive impact on the formation of an Arabic Eritrean national identity; rather 
the independence movement utilized the Muslim aspect of identity to generate regional 
support.  
The Lebanese case proved to be decisively different in terms of the influence of 
superpower politics and the Arab world/Israel on the formation of Lebanese national 
identity. The US, the Soviet Union and their regional allies all failed to directly 
influence the national identity of the country; popular attitudes towards these external 
powers were actually determined by pre-existing and highly oppositional perceptions of 
Lebanese identity. The active involvement of the US in the country especially divided 
opinion related to the question of national identity; these divisions were moreover 
exacerbated by a Lebanese political system that made manipulation by outside powers 
possible in the first place. The Lebanese government was weary of this problem and, as 
a result, tried to adopt a policy of neutrality. However this neutrality was only extended 
towards Arab countries and this upset the pro-Arab elements who resented the state’s 
bias towards non-Arab powers. Various communities in Lebanon maintained 
relationships with different external actors who were often in opposition to each other 
and this discord resulted in the use of Lebanese territory for proxy wars. Consequently, 
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the lack of a coherent unified foreign policy reinforced differences and inhibited the 
development of a cohesive national identity. 
While this chapter has examined the external influences that impacted the 
formation of national identity in Eritrea and Lebanon, the next chapter will look at an 
internal factor generally considered as playing an essential role in the process of 
socialization and forming a cohesive national identity: education.
268 
 
Chapter 7 – Education: Shaping or breaking national identity?  
The belief in a common history and myths together with a shared set of values and 
norms is widely considered one of the key factors in ensuring social cohesion and the 
development of a sense of belonging and national identity. Education not only plays an 
important part in the process of socialization of children but also serves to transfer 
knowledge of such common history and myths. As such, it has to be considered as 
contributing decisively to the process of ‘imaginative construction’ of the nation and a 
shared national identity.
1
 It can further play a role in social and economic development 
and/or change which also constitutes an important factor in the process of national 
identity formation.
2
 This is because education – through both the official curriculum and 
the ‘hidden curriculum’ – often not only aims at the reproduction of culture, but also of 
class relations, race and gender. All these together contribute to the formation of 
national consciousness and identity.  
Theorists of cultural politics of education generally affirm that schools function 
‘to inscribe particular rationalities into the sensibilities, dispositions, and awarenesses 
[sic] of individuals to make them conform to a single set of imaginaries about culture 
and national citizenship’3; yet, this is not always viewed positively since schools can 
also be used by dominant groups for the indoctrination of their culture and beliefs, 
thereby exerting social control over a society. Taking into account Marxist positions on 
education, Carnoy argues that education cannot only be used to dominate another group, 
but also constitute the outcome of the struggle for domination. In this case, education is 
viewed as a means to instil ‘universally accepted rules and regulations’4 in order to 
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avoid a struggle amongst the individuals forming the state. Hence, to him, education is 
also part of the state and ‘an expression of the consensual social mood, also subject to 
conflict, but a conflict which is acted out in the context of democratic decision-making 
and individual choice as to how much and what kind of education and training to take.’5 
Such a statement obviously refers to countries with a strong central state and democratic 
institutions. In fact, in such cases the role of the political system and the government 
sector can hardly be separated from the educational sector. Gellner has pointed out that 
because of the size of educational infrastructure and the costs linked to it, ‘only the state 
can sustain so large a burden, only the state is also strong enough to control so 
important and crucial a function.’6 Therefore, even in countries where large parts of the 
educational sector are covered by private and/or religious institutions, the state is 
generally in charge of controlling not only the quality of education but also the 
application of a curriculum that is not detrimental to the state and the cohesion of its 
society.  
Tawil affirms that in the European context it was ‘[i]ndeed, compulsory, 
standardized, public schooling [that] played a crucial part in the emergence, 
construction and consolidation of the nation-state.’7 However, he also notes the 
detrimental effect that education can have when it mirrors or enhances existing 
cleavages, or is used as ‘an ideological vehicle for political socialization.’8 In that case, 
it rather works against social cohesion and can fuel hostilities and violence. A UNICEF 
study identified the detrimental effects of education with regard to social integration and 
cohesion in cases of   
 
[…] uneven distribution of education; education as a weapon in cultural repression; denial of 
education as a weapon of war; the manipulation of history for political purposes; the 
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manipulation of textbooks; and segregated education that tends to reinforce inequality, lower 
self-esteem, and stereotyping.
9
 
 
The danger of such ‘abuse’ of education appears much higher in less developed 
countries and in states with heterogeneous or multi-communal societies - which 
includes most post-colonial/-mandate states. Especially when uneven socio-economic 
development results in exclusion from education, it can lead to the development or 
enhancement of differential identities contesting a unified national identity.  
This chapter examines the growth of the education sector in Eritrea and 
Lebanon, and analyses how it developed from systems of colonial/mandate education 
inculcating the cultures of the dominating European powers to promoting an 
independent and specifically national culture. In both cases, the main task was to build a 
curriculum and education system inclusive of all the communities of the country that 
ascribed not only to different religious beliefs but also to opposed interpretations of 
history and identity. It will argue that a completely inclusive education system did not 
develop in either of the two cases and that, therefore, the development of a syncretistic 
nationalism was undermined. 
  
ERITREA 
Education in colonial Eritrea  
Prior to the advent of Italian colonialism, education in the Eritrean territories did not 
take place within the framework of a state and was largely dominated by local religious 
institutions. Thus, secular content was limited and reading and writing was taught to a 
very limited group of people and primarily for the study of religious texts.
10
 By the end 
of the 19
th
 century, a few missionary schools had been established in the territory, most 
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notably by the Swedish Evangelic Mission near Massawa and by French Lazarists in 
Keren. As Schröder notes, these schools offered a quite modern, Western curriculum 
despite its religious content; yet their influence and appeal remained rather limited in 
pre-colonial Eritrea and their missionary zeal was viewed as unacceptable by the 
religious communities in the territory.
11
  
After the establishment of the colony of Eritrea by Italy, education came under 
the control of a single administration. While Italian approaches towards native 
education varied according to how the purpose of the colonial possession was viewed, 
they were generally marked by an attitude of superiority towards the local population 
and education was never a priority in Italian colonial politics. The little importance that 
was given to native education is reflected in the limited amount of archival material 
available.
12
 Unlike other European colonial powers, such as France, the Italians initially 
had little interest in ‘Italianizing’ or ‘culturally assimilating’ the native populations in 
their colonies. Considering the territories more as economic enterprises and areas to 
settle its own population, ‘the main motive for colonialism was not to civilize the native 
but to substitute him with the Italian.’13 Schools established to cater the needs of Italians 
and other Europeans in the territory were not open to the local population. As the Italian 
Governor Ferdinando Martini noted: 
 
[…] mixed schools for whites and blacks: no, no, and again no. The native child more agile and 
alert, has the intelligence of the white child; therefore avoid comparison. […] Schools for 
blacks? Is their establishment useful? We do not have the same conditions as the British in 
Kassala. We cannot use the natives in postal services for example, or telegraphic services. And it 
will be happy the day when we do not even need them as interpreters. [...] To stammer out some 
Italian, they can learn by themselves.
14 
 
Therefore, little importance was given to native education and schools for locals 
remained restricted to primary education. In general, schools were largely run by 
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Catholic missions, and Catholic priests ‘played a leading role’ while maintaining ‘good 
relationships with the colonial authorities’.15 While missionary schools received 
financial support, their importance lay in the fact that they kept the overall costs of 
educational institutions to the colonial authorities limited.   
 When Governor Salvago-Raggi succeeded Martini in 1907 the attitude towards 
native education changed and education of the local elites became considered necessary 
in order to recruit them for lower jobs in the colonial administration, yet the official 
policy of segregation established in 1905 remained. The first government school for 
locals was opened by Salvago-Raggi in Keren in 1911. It was limited to lower 
elementary education and followed a curriculum that was specifically and ad hoc 
designed for Eritrea by the Italian Foreign Office.
16
 Furthermore, the school in Keren 
was specifically aimed at the children of Muslim notables; other schools that opened in 
1914 in Segeneti and Addi Ugri targeted the Catholic and Orthodox communities. In 
line with the respective religious affiliation, Arabic or Tigrinya was used as the 
language of instruction as well as Italian.
17
 Pateman asserts that the introduction of 
separate languages of instruction enforced the separate development of Muslims and 
Christians, and he traces later divisions back to this period.
18
 It can, indeed, be 
considered as strengthening religious identities, especially within the linguistically 
rather diverse Muslim community, and enforcing differentiation from those of the other 
denomination. For the Italians though, the establishment of a uniform education system 
was mainly impeded by the make-up of the colony itself:  
 
It is not yet, nor will it probably ever be, possible to adopt a uniform school regulation, not only 
because of the wide diversity in the degree of civilization of the various races which inhabit 
Eritrea, but also because their prejudices and their century-old mutual antipathy do not permit 
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children of different race and religion to be educated in the same school. There would be needed 
as many groups of schools as there are races in Eritrea, each of which should have its own 
program of special instruction for particular cases.
19
 
 
Consequently, the few further schools that opened always targeted specific 
communities. Even after 1928, when Italian was established as the compulsory language 
of instruction by decree, the traditional missionary schools were allowed to continue 
teaching in native languages.
20
  
 With the emergence of the Fascist regime, the approach towards native 
education changed as, as the education officer for Libya and Eritrea, Andrea Festa put 
it, the next generation of local people ‘must understand Italy’s civilizing mission’.21 It 
was now considered essential to instil in them some sort of loyalty to the ‘motherland’; 
consequently, Italian textbooks were full of praise for Il Duce and lauded military 
service in the Italian army, clearly encouraging young Eritrean students to join.
22
 
Furthermore, textbooks focused mainly on Italian history and topics and as Negash 
rightfully notes, constituted ‘the classic colonial teaching aid […] with little knowledge 
of the cultural heritage of the inhabitants of the colony’.23 They were produced by the 
Ministry for the Colonies in both Italian and Arabic and replaced the previous textbooks 
that had been published in Asmara by the Catholic missionaries. By 1931, all schools in 
the territory were put under direct government supervision with the exception of 
Koranic schools and Coptic monasteries’ schools.24 
In general, education during the colonial period only had a limited impact on the 
Eritrean population and the development of national consciousness. This is due to the 
fact that it remained largely concentrated in the urban centres and enrolment figures 
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were always rather low, even though an overall increase can be seen in the fragmented 
archival material available. In the Muslim rural areas, schools were largely absent and 
the Muslim urban population was very small at only 27,000 people. As a consequence, 
quite a high percentage of the Muslim population remained illiterate.
25
 Furthermore, 
education remained virtually limited to the primary level and the strongest focus was on 
practical skills considered necessary for the material needs of the colony; agriculture, 
for example, was one of the main subjects of instruction. Even though two-year 
secondary school courses were established in Asmara in 1927, seven years later there 
were still only 38 students enrolled.
26
 Overall, education remained very elitist with 
colonial schools being ‘accessible at the most to 2 per cent of the school age 
population.’27 Nevertheless, it made Eritreans more eligible than local Ethiopians for 
administrative positions in the Italian East Africa Empire, and facilitated the emergence 
of a small politically conscious group of intellectuals that first gathered in the MFH, and 
which certainly did not have an equivalent in Ethiopia.  
 
Education during the BMA  
As with all aspects of its administration of Eritrea, the British approach towards 
education in the territory was largely guided by the goal of keeping the financial burden 
as low as possible. Therefore, of the schools that had been closed down during 
hostilities, initially only native elementary schools were re-opened.
28
 In January 1943, 
there were 28 primary schools including one girls’ school with 75 students. Eight of the 
schools were Muslim and teaching took place in Arabic.
29
 The main problem, the 
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recruitment of teachers, was addressed by increasing their status by granting them 
special privileges and a better salary. Furthermore, while teachers still had to ‘be 
recruited from the highways and by-ways’, the administration started special teacher 
training including demonstration lessons.
30
 A curriculum was also introduced in 1943 
that, as well as basic literacy, covered other subjects considered relevant for the 
population such as agriculture and woodwork.
31
 For books in Tigrinya, the 
administration initially resorted to the Medical Department’s pamphlets on hygiene, 
until new books were produced.
32
 For education in Arabic, it was first proposed to 
provide books from Sudan and to follow the example of British Somaliland, 
establishing a system of ‘grant-in-aid to Koranic schools’.33 Miran notes that more than 
a dozen Islamic religious institutions opened during the British administration which 
established a collaboration with the Al-Azhar University in Cairo and, thereby, secured 
financial assistance and trained teachers while adapting the Egyptian curricula.
34
 This 
certainly contributed to the transformation of the heterogeneous Muslim communities 
into a more unified group; yet, it also reinforced a certain level of differentiation from 
the non-Muslim communities in the territory.  
 However, financial assistance in the education sector was of great importance. 
While the British planned to introduce secondary education in the interests of the local 
population, many initiatives in the sector depended largely on costs for the institutions 
being shared. As the acting Chief Civil Affairs Officer of the War Office, Colonel 
Anderson, noted: 
 
In practically all the Eritrean schools the natives bear some part of the running costs. Certain 
schools have been built entirely at native expense and everywhere there is a keen desire to 
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cooperate with the authorities in providing more and better education. Native education in the 
territory is essentially a matter of helping those who help themselves.
35 
  
Despite the financial constraints, the number of schools in the territory increased; over 
one hundred primary and middle schools were introduced and two secondary schools 
established. The British themselves described the education system in Eritrea as 
‘perhaps the most constructive and most popular of our innovations.’36 Nevertheless, as 
the Report of the United Nations Commissioner for Eritrea noted in June 1950, as many 
as ‘70 per cent of the people are illiterate’ and ‘a little less than 10,000 Eritrean children 
attend school, which is approximately 6 per cent of the Eritrean population of school 
age’.37 While this was an improvement compared to the Italian colonial period, the 
number of people benefiting from the education system still remained limited. At the 
same time, together with the overall politicization taking place in the territory, it has to 
be considered essential in the development of a sizeable intelligentsia that was 
envisioned to continue education efforts in the autonomous Eritrean state. 
The constitution developed for Eritrea guaranteed the right to education, and 
both Tigrinya and Arabic were to be used for educational purposes. While the religious 
communities were also granted the right to maintain their educational institutions, a 
secular approach was introduced for governmental education. Article 29 of the 
constitution stated that ‘[n]o pupil attending a public school shall be required to take 
part in any religious instruction at such school or attend any religious service at such 
school.’38 In 1953, the Department of Education was founded and a Publications 
Committee tasked with the development of textbooks in Tigrinya. Textbooks in Arabic 
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continued to be imported from Egypt.
39
  
While an education system had been established in Eritrea and textbooks were 
available, the lack of the latter left teaching in Ethiopia ‘virtually […] up to the 
teachers.’40 Even though a stronger emphasis was put on education, and the number of 
schools in Ethiopia decisively increased between 1952 and 1955, the standard of 
education in Eritrea would make the territory stand out in the federation. 
 
Education under Ethiopian control  
During the first few years of federation ‘education was at its best in Eritrea’.41 It was 
extended to the rural areas and two secondary schools were added to the already 
existing levels of primary and middle schools. In 1954, a vocational trade school was 
opened in Asmara.
42
 While the latter was partly funded by Ethiopia, the undermining of 
the autonomous institutions by the federal authorities also affected the education sector.  
The Muslim community in Eritrea in particular quickly felt discriminated against 
when the federal government declared the imposition of Amharic as the sole language 
of instruction. In a memorandum submitted by the Moslem Mosques Committee on 21 
May 1956 to the Eritrean government specific reference was made to article 31 of the 
Eritrean constitution and the government was reminded that it ‘should encourage the 
Moslem students to have instructions in Arabic language’ and that qualified teachers 
should be provided ‘in order to enable the Moslem students to have their high education 
in their own language’.43 However, Christian students and teachers were equally 
opposed to the imposition of Amharic which resulted in a number of strikes from 1956 
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onwards, which spread from the Prince Makonnen Secondary School and the Haile 
Selassie I Secondary School in Asmara all over the country. As discussed earlier, these 
strikes quickly turned into a general condemnation of Ethiopian politics in the territory. 
With reference to the strikes starting from predominantly Christian schools attended by 
children of prominent Unionists, the American Consul in Asmara noted that ‘the initial 
attempt of the Ethiopians to recruit and educate a loyal group of young Eritreans in their 
own schools in Eritrea appears to be counterproductive. Instead of producing Unionist 
advocators, they appear so far to have fostered the growth of a group of young Turks.’44 
Strikes followed all Ethiopian acts of undermining the autonomous status of 
Eritrea such as the placing of the schools under the jurisdiction of the Ethiopian 
Education Department in 1960, and the abrogation of the federation in 1962. A new 
curriculum for elementary schools was implemented in 1963 supporting the policy of 
‘Amharization’ and aimed at socialising children as Ethiopians from early on. The 
Eritrean Publications Committee was officially abolished and all schoolbooks and 
literature in Tigrinya and Arabic were burnt.
45
 The obligation to teach in Amharic 
created a huge problem for Eritrean teachers and a number of them were forced into 
early retirement or had to do menial jobs in schools and offices.
46
 To replace them and 
to facilitate education in Amharic, teachers were transferred from Ethiopia to Eritrea, 
where they taught wearing army uniforms in a bid to intimidate the Eritrean students.
47
 
Eritrean teachers went on strike, officially to protest the discrepancy in salary between 
them and Ethiopian teachers, but underlying this was the growing discontent with the 
denial of any educational freedom, aimed at suppressing dissent or Eritrean nationalist 
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sentiments.
48
 Many Eritrean students and teachers started to sympathise with the ELF 
and either joined it in the field or became active in the clandestine activities it 
organized.
49
 The outbreak of large-scale military confrontations and the Ethiopian 
offensive in 1967 resulted in an increased number of students and teachers joining the 
ELF in the field.  
Not much changed in terms of education for the Eritreans under the new 
Revolutionary regime after 1974. It re-affirmed the key role of education in the 
development of the country and started a literacy campaign which went ‘well beyond 
the absorption capacity of the economy.’50 The ‘Red Terror’ of 1977-78 constituted the 
peak of harassment and violence against the educated, teachers and students all over 
Ethiopia. This period witnessed the incarceration and executions of thousands, amongst 
them many Eritreans that were accused of supporting the liberation movements.
51
 By 
1982, all schools in Eritrea, including private mission schools, were nationalized despite 
the fact that the Ethiopian government did not have the necessary financial means to 
maintain them. Besides, the Ethiopian approach to teaching was not conducive to the 
creation of a strong common political identity. Examining the history textbooks of 
grades nine to twelve used in Ethiopia during the 1980s, Negash reached the conclusion 
that ‘the chapter on Ethiopian history has virtually no relevance for nation-building’.52 
This exacerbated feelings of distinctiveness and the urge for independence within the 
Eritrean territories under Ethiopian control. At school, students were taught that Eritrea 
was an integral part of Ethiopia and had been so historically. The independence struggle 
was hardly mentioned and if the topic came up, the fighters were portrayed as traitors 
and bandits. However, through their parents and social networks they learned more 
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about the struggle.
53
 While the standard of education in the Ethiopian-controlled areas 
of Eritrea plummeted and often came to a halt due to the disruptive effects of the 
ongoing fighting between the Liberation Forces and the Ethiopian Army, many Eritrean 
students still considered their education standard considerably higher than in the rest of 
Ethiopia.
54
 
 
Unifying the masses through education? Education initiatives by the Liberation Fronts 
Recognizing the importance of education and its integrative force, the liberation 
movements quickly took over the task of education as part of their political programme 
in the field and in Eritrean refugee camps in Sudan. Many scholarly accounts have 
pointed out and analysed the education efforts made by the EPLF, based largely on 
personal visits to the field during the independence struggle.
55
 This might be due to the 
fact that after the expulsion of the ELF to Sudan, the EPLF remained the only 
movement providing education in the field; yet, it somehow obscures the fact that 
educational efforts were also made by the former, albeit to a lesser and probably also 
less organized extent. In fact, the political programmes of both fronts were strikingly 
similar after the ELF’s first organizational congress in October 1971 and included a 
campaign against illiteracy in recognition that ‘education is the basic necessity for 
development’.56  
Educational programmes by the ELF were created in the mid-1970s, yet their 
implementation only became possible from 1976 onwards due to the previous civil 
confrontations. The education offered by the ELF during the struggle included literacy 
for the rank and file, political education for the cadres, and elementary education for 
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children.
57
 While it is not clear whether the literacy campaign formed part of the basic 
military training of the fighters, most attended three-month literacy classes which were 
largely based on socialist literature translated from English, such as Marx and Mao Tse-
tung.
58
 Elementary education started in the Barka area with a small school of around 
thirty children who were taught reading and writing in both Arabic and Tigrinya.
59
 The 
mid-1970s had seen disagreement within the ELF regarding the question of languages 
of instruction. A small group had proposed the development of textbooks in the various 
local languages; however, Muslim members of the ELF that had gained their education 
abroad in Arab countries objected to this and the proposal never came to fruition.
60
 
Henceforth, textbooks and pamphlets were produced in Tigrinya and Arabic, the two 
languages ‘encouraged […] among the country’s nine ethnic groups’ by the ELF.61 A 
working group was formed within the Social Affairs division of the ELF, tasked with 
the development of a curriculum for the elementary and middle school level. By the 
early 1980s, more than 1300 children were taught up to seventh grade in ELF schools in 
Barka.
62
 Due to the circumstances in the field, classes mainly took place outside under 
trees and material for students was scarce. Great emphasis was placed on conveying the 
idea of an Eritrean nation based on the common colonial experience starting with the 
Italians, and educational content was deliberately devoid of regional or religious 
connotations.
63
 The curriculum developed by the working groups was used both inside 
the liberated areas and in refugee camps in Sudan. Many of the students and educators 
of the ELF went on to join a school for grades 7-12 established by the UNHCR in 
Kassala in 1977 (often referred to as ‘UNESCO school’).64 The expulsion of the ELF 
                                                          
57
 Interview with Jacob Abraham, Kassel, 06.07.2013. 
58
 Interview with Berhane Gh., Esslingen, 15.06.2013 and Interview with Berhe O., Ulm, 06.12.2013.  
59
 Interview with Jacob Abraham. 
60
 Ibid. 
61
 Dan Connell (1993), p. 90. 
62
 Interview with Jacob Abraham. 
63
 Ibid. and Interview with Abdelaziz Saleh, Frankfurt, 15.09.2013. 
64
 Ibid. 
282 
 
from Eritrea resulted in the cessation of its education efforts in the field but education 
continued in Kassala. While many of the ELF textbooks were destroyed during the civil 
war, it was asserted in interviews that the EPLF seized many of the materials and based 
their own textbooks on them while removing any reference to the ELF.
65
  
The educational policy of the EPLF appears, in fact, largely similar to that of the 
ELF. Yet, in line with the EPLF’s policy of not postponing social reforms until after 
independence was achieved, education aimed at the transformation of Eritrean society 
and was extended beyond the fighters. Furthermore, the EPLF adopted a language 
policy inclusive of local languages. While Tigrinya and Arabic, as the two national 
languages of Eritrea, were compulsory subjects primary education was held in the 
native languages of the respective communities. To this end, primary curricula were 
developed in languages such as Tigre, Kunama, Saho and Afar.
66
 This language policy 
had two aims: the conservation of the languages and cultures of the various 
communities and their unification by creating official languages without suppressing the 
native ones. 
Firebrace and Holland note that the first goal of EPLF’s education policy was to 
make the fighters literate and, according to them, that was achieved as early as 1972.
67
 
From 1976 onwards, education efforts were extended to civilians and became more 
organized with people in the liberated areas under EPLF control being required to 
participate in six hours of formal classes every day.
68
 The National Democratic 
Programme of the EPLF dedicated an entire chapter to the development of culture and 
education. The new educational curriculum was to ‘provide for the proper 
dissemination, respect and development of the history of Eritrea and its people, the 
struggle against colonialism, oppression and for national independence, the experience, 
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sacrifices and heroism as well as the national folklore, traditions and culture of the 
Eritrean people.’69 The fight against illiteracy was described as part of the liberation 
struggle with the aim to ‘free the Eritrean people from the darkness of ignorance’ that 
colonialism had left behind.
70
 To achieve this, education was declared compulsory up to 
middle school, and free at all levels and in all regions of Eritrea. Another important 
point was that education was to be separated from religion, in accordance with the 
secular nationalism promoted by the EPLF.
71
 
 
A department of political education, culture and education was established 
which was in charge of developing schoolbooks that were printed in the EPLF’s 
underground printing workshops. According to estimates presented to Firebrace and 
Holland during a visit to the EPLF’s printing section in the early 1980s ‘some 200,000 
copies of 72 different textbooks for EPLF schools, adult education classes and technical 
courses’ were produced.72 However, eye-witness reports and interviews on education at 
that time often mention that material was scarce and that books were predominantly 
used by the teachers who wrote the content on blackboards.
73
 Students not only studied 
subjects such as mathematics, geography and science, but also received general 
education on agriculture in order to make them self-sufficient in growing vegetables.
74
 
Aspects of hygiene and medical care were also taught from early on, in an attempt to 
bring basic knowledge of healthcare to the more remote areas of the country. Great 
importance was also placed on the teaching of Eritrean history and world civilization, 
all of which would help the child to acquire ‘a progressive spirit and love for his 
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country and his people.’75 The Italian colonial period was referred to as the time of the 
creation of Eritrea as a nation-state; yet, reference was also made to the pre-colonial 
times such as the period of the Medri Bahri and the occupation of Massawa by the 
Egyptians, thus emphasizing that Eritrea was an old nation with a long history of 
subjugation.
76
 The presentation of Eritrean history sought to emphasize the country’s 
historic distinctiveness from Ethiopia, but was also highly selectively. Haile Woldensae, 
in charge of the department of political education, culture and education, admitted that it 
isolated ‘that which is worthless, or which carr[ies] the message of the old economic 
order.’77  
The most important aspect of the educational programme was, however, political 
education, not only to instil revolutionary consciousness in the students but also to 
‘create a new and progressive society with a new culture.’78 The creation of a new 
culture was considered essential and closely linked to the EPLF’s concept of social 
revolution and, therefore, not limited to education in school. To reach the most people 
possible, songs and poems with revolutionary content were produced, using old forms 
and rhythms. As Haile Woldensae explained: 
 
We try to reach our people through those forms of communication which are not alien to them, 
but which are part of their daily life. Thus, for example, in villages where there is widespread 
illiteracy, political persuasion is done through songs, skits and plays, while, perhaps, where our 
people can read and write, we have reading sessions and discussion etc.
79
 
 
Hence, traditional folklore and culture were not really preserved but rather used to 
present ‘new wine in old bottles’. Speaking in terms of syncretistic nationalism, this 
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means that communities were not just used as building-blocks that could preserve their 
identity under an overarching national identity, their cultures and traditions were ‘filled’ 
with that newly created identity. As Woldensae himself admitted, this required a high 
level of indoctrination, achieved through education. In fact, the revolutionary songs, 
skits and plays also played an important role in the schools, inside and outside the 
territory. Former students interviewed all report that these constituted part of the 
‘national education’ and how evenings were filled with heroic and militaristic songs 
about Eritrea and its fighters.
80
  
In the literature, the Zero School is often referred to as a positive example of 
EPLF education, specifically with regard to the inclusion of females.
81
 This boarding 
school was established on 12 January 1976 to educate the children of fighters in the 
field and started with 265 students. By 1983, over 3000 students were being taught at 
elementary (five years) and middle (two years) school level.
82
 The school also included 
a branch specifically for nationalistic music and two former students interviewed noted 
that the songs taught and sung in the evenings all aimed at exciting fighters for the 
continuous struggle, promoting a commitment to the movement and comradeship 
amongst the fighters.
83
 One of the interviewees notes that commitment was created 
‘basically by brainwashing the students’,84 an observation also made by Kibreab. He 
notes that through political education, fighters were socialized ‘into unquestioning 
submission to the party’ and recruits from different backgrounds homogenized.85 One 
important aspect of this is that it was not inclusive of all Eritreans since it inculcated ‘a 
sense of superiority vis-à-vis all the other national, civil and political organizations.’86 
In fact, other movements such as the ELF were portrayed as enemies of the social 
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revolution and the unity of the Eritrean people, and solely blamed for the civil war 
between the liberation movements.
87
 Therefore, while the EPLF’s education policy was 
certainly inclusive of the various communities in the country, members of competing 
movements were excluded from the ‘us’ to an extent that turned them into another 
‘them’ alongside the Ethiopians. 
In 1983, the ELF launched the National Literacy Campaign aimed at eradicating 
illiteracy, especially amongst the rural population, and raising national consciousness. 
In total, 599 high level students from the Zero School and other teachers were assigned 
to 183 stations throughout the liberated areas.
88
 Due to external circumstances, such as 
offensives by the Dergue and periods of drought and famine, the programme became 
increasingly limited in 1984 and 1985. Still, the EPLF reported 24,000 students enrolled 
in 154 schools in Eritrea for the 1985-1986 school year.
89
 Despite its limitations, the 
campaign has to be considered a decisive success for the EPLF and, as Gottesman 
noted, it ‘gave the EPLF the chance to try out the curriculum they had developed in the 
“ups and downs of society”, in the various traditional cultures. And the curriculum 
worked. The same curriculum worked for combatants and civilians in the cities and in 
rural areas.’90 Its success during the struggle resulted in the curriculum being adopted 
unchanged after the independence of Eritrea. 
While the EPLF’s education efforts undeniably played an important role in 
reducing illiteracy in the country and in unifying the various religious and linguistic 
Eritrean communities, the often praised equality that was supposedly promoted by 
‘teaching its followers that every man and woman, Moslem and Christian, peasant and 
urban dweller, was equally valuable’91 has to be qualified by pointing to the exclusion 
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of political movements opposed to the EPLF and its political programme. 
 
 
LEBANON 
Education in pre-mandate and mandate Lebanon  
Prior to the establishment of the state of Greater Lebanon by the French in 1920, a 
network of private, mainly religious schools already existed in the territory. Christian 
missionary schools in particular had a long history in Mount Lebanon, stretching back 
to the 16
th
 century and linked to the affiliation of the Maronites with the Catholic 
Church and French Jesuits. As Farha noted, while concessions were made regarding the 
establishment of these early missionary schools during the Ottoman period, they were 
generally considered as ‘contesting loyalty to the central, officially Sunni Ottoman 
state.’92 The 19th century saw a further spread of American and European mission 
schools, catering to specific religious communities within the territory. While they did 
provide modern forms of schooling, they also ‘allowed for the beginnings of an 
increasingly sectarian institutionalisation of knowledge.’93 At the same time, explicitly 
secular and inter-confessional schools also emerged, often outside Western initiatives, 
most notably al-madrasa al-wataniya, al-madrasa al-‘’uthmaniya and the Madrasat al-
Hikma, all open to students of all denominations.
94
 With the Tanzimat reaffirming the 
rights of religious and private schools, they further proliferated despite attempts by the 
Ottoman authorities to regain control over the education sector. The religious 
communities propagated different readings of Lebanese history in their teaching which 
reflected the opposing nationalist aspirations that existed towards the end of the 
Ottoman Empire. Two teachers at the privately-run Sunni Maqasid College, Zaki 
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Nakkash and Omar Farrukh, published a history textbook for elementary schools, 
Tarikh Suriyah wa Lubnan (History of Syria and Lebanon), in which no specific 
Lebanese history was to be found; rather Lebanon was depicted as a historical part of 
Syria whose history formed part of Arab history in general. The Christian establishment 
in Lebanon had its own textbook prepared in which Lebanon did, indeed, have a very 
distinctive history separate from Syrian and Arab history.
95
 This competitive-like 
behaviour over the ‘correct’ history of Lebanon, and which version was to be taught in 
schools was mainly fought out between the Christians and the Sunni Muslims. Overall, 
while the general level of education in Lebanon on the eve of WWI had become the 
most developed in the Ottoman Empire, it was still largely limited to the urban and 
predominantly Christian elite.
96
 Within the territory of the autonomous region of Mount 
Lebanon only one public school existed prior to World War I, in the predominantly 
Druze city of ‘Abey. Therefore, it was the public schools maintained by the Ottoman 
government in the areas which were added to Mount Lebanon in 1920 that became ‘the 
nucleus of the new Lebanese public-school system’.97  
The terms of the mandate given to the French by the League of Nations made a 
point of education taking into consideration the religious diversity of the people in the 
territory. Referring to both Syria and Lebanon, the text of the mandate of 12 August 
1922 states in Article 8:  
 
The mandatory shall encourage public instruction, which shall be given through the medium of 
the native languages in use in the territory of Syria and the Lebanon. The right of each 
community to maintain its own schools for the instruction and education of its own members in 
its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the 
administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.
98
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Hence, while developing a curriculum with French and Lebanese scholars throughout 
the 1920s, the French authorities also adopted the institutionalized system of private 
schools largely divided along sectarian lines. French was instituted as an official 
language alongside Arabic, which also required the inclusion of French-language 
instruction into the curriculum. The American Legation in Beirut noted that, indeed, the 
French Administration ‘has been notorious throughout the period of the mandate’ in 
implementing ‘a policy to make Syria and Lebanon cultural dependencies of France.’99 
While questions relating to moral education were pretty much left to the family sphere, 
the curriculum promoted the positive role of France, and French poetry ‘was proposed 
as a means of promoting nationalism. This dismissed the chance to use Lebanese 
literature which was closer to the students’ cultural heritage than the French.’100 On the 
other hand, the curriculum stressed the necessity of unity and religious tolerance, and 
considered education in history as ‘a means of awakening and nourishing 
nationalism.’101 Frayha claims that, unlike most colonial powers, the French did not fear 
instilling nationalist feelings within the Lebanese population since the nationalist 
movement was not considered a threat to French interests. On the contrary, Maronite 
nationalists were viewed as sharing most French cultural values. For this reason, while 
the majority of history textbooks were written and published in French, they focused on 
the history of the Lebanese territory as propagated by the Maronites. Nonetheless, the 
American Legation observed that many native schools as well as those directly 
dependent on the French administration witnessed a high ‘indoctrination of French 
culture’ and many graduates ‘were deplorably ignorant of the history and geography of 
their native land and far too often virtually illiterate in their native language, Arabic.’102 
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While government schools generally followed the French education system, private 
sectarian schools largely followed the type of education of their respective foreign 
sponsors. As Antony D. Smith noted, curricula based on Western systems tended to be 
more ‘civic’ in character and viewed ‘education […] as much for the benefit of the 
national community as for the individual.’103 However, the application of different 
systems together with the different sectarian interpretations of history and national 
identity left private sectarian school sector highly diversified. 
The French made attempts to control this diversification, especially among the 
private schools, by expanding public schools and by introducing a more secular and 
unified education system. Yet, these attempts by High Commissioner Sarrail and 
Governor Cayla met with fierce resistance from the Maronite church that considered 
this system a fundamental threat to its own influence and to the Maronite community in 
general.104 Due to the strong opposition, very few of the proposed reforms were ever put 
into practice and, in fact, the dominant role of the religious communities in the 
educational sector was affirmed by Article 10 of the Lebanese Constitution of 1926:  
 
Education shall be free in so far as it is not contrary to public order and morals and does not 
affect the dignity of any of the religions or creeds [mathāhib]. There shall be no violation of the 
right of religious communities [tawā’if] to have their own schools, provided they follow the 
general rules issued by the state regulating public instruction.
105
 
 
 
In accordance with this, government decrees were issued in the following years 
regulating the requirements for opening and administering private schools, as well as 
regulations on the curricula and use of books.
106
 
It is no surprise that, the Lebanese government having vetoed the expansion of 
public schools, only seven percent of the budget was devoted to public education. At the 
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same time, the number of private schools increased to 1,342.
107
 Since most of the 
private and foreign schools were run and attended by Christians, it was mainly Muslims 
and those of the more underprivileged classes that were attracted by the governmental 
institutions. According to Farha, 83 percent of students in public schools were Muslim, 
and only 13 percent Christians.
108
 The fact that the lower Muslim classes increasingly 
had access to education contributed to their rising political consciousness and, to a 
certain extent, contributed to the changing dynamics of the country. Primary and 
secondary education was also extended to both sexes, following a process that had 
started during the nineteenth century and formalized during the Ottoman Empire by the 
1913 law on education which made school attendance for both sexes compulsory and 
free for at least the primary level.
109
 In 1924, the French mandate also facilitated female 
access to higher education by officially allowing the American University of Beirut 
(AUB) to accept female students into its Liberal Arts programme.
110
 Although female 
attendance of educational institutes increased over the following years, it still had to be 
considered as unsatisfactory by the late 1960s, especially in the rural, predominantly 
Muslim areas.
111
 
  
Consolidation of sectarian education after independence  
When Lebanon achieved independence in 1943, the new government 
automatically gained full authority over the education sector: private schools, mostly of 
a sectarian nature, constituted the single largest group, making up 60.3 percent of 
schools and 49.4 percent of enrolments in 1944-45.
112
 Since schools were considered 
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‘the best soil to cultivate virtues and tolerance’ and to foster national cohesion among 
the coexisting communities the new government quickly started measures to centralize 
the educational system and gain control over private schools.
113
 Government efforts 
resulted in the curriculum of 1946, developed by educators at the re-organized Ministry 
of Education. A decree was also passed making Arabic compulsory in all private 
schools and requiring them to follow the official course of study. Yet, the addition that 
directors ‘may choose to employ techniques of teaching that they see fit’114 watered 
down the impact of the decree and the curriculum. Textbooks for history, geography, 
moral civics and ‘patriotic subjects’ had to be approved by the Ministry of Education, 
and the use of banned textbooks was to be punished by severe measures including the 
closing of schools.
115
 In 1949, a Textbook Committee was created, headed by the 
General Director of the Ministry of Education, in order to decide on the suitability of 
textbooks. Frayha claims that this was meant as ‘an accommodation between the 
principle of free education and the urgent need of national unity and orientation.’116
 
In 
addition to strengthening the status of Arabic and gaining greater control over the 
private education sector, the 1946 curriculum also put a stronger emphasis on 
citizenship education, starting at the second year of pre-elementary school level by 
‘nurturing the children with the love of their homeland through stories’.117 At the 
elementary level this was to become more concrete, for example by using books with 
pictures of the Lebanese flag and map in the second year.
118
 This use of the map and 
placing Lebanon in its surroundings was meant to enforce an important point made in 
the rationale of the curriculum: to make students aware of the position of Lebanon with 
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regard to the neighbouring Arab states on the one hand and the West on the other.
119
 
Special consideration was given to the teaching of history since it was considered ‘the 
most useful study to enhance patriotic affection and national pride.’120 In the same way, 
great importance was placed on ethics and civic education with the aim of making the 
child ‘grow up loving his country, taking pride in it’ and ultimately to gain a 
consciousness of ‘sacrificing himself for its [the country’s] dignity’.121 In his detailed 
evaluation of the 1946 social studies curriculum, Frayha comes to the conclusion that 
the effort of emphasizing all aspects of Lebanese life in order to create and promote 
nationalism actually ignored the fact that Lebanon was indeed a pluralistic society and 
was based on the assumption ‘that the society could become homogenous with minimal 
willingness and effort.’122 Therefore, this curriculum has to be considered as working 
directly against any form of syncretistic nationalism that would consider communities 
as building blocks of the nation that maintain their identity while transferring loyalty to 
an overarching, more civic national identity. 
The curriculum actually left enough space for the various schools, which in the 
first decades of independence showed a willingness to implement the official 
educational policy, to emphasize whichever aspect they wanted to at the expense of the 
others. Not surprisingly, religious schools emphasized religion in order to strengthen 
their denomination. This, in turn, enhanced sectarian interests being placed over 
national interests.
123
 In fact, evaluating the Lebanese educational system in 1949, 
Roderic and Akrawi came to the conclusion that ‘[i]t can perhaps be safely said that the 
schools help to perpetuate […] cleavages, if not make them more pronounced.’124 
Private sectarian schools continued to flourish despite efforts to strengthen 
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governmental education and to enforce a unified curriculum. It was not before 1951 that 
the first comprehensive public school was opened and the first state university 
established and so, with the exception of primary education, the monopoly on education 
was left in the hands of foreign and/or private schools. Furthermore, the sectarian 
system was also widely accepted within Lebanese society, so that the choice of school 
remained ‘to a large extent determined by sectarian considerations.’125 This did not 
necessarily mean that children were always sent to schools run by their own 
denomination. The choice was often also guided by the economic situation of families 
or which foreign system the school followed. In such cases, secular schools were often 
chosen since the deciding factor then became ‘the absence or minimum of 
proselytization.’126 
When the less-privileged Muslim communities, who for financial reasons largely 
had to send their children to public schools, began to ask for an abolition of the 
sectarian system in the early 1950s, the aspect of education was crucial to them. Point 
nine of a Muslim manifesto demanded:  
 
Cessation of the printing, distribution and use of text books for government schools which 
propagate Lebanese history and sociology from the exclusive viewpoint of one sect to the 
excusion [sic] of equal prominence for Arabism and the viewpoints of the other groups and 
sects.
127 
 
 
In addition, the group claimed that government support was given only to Christian 
private schools, but not to those of the Muslim communities, and foreign scholarships 
were exclusively given to Christian citizens. Such treatment was considered as 
especially unfair since the need for assistance was considerably higher among the 
Muslim communities. The manifesto came to the conclusion that the government policy 
regarding education was abused by the regime which was ‘uninterested in seeing 
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progress or betterment for its Moslem citizens.’128  
The lack of a proper, unified educational system was partly held responsible for 
negative developments resulting from the lack of social cohesion in Lebanon. Referring 
to the 1958 crisis, Bustani claimed that ‘[s]ome system of compulsory schooling would 
have given the younger generation a natural sense of patriotism which would have 
prevented so many of its members from seeking political inspiration from beyond their 
national borders.’129 In fact, the education system in place certainly exacerbated their 
feeling of being discriminated against and economically deprived compared to the 
Lebanese Christian community that facilitated the growing influence of Nasser and Pan-
Arabism on the younger generation of Lebanese Muslims. 
 
 
Education towards civil war 
The 1960s and 1970s saw an impressive expansion of the education sector, both 
governmental and private. During this, the private religious schools remained the most 
attractive to students, followed by non-religious private schools. Socio-economic 
differences that became more and more polarized throughout the 1960s and 1970s were 
highlighted by which school students attended. The end of the 1960s constituted the 
high tide of public schools, yet they still only enrolled 39 percent of Lebanese students. 
Their quality had increased considerably, however, and Farha claims they ‘were able to 
compete with the best of private schools,’130 which remained mainly frequented by 
children from higher social classes.  
Therefore, as Hanf concluded in his comprehensive study on Lebanese 
education, by the end of the 1960s the education system in Lebanon largely mirrored the 
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many rifts and divisions of Lebanese society, both religious and social.
131
 Furthermore, 
the dominating private religious schools continued their tendency to ‘induce or affirm 
[…] a feeling of “differentness” from the other groups in the country’ and contributed to 
the creation or reinforcement of ‘already present jealousies and animosities among their 
graduates.’132 While this assertion by Suleiman mainly referred to private schools for 
the Maronite denomination, one respondent to the questionnaires who attended an 
American-sponsored private religious school for Muslims in the late 1960s noted that 
her education ‘never emphasized our being Lebanese’ and that Lebanon was rather 
perceived as ‘being a country for the Christians’ in which Muslims were 
marginalized.
133
 On the other hand, a Shi
c
a Muslim respondent who attended a private 
Catholic school in the 1960s explicitly stated that ‘going to a Christian school made me 
more understanding and comfortable with people from different sects.’134 It can 
probably be asserted that it was the exposure to students of different denominations that 
facilitated the comfort with religious co-existence rather than the content of the 
curriculum. Overall, those questionnaire respondents who went to mixed secular 
schools all stated that their educational experience helped to shape their perception of 
Lebanese identity as multi-communal, while those attending private religious schools 
largely point to their contact with people of other denominations outside school and 
their upbringing at home as being responsible for instilling in them the value of co-
existence.
135
 
The social pressures created by the increase of public schools and the continuing 
dominance of private religious schools led to a growing debate over the reform of the 
education sector amongst all denominations and resulted in the revised curriculum of 
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1968-71.
136
 In accordance with the political atmosphere at this time, the new curriculum 
placed a greater emphasis on Arabism than the 1946 curriculum. This mirrored the 
strength pan-Arabism had gained at the expense of Lebanese nationalism because of the 
growing influence of Lebanon’s Muslim community. Examining the teaching of history 
at the secondary level makes this very obvious. According to the new curriculum, no 
precedence was given to the Phoenician civilization, and more importance was placed 
on the history of the Arab world than on the history of Lebanon itself.
137
 The new 
elementary education curriculum intended social studies courses ‘to mould the student 
into a good citizen through moral and social education as well as geographical and 
historical knowledge. The teacher […] should help to develop patriotism among his 
students.’138 Yet the civics curriculum for the elementary level was merely an 
introduction to the Lebanese political system, and as it did not promote any sort of 
discussion of democratic principles it rather inhibited the development of an active 
citizenship.  
Over time, the production of new textbooks reflected the ongoing discourse on 
Lebanese identity and history, often avoiding touching upon contentious issues 
concerning the history of the country. The governmental development plan for the 
period 1972 to 1977 included an article on education in the country. It reads as follows:  
 
The principal aim of education is to develop the individual’s capabilities and humanitarian 
aspects in order to prove himself and regain his dignity and freedom (!). Another educational aim 
has a special interest in Lebanon, that is, preparing the good citizen. True education is the best 
means to get rid of this torn situation from which the Lebanese are suffering.
139
 
 
 
Yet in 1973 civics was actually removed from the secondary social studies curriculum 
since students had started interpreting ‘all institutional activities according to their 
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ideologies.’140 Instead, the number of hours for religious education was increased.  
Bashur asserts that there may have been some links between the expansion of 
government education and the outbreak of the hostilities in the mid-1970s.
141
 While this 
appears hard to prove, it can be stated that the increase contributed to a growing 
awareness of the lesser privileged Muslim communities that started demanding more 
equality and a fairer representation in the state. Most notably the consciousness of the 
Shi
c
a increased around the same time, and Imam Musa Sadr made a point of equality in 
education. During his speech announcing the launch of the Harakat al-Mahrumin he 
strongly denounced the denial of education to Lebanon’s Muslim citizens and noted that 
there was actually only one government school in Ba’albek and it dated back to the 
mandate period.
142
 The Supreme Shi
c
ite Islamic Council said that the state should take 
over the responsibility for religious education while stressing the need for free, unified 
education:  
 
An over-all educational plan should be drawn up to assure that the youth in the various schools 
receive a unified, responsible, sensible education which will take care to impart instruction in the 
national and Arab heritage.
143
 
 
 
In fact, the strong Arab character of a unified educational programme and textbooks for 
Lebanon was specifically emphasized.  
The Permanent Congress of Superiors General of the Lebanese Monastic 
Orders and the Maronite League brought up the necessity of reforming the educational 
sector as well. However, no mention was made of the need for unified curricula and 
textbooks. On the contrary, the paper reaffirmed the special role of private education 
and the assurance of the freedom of education as guaranteed by the constitution. While 
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it asserted that ‘[e]ducational reform must be focused on common goals which bring 
together the various human, national, professional, spiritual and cultural aspects’144 this 
left enough room for interpretation. Also, no mention was made of Arab history and/or 
culture; rather the educational programme ‘must be related to world culture’.145 Such 
statements have to be considered part of a trend labelled ‘cultural pluralism’ that had 
started in the mid-1970s. Despite the new label, this trend remained based on the 
traditional divisive concept of sectarian education.
146
  
Any debate surrounding educational reforms, however, quickly came to an end 
with the outbreak of hostilities.  
 
Education during the civil war  
The descent into civil war, the breakdown of the state and the virtual fragmentation of 
the country into militia districts resulted in the increase of sectarian schools. Instead of 
reforms, students’ lives were repeatedly interrupted by fighting, school buildings being 
destroyed or militias and displaced people occupying facilities. The academic year 
1975-1976 was cancelled altogether due to the fighting in most of Lebanon. As the 
questionnaires reveal, students not only had their education interrupted but most of the 
respondents also had to change school several times due to relocations related to the 
conflict.
147
 While during the first phase of the war, students were still able to attend 
schools of different denominations, respondents also noted that the civil war ‘divided 
Lebanon more or less according to religion’ and this started to be reflected in the 
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composition of students in schools in the later phases of the conflict.
148
 
These things were, however, out of the control of the state that had largely 
broken down. Throughout the civil war no legislative acts concerning social studies and 
citizenship education were passed. While a memorandum in 1981 recommended the use 
of Red Cross educational material, this did not seem to have been put into practice. 
However, Frayha points out that the Ministry of Education of the virtually demised 
central state made some attempts ‘to revive patriotism and a sense of nationhood among 
the Lebanese youth’ through the recommendation of cultural activities at the schools 
such as flag day and independence day.
149
 Students were also encouraged to raise the 
Lebanese flag at home; yet it does not seem that these attempts were successful in the 
highly politicized and militarized environment during the civil war. Such activities were 
also not mentioned by any of the questionnaire respondents.  
 As Salibi pointed out, the civil war was in many ways also a war over the correct 
history of the country, and the lack of a uniform textbook on Lebanese history in order 
to effectively educate Lebanese children as citizens of the country was an issue 
recognized and discussed throughout the various stages of the civil war and the 
production of such a textbook was considered essential to achieve a solution to the 
conflict.
150
 While the competition over the ‘correct history’ had been played out mainly 
between the Maronite and the Sunni Muslim communities, the Shi
c
a and the Druze 
communities had increasingly entered the discussion as well. Since 1983, the Druze 
leader Walid Jumblatt had ‘repeatedly declared that the rewriting of the Lebanese 
history textbooks was a necessary precondition for any lasting political settlement in 
Lebanon, if not the primary one’ and asked for the removal of ‘all the Christian-
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fabricated myths.’151 In the absence of a working central state, he took matters into his 
own hands in the predominantly Shuf mountains under his control. The curriculum was 
rewritten ‘in keeping with the political ethos of the Druze community’, and a new 
version of history introduced for instruction in Druze schools.
152
 Most importantly 
though, and surely contributing to aggravate already existing cleavages, was the 
different way in which national symbols were dealt with. Salibi notes that students in 
Druze schools ‘no longer honoured the Lebanese banner and national anthem, nor did 
they defer in any way to the state as a matter of principle.’153 He ascribes this to the fact 
that the Lebanese republic was considered as congruent with the official version of 
Lebanese history and, as such, only serving the Maronite community. The opposite 
trend was noticed in Sunni schools around Beirut where the official government 
curriculum was strictly adhered to, and specifically the schools run by the Maqasid 
Society in Beirut emphasized the upholding of established Lebanese national symbols 
and traditions. Salibi notes that this was an important factor in the disintegrating 
country, and it has to be considered especially remarkable since the Maqasid College 
had been the centre of opposition to the official Lebanese historical narrative in the 
early 1930s.
154
 
The issue of education also played a role in the Ta’if agreement that finally 
ended the civil war in 1989. However, it was relegated to a place under the heading of 
‘Other Reforms’ where earlier agreements and documents concerning education were 
merely reaffirmed. On the one hand that was consistent with the rest of the agreement 
since it, in general, basically constituted a reaffirmation of the 1943 National Pact. On 
the other hand it meant that with the postponement of a durable solution yet another 
contentious issue within the Lebanese system was left in limbo. While private education 
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remained ‘protected’, the agreement also stated that ‘state control over private schools 
and textbooks shall be strengthened.’155 The existing curricula should be reviewed and 
‘developed in a manner that strengthens national belonging, fusion, spiritual and 
cultural openness, and that unifies textbooks on the subjects of history and national 
education.’156 This rather vague statement did not differ much from previous ones 
concerned with the education system in the country and lacked any precise suggestions 
for reform.  
 
CONCLUSION  
Modern education in both Eritrea and Lebanon was first introduced by 
missionary institutions and initially not under the firm control of a central government. 
During the colonial/mandate period, religious institutions continued to play an 
important role despite the existence of a strong, central state. Aside from the content of 
education working towards the inculcation of the dominating European power’s culture, 
this contributed to enhancing cleavages largely based on religious lines and related 
concepts of a sense of belonging. Hence, when the period of European domination 
ended, an educational system and a unified curriculum was needed that would be 
inclusive of all communities in the territory, while taking over the role of socializing 
students as citizens of the territorial entity by promoting an overarching civil, national 
identity. In Eritrea, such was created through the UN resolution and with the help of the 
British administration before the territory became an autonomous unit federated with 
Ethiopia. However, the experience of this system and curriculum was short-lived due to 
Ethiopian undermining and finally annexation that resulted in the Ethiopian system, 
curriculum and language being imposed on Eritrean students. Soon after the beginning 
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of the liberation struggle, the task of education was taken up by the liberation 
movements in the liberated areas. While the newly developed system and curriculum 
did ultimately promote cohesion between the various socio-linguistic, ethnic and 
religious communities, it was solely designed by the dominating EPLF and largely used 
for political indoctrination, which included the demonizing of any political opposition, 
thereby creating new cleavages. The sovereign government of independent Lebanon, on 
the other hand, presented a unified curriculum but, at the same time, failed to create a 
unified educational system or to strictly implement the new curriculum, especially in the 
private religious schools. Consequently, the system continued to reflect existing 
cleavages and this was exacerbated during the civil war.  
Therefore, while the educational systems that had developed certainly have to be 
credited with reducing illiteracy, especially in the case of Eritrea, and the promotion of a 
sense of belonging to the territorial entity, neither was inclusive truly inclusive of all 
parts of their society. The fact that no unified and standardized education creating a 
cohesive national identity had been established certainly contributed to the outbreak of 
civil conflict to a certain extent. In addition, the conflict turned the educational sector 
into an area of contestation over domination which was detrimental for establishing a 
system promoting syncretistic nationalism.  
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CONCLUSION 
Drawing together the experiences of the two cases researched attests to the difficulty of 
developing and realising a national identity based on the concept of syncretistic 
nationalism in postcolonial, multi-communal states. As the various lenses used to look 
at the development of national identity formation have shown, a development from 
positions strongly marked by religious cleavages and correlated opposed definitions of 
identity towards a more civic understanding of national identity occurred in both Eritrea 
and Lebanon despite their different circumstances.  
 By the end of the European domination of Eritrea, two opposed nationalist 
aspirations had emerged that, due to the international decision on the future status of the 
territory, did not have to find a mode of reconciliation within an independent state but 
rather in an autonomous unit federated with Ethiopia. Although a system of power-
sharing was established that could have allowed a syncretistic nationalism to develop, 
the dismantling of the federation and final annexation of the territory by Ethiopia 
resulted in the Eritrean people establishing a concept of Eritrean national identity in the 
context of their struggle for independence from Ethiopia. The fact that the Eritrean right 
to self-determination was repudiated not only by the Ethiopian state but also by the 
international community at large, gave rise to a strong emphasis on self-reliance. 
Furthermore, the absence of a state structure and a political system within which 
Eritrean identity could be defined and developed led to the evolution of a concept of 
identity based on the territorial entity created by the former colonial power of Italy and 
the system envisioned for a liberated Eritrea. In order to facilitate the establishment of a 
transcending national identity, considered specifically relevant to enforce claims to self-
determination, communities were deliberately depoliticized. This corresponds to the 
form of syncretistic nationalism that is generally described as potentially more 
successful. However, it was achieved through indoctrination and the stripping of 
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traditional cultures and traditions of their content and, in an attempt to secure monopoly 
over power within the liberation movement and the future independent state, political 
opposition was violently suppressed which resulted in the creation of new cleavages.  
In Lebanon, on the other hand, a form of syncretistic nationalism was 
implemented that combined power-sharing with institutionalized sectarianism. Thus, 
religious communities were highly politicized which, together with the system’s 
inflexibility with regard to demographic changes, created a constant source of conflict. 
The depoliticization of the communities that could have opened the way to stronger 
political unity of the state was prevented by the fact that the Maronite community and 
its foreign supporters, decisively strengthened by the system, constantly insisted on the 
reaffirmation of the system due to their fear of losing influence and power. While these 
approaches to nation-building on the elite level appear rather detrimental to the 
development of a cohesive national identity, this thesis has also shown that a will to live 
together and a sense of belonging to the same ‘imagined’ national community has, 
indeed, developed in both countries.  
What is conclusive is that a syncretistic nationalism does, indeed, appear to be 
the concept most likely to facilitate co-existence and the development of a national 
identity that does not infringe on the generally more deeply rooted and emotionally 
loaded sense of belonging to a subnational community. However, this overarching 
identity, based on civic rather than ethnic, cultural or religious principals, needs to also 
provide symbols and myths that can evoke at least the same level of emotional appeal as 
identities based on the latter in order to not become submerged in times of crisis and/or 
conflict. Furthermore, in countries with an almost even division between the main 
communities such as Eritrea and Lebanon, a democratic system of power-sharing is 
needed that is flexible enough to adapt to demographic changes and does not give 
predominance to either side. It appears that the periods under common administration 
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and, in the case of Eritrea, common subjugation, had already created the will to live 
together and the imagination of belonging to one single community amongst the people. 
Yet, appropriate still had to be taken on the elite level to transfer this into a viable and 
democratic political system, otherwise both countries will remain susceptible to internal 
disaffections and the negative impact of the rather instable regional environment.   
Therefore, in both countries the process of national identity formation could not 
be considered conclusive by the beginning of the 1990s and both faced similar tasks 
with regard to demilitarizing the society and creating an atmosphere of reconciliation 
between all communities and/or political organizations. Furthermore, a relationship with 
the regional neighbours had to be established that would not be detrimental to the 
internal stability of the country and/or evoke the reappearance of old sentiments of 
bonds with the neighbouring entity. In the case of Eritrea, the commonly experienced 
suppression and violence by the Ethiopian state not only facilitated unity with regard to 
opposition to Ethiopian control but resulted in breaking Ethiopian hegemony in the 
region by realizing military victory; and due to cooperation with the movements which 
were to form the new regime in Addis Ababa the newly independent state of Eritrea 
managed to establish a new relationship with the former dominant country. With Eritrea 
treated as an equal partner, and both countries acknowledging the need for economic 
cooperation and regional stability, the question of granting Ethiopia access to the sea no 
longer constituted an issue.
 
In Lebanon, on the other hand, the fragility of national 
identity had left the country vulnerable to foreign manipulation and intervention, which 
resulted in neighbouring Syria establishing a decisive influence, even domination, over 
the country. In fact, post-war Lebanon’s strong dependence on Syria decisively 
impacted its ability to act as an independent and sovereign state.  
Furthermore, the existing national consciousness also had to prove its resilience 
in the face of the challenges ahead of both countries. In Eritrea, the main problems were 
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linked to the need for massive reconstruction work, effective institution-building and 
the establishment of a pluralist and democratic system. The last point was of major 
importance since it not only referred to the crucial question of whether Eritrean society 
would be able to maintain political pluralism but also contained the necessity of 
addressing the strictly hierarchical and autocratic structure developed by the EPLF. 
While the development of this structure and the suppression of internal opposition 
during the independence struggle were justified by the fear of weakening the struggle 
through disunity, the disappearance of the common enemy rendered them obsolete in 
the independent polity. The new context required finding a new basis for and 
establishment of an inclusive political system which would tolerate and be able to 
contain all the existing internal differences. In addition, Eritrea also had to face the 
challenge of the sense of isolation and mistrust it had developed during the struggle. 
While the relationship with Ethiopia was quickly established, and suspicion of the 
international community, specifically Western powers, persisted and influenced 
reconstruction efforts decisively as foreign aid was largely refuted. In Lebanon, the 
main challenges, in addition to Syrian dominance, were linked to the question of the 
solidity of the national feeling developed during the war, and the likeliness of it 
transcending to the elite level. The majority of the people were desirous of peaceful co-
existence and were largely ready to accept a political system based on power-sharing. 
Yet the fact that the Ta’if agreement merely re-affirmed the sectarian system based on 
the 1943 National Pact without any modification carried the danger of the elites simply 
returning to their pre-war power politics. Since the system was, again, affirmed to be 
only of a temporary nature, the agreement did not include any mechanisms to take into 
account demographic changes in the country either since the National Pact, or in the 
future. Furthermore, it did not provide for any process of reconciliation, an essential 
element in a post-civil war environment. Unlike Eritrea, Lebanon’s prolonged conflict 
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was largely inter-communal and even intra-communal at times. Without any 
reconciliation it appeared questionable whether the common desire for peace would be 
strong enough to overcome memories of atrocities committed by co-nationals, and to 
build the trust necessary for a strong national cohesive feeling. 
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